Thread by @snekotron

Reading about the Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts of 1979 through the 1980s, one can’t help but get a sense of déjà vu. In fact the prelude with the buildup in 1979 eerily echoes the current special military operation. /1

And once the fighting was underway, talk of the war was subdued, without even public displays in the PRC for supporting the troops. The operation had to be limited in scale and time so as to not attract outside attention, especially from Vietnam’s ally, the USSR. /2

Ostensibly, the reason for the intervention was to halt Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, but there were deeper motivations, such as the Sino-Soviet tensions (Mao split over destalinization), the historical problems with Vietnam’s relationship with its larger neighbor, and /3

The repression and expulsion of the Hoa (Chinese ancestry) minority in Vietnam. Because the Hoa were overwhelmingly represented in South Vietnamese small business (petit bourgeoisie), “de-kulakization” in Vietnam had a nasty ethnic component. /4

You can already see where the parallels are, but it gets better. Prior to the invasion, Vietnamese intelligence consistently downplayed the Chinese threat and were convinced that there would be no attack. The attack was launched on Feb. 17, 1979. /5

One of the key differences between this “Special Military Operation” and the current SMO was the time constraint. It was only slated to last one month, because Vietnam was a formal ally of the USSR and threatened to get the USSR involved. /6

Retrospective analyses generally play up the experience and grit of the Vietnamese defenders, but his where another odd parallel surfaces. Where have we heard this before? Brave guerrilla fighters holding out against impossible odds. /7

In the war with the Americans, guerrilla tactics were a means of keeping forces in the field. In general, they didn’t have much staying power due to their lack of heavy weapons and could not really dictate results on the battlefield. /8

The results of less than 3 weeks of fighting bore that out. Basically every single city that the PLA attacked was taken, including 3 provincial capitals, in just days of fighting, with defenders suffering proportionately greater casualties together with unfortunate civilians. /9

But Vietnam was perfectly aware of what these tactics could and couldn’t do. This is why the best forces (including air force) were consciously kept in operational reserve around Hanoi and only local units were thrown in platoon and co. sized elements into the path of the PLA./10

Ultimately it was the combination of the PLA’s own time constraints, the threat of Soviet response, and Vietnam’s own intact reserves capable of counterattacking that brought this SMO to an end. On March 5th, Beijing announced the end of combat operations and withdrew. /11

Out of a force of 320k deployed by the PLA, some 22k were casualties, ~7k KIA. Which for 3 weeks of combat was a very high number. There are no accurate figures for the Vietnamese side, but 3 entire provinces had been subject to “scorched earth tactics.” /12

Hastily organized militia and armed civilians, fighting largely without the support of regular forces, would have suffered tremendously. POW totals hint at the direction of the results: 1636 POWs held by China vs. only 238 held by Vietnam. All were exchanged together in June. /13

It was a victory for Vietnam, but it was a costly one. Vietnam was forced to maintain a mobilization posture at a time when the economy was just recovering from the war against the US. Not only was it deployed in Cambodia but had to deal with China and destroyed provinces. /14

For China, the war exposed many of the shortcomings of the PLA which basically received no upgrades since the late-50s. In a way that might be familiar to followers of the current SMO. Debate inside the PLA highlighted a laundry list of inadequacies… /15

The difficulty of coordinating maneuver over difficult terrain, the lack of airpower, outdated maps, and the inadequacy and vulnerability of logistics convoys. All this was brought up then. After this, there was an increasing technology focus in the PLA. /16

The shortcomings of the PLA’s equipment spurred R&D in the nascent Chinese defense industrial complex, growing in size and capability with the economic reforms. Vietnam and China fought again a number of times in the 1980s, and the pattern is again a familiar one. /17

After the operation of 1979, China just leveraged its artillery advantage to control the border by pounding any would-be incursion with massed fire. In one 20 km2 patch of Hà Giang Province, some 2 million artillery rounds landed between 1984 and 1989. /18

One study of the early 1990s concludes: “The war was most successful when seen as a tactic in China’s strategy of a protracted war of attrition.” And here we are 30 years later talking about the attrition of an artillery war. /19

Ultimately, Vietnam and China normalized relations. Vietnam pulled out of Cambodia, and China pulled its forces back from the border, and despite occasional issues both countries seem to be down with the business of doing business. /20

Sadly, I don’t think this kind of relatively amicable result can happen from the current SMO between Russia and Ukraine. Active hostilities between China and Vietnam was short and limited consciously by both sides. /21

Ukraine, however, is heading up the escalation ladder on a path that will ensure demographic catastrophe, where it’s likely a significant portion of families in what’s left of Ukraine will be “baptized by blood,” ensuring that there will be no reconciliation. /22 END

Addendum: Soviet advisors actually told the Vietnamese that light infantry was incapable of holding back the PLA's advance and that they needed to maintain a reserve force around Hanoi, which they did with emergency reinforcements sent back from Cambodia.