I’ve recommended “Ukraine vs. Darkness” by @olex_scherba before but just have to emphasise again how insightful it is for everyone who wants to understand 🇺🇦.
Its greatest merit is how painfully it shows that the Ukrainian perspective has been lacking in Western discourses
The book came out in 2021 so it doesn’t include the latest Russian invasion. Nevertheless every chapter is so full of truth. All of it was there for anyone to see but we looked away.
It deeply saddens me that e.g. this narrative is still floating around, after all 🇷🇺 has done
Or how many people totally bought the Russian - absolutely ridiculous - smokescreen of oppression of Russian-speakers
Or the narrative of “separatism” in Eastern Ukraine. Or that the annexation of Crimea by Russia was a bloodless occasion.
Putin did copy quite many things from Hitler’s playbook so no wonder all of NCEE sees parallels to WWII, not to WWI (like France and Germany)
Or here: Ukraine wasn’t “anti-Russian” until 🇷🇺 made it so.
Same with Finland. Some ppl buy the 🇷🇺 view that 🇫🇮 is causing tensions by joining NATO. But 🇫🇮 was an almost ridiculously good and considerate neighbour to 🇷🇺 until now. 🇷🇺 just has a way of antagonising its neighbours
Last but not least: it’s a fact that the West, or at least large parts of it, have been constantly prioritising its relations with Russia over Ukraine. It’s very, very sad that it took a full-scale invasion by Russia to change that - and even that change is not even complete
This is the book for everyone who asked !
P.S. have to add this quote: it’s indeed incredible how many people - not only in Russia - think that the US is behind everything that somehow goes against Russia. I keep reading and hearing takes that the US forced Finland and Sweden to join NATO too. It’s just 🤯🤯🤯
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Yes, the chancellery seems to be very consistent in its risk assessment that supporting Ukraine remains the riskier option, as it might bring us closer to the nuclear threshold if Ukraine can eliminate Russian ability to attack too effectively.
Conversely, it suggests that if Ukraine were to lose this war, it would be deeply regrettable, but at least a nuclear war would be averted.
Why this logic is flawed is fairly obvious: giving in to nuclear blackmail isn’t going to help non-proliferation efforts
As @drfranksauer & I argued in a response to @tobiaspfella, a risk assessment must consider also the risks of failing to support Ukraine. Apart from Berlin, this concern prevails in most European capitals. At least anywhere close to the Russian border. ipg-journal.de/rubriken/ausse…
Europe has recently woken up to the threat posed by Russian hybrid warfare aiming to weaken the West by different means below the threshold of armed conflict, such as sabotage and GPS jamming.
Russia has been cultivating its hybrid toolbox over the past decade(s) with almost no consequences, as European countries have been reluctant to attribute even blatant cases for the sake of “good relations” until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine 2022.
The Nordic-Baltic region, due to geographical proximity, has been subjected to Russian interference to a particularly high degree - even to the point where GPS jamming and air space violations have become everyday occurrences and tolerated as such.
It’s possible to understand France even without understanding French (although we should ofc all strive to learn the magnificent language 😉).
Most things about French strategic thinking and nuclear doctrine are pretty straightforward. 🧵
However, the obvious flaw in the system is the same principle that is also its strength: the strong centralisation of decision-making power in the presidency.
Despite all the solid policy work in the ministries, the president can unilaterally undermine France’s credibility.
If the president gets a great idea at 2am and decides to go on national morning radio with it, the people in the administration hear about it on the radio like every other citizen.
Mr. Macron has a lot of ideas that may make sense to him but that appear self-contradictory.
Q about other Nordic CHODs’ warnings about timelines for a Russian attack on NATO & why he isn’t issuing similar warnings: “they say it’s a possibility. Of course it’s always a possibility, but the question is its probability”
Jaakkola continues that he doesn’t think a Russian attack on NATO is *probable* in the near future. He doesn’t consider a similar wake-up call necessary in Finland as Finnish defence thinking has always included the *possibility* of a Russian attack and 🇫🇮 is therefore prepared
On Ukraine, Jaakkola says that the general speculation is a new large summer offensive by Russia to reach an as good as possible military situation to then start pushing for political talks about Ukraine’s and the West’s concessions.
The Finnish security and intelligence service is giving the annual press conference.
Overall assessment: Finland’s security environment has changed fundamentally and for good. There is no going back to status quo ante (with Russia).
Overall, Russian intelligence activities have decreased in Finland since 2022 due to countermeasures, such as expelling of known intelligence officers and visa restrictions.
Cyber threats and threats against critical infrastructure, especially maritime, have increased
“Russia has been the main subject of our work throughout our (75 years of) existence. It’s great to be able to say it out loud now” says the Finnish intelligence service officer.
There’s no going back indeed, the genie is out of the bottle