Research Fella @FIIA_fi | @cepa fellow | senior fellow @freeworldforum. Plot twist: not from Åland. Rants my own. 📸 Arno Mikkor/ICDS
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Nov 10 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
Ich hoffe sehr, dass sich das Denken und der Ton in Deutschland nach dem Ampel-Aus ändert, was eine Lösung für die Ukraine angeht.
Die Berichte über die Idee eines „finnischen Modells“ der Neutralität wie im kalten Krieg wurden in Finnland mit großer Bestürzung aufgenommen.
In diesem Thread sammle ich die wichtigsten Reaktionen auf höchster politischer und medialer Ebene. Ich will damit nichts anderes bezwecken, als dass deutsche Entscheidungsträger*innen und Medienvertreter*innen hoffentlich verstehen, wie schlecht das aufgenommen wurde.
Nov 4 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
I am incredibly lucky to know many senior people in my field of work whose experience and insights I greatly value, them having witnessed the world transition from the Cold War to what came after it.
But I think there’s value also in lacking that experience.
If you lived through the Cold War, you appreciate in a different way how far we have come since, say, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act in 1975 in terms of self-determination of peoples and respect for sovereignty of states whatever their size.
Nov 4 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
The whole thread leaves me simply speechless. It’s utterly incredible to me that the Finlandisation idea would make a comeback in any serious conversation especially AFTER Finland itself joined NATO and by doing so made it clear that non-alignment wasn’t an option anymore
If one thing is clear about the changes needed in a new or at least adapted European security order, it is that spaces for neutrality are almost nonexistent.
Neutrality a la Finland was never an option for Ukraine for several reasons:
Sep 24 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Taking stock of 2,5+ years of Russia’s war against Ukraine:
- Western leaders have successfully avoided nuclear war
- but made the war in Ukraine a world-order changing event, which it didn’t necessarily have to be
- and made nuclear proliferation more likely in the future
The West’s incremental strategy has enabled Russia to gather support from China, North Korea and Iran who were more hesitant in the beginning. They are now building the BRICS+ alternative, which can become serious competition to the western-led international order.
Sep 20 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Takes on Finlandisation and its post-Cold War legacy are almost exclusively bad. Labelling it as “diplo-nonsense to appease the USSR” is as mistaken as romanticising it as some kind of stroke of genius that could be exported to any other country with a Russia problem.
The only mind-boggling aspect of this is that things many Finns privately thought are now within the limits of political correctness to be said out loud.
The gist of Finlandisation was that there was a thin, performative official truth but the reality was often the opposite.
This is what I feared. I had hoped that things changed in the past 80 years and supporting Ukraine’s defence TO THE FULLEST would be a no brainer. But the western incremental strategy to keep Ukraine afloat but not more was bound to lead to this disillusionment & loss of trust.
The consequences of having generations of Ukrainians who remember how we, in fact, did NOT stand with Ukraine in their hour of need will be devastating. And I don’t think western leaders appreciate it enough what a powder keg this might create, if we end up failing Ukraine fully
Sep 2 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
It bothers me about the alarmist takes on Russian nuclear sabre rattling that nukes are reserved for an extreme case & the conditions of an existential threat must be met to contemplate use.
Even with a more “liberal” 🇷🇺 doctrine, I don’t see how this war would tick the boxes.
As much as Putin would like to twist and turn it, it’s not a defensive war for Russia. It’s also not an existential one. It’s a war of choice.
AND it’s supposed to be a minor regional conflict, so nuclear use in such a context would signal extreme weakness.
Aug 27 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
As a Finn, I know what it feels like to be part of a nation that is several generations into the healing process after an unjust aggression that was successfully averted but not without massive consequences. That’s why it’s killing me what we are doing to Ukrainians. A thread:
In the Winter War Finland wasn’t important enough for anyone in the world (not even its neighbours) to receive substantial military aid. The result could’ve been different if only we had had an air force. Sounds familiar ?
Aug 22 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
For me, the most frustrating thing about Zeitenwende is that I hoped for it to include Germany learning to make right decisions and not always having to go through the loop of first making a bad decision and then being forced to correct course under pressure from partners. Alas
As a diplomatic source in Berlin astutely described it, “Zeitenwende could have been a quantum leap but they made it a time loop”
Aug 14 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
With the Kursk operation proceeding beyond all expectations, Ukraine has reminded both Russia and the West that the war is far from settled.
I wonder whether many decision-makers and analysts in the west fully appreciate what’s at stake in this war. Some thoughts:
First: there’s no “deal solution” available. Not even Trump can “deal his way out” because there’s no status quo to return to.
At this point the war has unfolded a global effect that is the question whether the western-dominated rules-based world order will prevail.
Aug 9 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
People have been puzzling over Ukraine’s objectives in the Kursk operation. Politically, I can think of at least 7:
- catch Russia off guard and bring the war to Russians in a way they haven’t experienced before
- make Putin look stupid and hopefully generate discontent
- boost morale in Ukraine
- kill morale in Russia
- seize control of the information sphere
- show the west that Russia can be attacked without it resulting in WW3 (🤞)
- reassure western supporters that Ukraine can win this war
Aug 3 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
This reminds me of a conversation I had in November 2022 with a Russian opposition-supporter who had fled Russia. They said that Finland’s visa restrictions on Russians are undermining our own value system.
I explained that the extensive access Russians enjoyed to Europe was a privilege, not a right. Therefore, it can be revoked if the trust that’s the basis of granting such a privilege is broken.
No other third country nationals from the EU’s eastern neighbourhood had such access
Jul 17 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
In the past 2 years, most Finns also seriously asked themselves the question: would I be ready to die defending my country ? And for most of them, the answer was yes. Finns know that a war would mean many of us dying. That’s why we want to prevent one (hence NATO membership)
In spring 2022, I had this conversation with literally all my friends: Finns living abroad wondering whether they should go back to Finland just in case, and even most left wing artist friends inquiring whether they could also contribute in some way to the war effort if need be
Jul 3 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
European NATO countries’ security isn’t separate from that of Ukraine.
The better the war goes for Russia, the more capacity it has free to stir up incidents in other countries - likely below the threshold of armed conflict but it’s a quite direct threat nevertheless.
Example from Finland: we had a peaceful year after submitting the NATO application as Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. Since fall 2023, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive, we’ve seen:
- instrumentalized migration
- several attempts at sabotage at water supply
Jul 2 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Call me a hopeless idealist but I’d like to think that 80 years of western European integration and 30 years of integration with what was separated by the iron curtain means something.
It’ll be hard to re-learn how to be serious about defence again but unity might prevail
European integration was facilitated by the American security guarantees but it’s nevertheless a unique political process in the world. We Europeans managed to do this one thing right after having messed up pretty much everything imaginable, on a global scale, in the past.
Jun 30 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Suomessa on täysi konsensus siitä, että itäraja pitää turvata kaikkia mahdollisia hyökkäyksiä vastaan.
Edellinen keskusta-vasemmistohallitus aloitti aidan rakentamisen, sääti lain rajan väliaikaisesta sulkemisesta ja aloitti rajamenettelyn valmistelun.
Mikä nyt harmittaa monia tämän hallituksen käännytyslaissa on sen huono valmistelu. Huutia on tullut jo heti alkuvaiheessa ja on alusta asti ollut selvää, että tämä laki on ristiriidassa Suomen muun oikeuskäytännön kanssa. Lopulta se ei ehkä edes mene läpi juuri siitä syystä.
Jun 5 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Yes, the chancellery seems to be very consistent in its risk assessment that supporting Ukraine remains the riskier option, as it might bring us closer to the nuclear threshold if Ukraine can eliminate Russian ability to attack too effectively.
Conversely, it suggests that if Ukraine were to lose this war, it would be deeply regrettable, but at least a nuclear war would be averted.
Why this logic is flawed is fairly obvious: giving in to nuclear blackmail isn’t going to help non-proliferation efforts
May 27 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
Europe has recently woken up to the threat posed by Russian hybrid warfare aiming to weaken the West by different means below the threshold of armed conflict, such as sabotage and GPS jamming.
However, the phenomenon is far from new. A detailed thread: frivarld.se/rapporter/trac…
Russia has been cultivating its hybrid toolbox over the past decade(s) with almost no consequences, as European countries have been reluctant to attribute even blatant cases for the sake of “good relations” until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine 2022.
May 19 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Initial thoughts on my week in Paris:
It’s possible to understand France even without understanding French (although we should ofc all strive to learn the magnificent language 😉).
Most things about French strategic thinking and nuclear doctrine are pretty straightforward. 🧵
However, the obvious flaw in the system is the same principle that is also its strength: the strong centralisation of decision-making power in the presidency.
Despite all the solid policy work in the ministries, the president can unilaterally undermine France’s credibility.
Apr 20 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Interesting interview with the new @Finnchod.
Q about other Nordic CHODs’ warnings about timelines for a Russian attack on NATO & why he isn’t issuing similar warnings: “they say it’s a possibility. Of course it’s always a possibility, but the question is its probability”
Jaakkola continues that he doesn’t think a Russian attack on NATO is *probable* in the near future. He doesn’t consider a similar wake-up call necessary in Finland as Finnish defence thinking has always included the *possibility* of a Russian attack and 🇫🇮 is therefore prepared
Mar 26 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
The Finnish security and intelligence service is giving the annual press conference.
Overall assessment: Finland’s security environment has changed fundamentally and for good. There is no going back to status quo ante (with Russia).
Overall, Russian intelligence activities have decreased in Finland since 2022 due to countermeasures, such as expelling of known intelligence officers and visa restrictions.
Cyber threats and threats against critical infrastructure, especially maritime, have increased
