For me, the most frustrating thing about Zeitenwende is that I hoped for it to include Germany learning to make right decisions and not always having to go through the loop of first making a bad decision and then being forced to correct course under pressure from partners. Alas

https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1826646501172330589

As a diplomatic source in Berlin astutely described it, “Zeitenwende could have been a quantum leap but they made it a time loop”

With the Kursk operation proceeding beyond all expectations, Ukraine has reminded both Russia and the West that the war is far from settled.

I wonder whether many decision-makers and analysts in the west fully appreciate what’s at stake in this war. Some thoughts: First: there’s no “deal solution” available. Not even Trump can “deal his way out” because there’s no status quo to return to.

At this point the war has unfolded a global effect that is the question whether the western-dominated rules-based world order will prevail.

People have been puzzling over Ukraine’s objectives in the Kursk operation. Politically, I can think of at least 7:

- catch Russia off guard and bring the war to Russians in a way they haven’t experienced before
- make Putin look stupid and hopefully generate discontent - boost morale in Ukraine
- kill morale in Russia
- seize control of the information sphere
- show the west that Russia can be attacked without it resulting in WW3 (🤞)
- reassure western supporters that Ukraine can win this war

This reminds me of a conversation I had in November 2022 with a Russian opposition-supporter who had fled Russia. They said that Finland’s visa restrictions on Russians are undermining our own value system.

A thread:

https://twitter.com/acf_int/status/1819438271375536169

I explained that the extensive access Russians enjoyed to Europe was a privilege, not a right. Therefore, it can be revoked if the trust that’s the basis of granting such a privilege is broken.

No other third country nationals from the EU’s eastern neighbourhood had such access

In the past 2 years, most Finns also seriously asked themselves the question: would I be ready to die defending my country ? And for most of them, the answer was yes. Finns know that a war would mean many of us dying. That’s why we want to prevent one (hence NATO membership)

https://twitter.com/mattlightcrim/status/1811149203650871513

In spring 2022, I had this conversation with literally all my friends: Finns living abroad wondering whether they should go back to Finland just in case, and even most left wing artist friends inquiring whether they could also contribute in some way to the war effort if need be

European NATO countries’ security isn’t separate from that of Ukraine.

The better the war goes for Russia, the more capacity it has free to stir up incidents in other countries - likely below the threshold of armed conflict but it’s a quite direct threat nevertheless.

https://twitter.com/hanskundnani/status/1808528109789929964

Example from Finland: we had a peaceful year after submitting the NATO application as Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. Since fall 2023, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive, we’ve seen:
- instrumentalized migration
- several attempts at sabotage at water supply

Call me a hopeless idealist but I’d like to think that 80 years of western European integration and 30 years of integration with what was separated by the iron curtain means something.

It’ll be hard to re-learn how to be serious about defence again but unity might prevail

https://twitter.com/marceldirsus/status/1808050406611656791

European integration was facilitated by the American security guarantees but it’s nevertheless a unique political process in the world. We Europeans managed to do this one thing right after having messed up pretty much everything imaginable, on a global scale, in the past.

Suomessa on täysi konsensus siitä, että itäraja pitää turvata kaikkia mahdollisia hyökkäyksiä vastaan.

Edellinen keskusta-vasemmistohallitus aloitti aidan rakentamisen, sääti lain rajan väliaikaisesta sulkemisesta ja aloitti rajamenettelyn valmistelun. Mikä nyt harmittaa monia tämän hallituksen käännytyslaissa on sen huono valmistelu. Huutia on tullut jo heti alkuvaiheessa ja on alusta asti ollut selvää, että tämä laki on ristiriidassa Suomen muun oikeuskäytännön kanssa. Lopulta se ei ehkä edes mene läpi juuri siitä syystä.

Yes, the chancellery seems to be very consistent in its risk assessment that supporting Ukraine remains the riskier option, as it might bring us closer to the nuclear threshold if Ukraine can eliminate Russian ability to attack too effectively.

https://twitter.com/tobiaspfella/status/1797646592859844975

Conversely, it suggests that if Ukraine were to lose this war, it would be deeply regrettable, but at least a nuclear war would be averted.

Why this logic is flawed is fairly obvious: giving in to nuclear blackmail isn’t going to help non-proliferation efforts

Europe has recently woken up to the threat posed by Russian hybrid warfare aiming to weaken the West by different means below the threshold of armed conflict, such as sabotage and GPS jamming.

However, the phenomenon is far from new. A detailed thread:
frivarld.se/rapporter/trac… Russia has been cultivating its hybrid toolbox over the past decade(s) with almost no consequences, as European countries have been reluctant to attribute even blatant cases for the sake of “good relations” until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine 2022.

Initial thoughts on my week in Paris:

It’s possible to understand France even without understanding French (although we should ofc all strive to learn the magnificent language 😉).

Most things about French strategic thinking and nuclear doctrine are pretty straightforward. 🧵 However, the obvious flaw in the system is the same principle that is also its strength: the strong centralisation of decision-making power in the presidency.

Despite all the solid policy work in the ministries, the president can unilaterally undermine France’s credibility.

Interesting interview with the new @Finnchod.

Q about other Nordic CHODs’ warnings about timelines for a Russian attack on NATO & why he isn’t issuing similar warnings: “they say it’s a possibility. Of course it’s always a possibility, but the question is its probability” Jaakkola continues that he doesn’t think a Russian attack on NATO is *probable* in the near future. He doesn’t consider a similar wake-up call necessary in Finland as Finnish defence thinking has always included the *possibility* of a Russian attack and 🇫🇮 is therefore prepared

The Finnish security and intelligence service is giving the annual press conference.

Overall assessment: Finland’s security environment has changed fundamentally and for good. There is no going back to status quo ante (with Russia). Overall, Russian intelligence activities have decreased in Finland since 2022 due to countermeasures, such as expelling of known intelligence officers and visa restrictions.

Cyber threats and threats against critical infrastructure, especially maritime, have increased

The western Ukraine support coalition politics, as Teletubbies gifs. A thread:

https://twitter.com/minna_alander/status/1771127642449715548

(The red one is Scholz)

https://twitter.com/eadamson91/status/1771128907225350392

Liebes Deutschland,

Russland ist nicht erst seit letzter Woche im Informationskrieg gegen euch, sondern versucht seit mindestens 10 Jahren (leider ziemlich erfolgreich) aktiv sowohl politische Entscheidungsfindung als auch öffentlichen Diskurs in 🇩🇪 zu beeinflussen ! Dabei kann Russland auf ein Netzwerk von Botschaftern, Generälen und Kanzlern a.D. sowie Politiker links- und rechtsaußen zurückgreifen die alle fröhlich die gewünschten Narrative in den deutschen Debatten aufrechterhalten.

Got tired of the defeatism that is AGAIN spreading in Europe amid the weekly warnings that Russia might attack NATO in 1-5 (or 20) years so I wrote about Nordic-Baltic preparedness.

Not everybody has been sitting on their hands for the past 2 years.

cepa.org/article/the-no… Finland has activated a war economy lite. The Baltic states have been busy jointly procuring air defence systems to establish the “Livonian air shield” and are working to reinforce their borders together in the “Baltic Defence Line”. Sweden is reaching 2% already this year.

Finland has quietly filled its wartime stockpiles and is activating some of the so-called “production reservation agreements” which means that companies produce at the armed forces’ request what is needed for logistics - basically wartime economy light

hs.fi/kotimaa/art-20… The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) received extra money right in the spring of 2022 and started working on increasing stockpiles immediately, “luckily before many other European states woke up to the issue”, says the logistics chief - which means that the orders have been coming in

Interesting discussion by @FRHoffmann1 & @liviuhorovitz about the likelihood of a NATO-Russia war.

Also in light of the recent BILD-leak of a German armed forces worst-case scenario (I assume as part of a wargame) dating such a contingency to as early as 2025, some thoughts:

https://twitter.com/liviuhorovitz/status/1746842865165029801

While it’s hard to assess what exactly the Bundeswehr scenario included, as I haven’t seen the original document, it sounded quite similar to the classic fait accompli scenarios NATO has been wargaming in the past decade and that the tripwire posture was based on.

Halfway serious about this:

I don’t think it’s likely that we’re headed to a World War 3 that comes with a big (nuclear) bang. It’s more likely that we could see a cascading series and coincidence of wars in different parts of the world (rather world wars than a World War). The effect would be, as we already see now: difficulty to focus attention and resources when too many things are happening at the same time.

Much will depend on the US ability to contain this development in the parts of the world where it has extended deterrence obligations.

Wow this is quite something in the promised land of strategic non-communication: Finnish security and intelligence service is giving a presser about Russian disturbance and influence attempts in Finland.

“Russia can endure the war, but it may not be able to endure the peace” - aim of cyber- and other attacks not so much to cause real damage (partly because Finland has invested in resilience and is a hard target) but to sow fear
- Finland is not a prioritised object of Russian attention but Russia observes how 🇫🇮 NATO membership shapes

It’s starting, the comments “it’s gonna get messy, there will lots of civilian victims” when the IDF is responding.

That’s also because Hamas has been using human shields as its strategy from the start. See e.g. this NATO report from the period 2007-2014:
stratcomcoe.org/publications/d…
“Hamas relies on the Israeli government’s aim to minimise collateral damage, and is also aware of the West’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties […] it is also aimed at gaining diplomatic and public opinion-related leverage…