Interesting interview with the new @Finnchod.

Q about other Nordic CHODs’ warnings about timelines for a Russian attack on NATO & why he isn’t issuing similar warnings: “they say it’s a possibility. Of course it’s always a possibility, but the question is its probability” Jaakkola continues that he doesn’t think a Russian attack on NATO is *probable* in the near future. He doesn’t consider a similar wake-up call necessary in Finland as Finnish defence thinking has always included the *possibility* of a Russian attack and 🇫🇮 is therefore prepared

The Finnish security and intelligence service is giving the annual press conference.

Overall assessment: Finland’s security environment has changed fundamentally and for good. There is no going back to status quo ante (with Russia). Overall, Russian intelligence activities have decreased in Finland since 2022 due to countermeasures, such as expelling of known intelligence officers and visa restrictions.

Cyber threats and threats against critical infrastructure, especially maritime, have increased

The western Ukraine support coalition politics, as Teletubbies gifs. A thread:

https://twitter.com/minna_alander/status/1771127642449715548

(The red one is Scholz)

https://twitter.com/eadamson91/status/1771128907225350392

Liebes Deutschland,

Russland ist nicht erst seit letzter Woche im Informationskrieg gegen euch, sondern versucht seit mindestens 10 Jahren (leider ziemlich erfolgreich) aktiv sowohl politische Entscheidungsfindung als auch öffentlichen Diskurs in 🇩🇪 zu beeinflussen ! Dabei kann Russland auf ein Netzwerk von Botschaftern, Generälen und Kanzlern a.D. sowie Politiker links- und rechtsaußen zurückgreifen die alle fröhlich die gewünschten Narrative in den deutschen Debatten aufrechterhalten.

Got tired of the defeatism that is AGAIN spreading in Europe amid the weekly warnings that Russia might attack NATO in 1-5 (or 20) years so I wrote about Nordic-Baltic preparedness.

Not everybody has been sitting on their hands for the past 2 years.

cepa.org/article/the-no… Finland has activated a war economy lite. The Baltic states have been busy jointly procuring air defence systems to establish the “Livonian air shield” and are working to reinforce their borders together in the “Baltic Defence Line”. Sweden is reaching 2% already this year.

Finland has quietly filled its wartime stockpiles and is activating some of the so-called “production reservation agreements” which means that companies produce at the armed forces’ request what is needed for logistics - basically wartime economy light

hs.fi/kotimaa/art-20… The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) received extra money right in the spring of 2022 and started working on increasing stockpiles immediately, “luckily before many other European states woke up to the issue”, says the logistics chief - which means that the orders have been coming in

Interesting discussion by @FRHoffmann1 & @liviuhorovitz about the likelihood of a NATO-Russia war.

Also in light of the recent BILD-leak of a German armed forces worst-case scenario (I assume as part of a wargame) dating such a contingency to as early as 2025, some thoughts:

https://twitter.com/liviuhorovitz/status/1746842865165029801

While it’s hard to assess what exactly the Bundeswehr scenario included, as I haven’t seen the original document, it sounded quite similar to the classic fait accompli scenarios NATO has been wargaming in the past decade and that the tripwire posture was based on.

Halfway serious about this:

I don’t think it’s likely that we’re headed to a World War 3 that comes with a big (nuclear) bang. It’s more likely that we could see a cascading series and coincidence of wars in different parts of the world (rather world wars than a World War). The effect would be, as we already see now: difficulty to focus attention and resources when too many things are happening at the same time.

Much will depend on the US ability to contain this development in the parts of the world where it has extended deterrence obligations.

Wow this is quite something in the promised land of strategic non-communication: Finnish security and intelligence service is giving a presser about Russian disturbance and influence attempts in Finland.

“Russia can endure the war, but it may not be able to endure the peace” - aim of cyber- and other attacks not so much to cause real damage (partly because Finland has invested in resilience and is a hard target) but to sow fear
- Finland is not a prioritised object of Russian attention but Russia observes how 🇫🇮 NATO membership shapes

It’s starting, the comments “it’s gonna get messy, there will lots of civilian victims” when the IDF is responding.

That’s also because Hamas has been using human shields as its strategy from the start. See e.g. this NATO report from the period 2007-2014:
stratcomcoe.org/publications/d…
“Hamas relies on the Israeli government’s aim to minimise collateral damage, and is also aware of the West’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties […] it is also aimed at gaining diplomatic and public opinion-related leverage…

At the annual ambassadors’ conference this week, President Niinistö emphasised in his speech that Russia has been escalating month after month in Ukraine. Important to keep driving home this point.

Some notes about what was said - and what not - in the speeches this year: President Niinistö also reminded that although diplomatic efforts and staying in conversation is a key feature of Finnish foreign policy, at the moment it’s not possible with Russia because of the enemy narrative the Kremlin is spreading about Finland.
presidentti.fi/en/speeches/sp…

There’s a new kid on the block: this week’s NATO summit in Vilnius is Finland’s first as full member.

I wrote for @cepa what can be expected of Finland as new ally - and what Finland might be expecting from the alliance

cepa.org/article/finlan… With its capable armed forces, Finland was a welcome birthday present for NATO as it joined on April 4, the alliance’s 74th anniversary.

Finland’s NATO policy will be developed in longer govt reports but the new govt’s programme gives some indications of priorities:

Wrote a piece (in 🇫🇮 & unfortunately 💶) about Germany in the second year of Zeitenwende. Short summary:

Germany’s problem isn’t bad faith or unwillingness to play a greater role in European security - but sec pol incompetence in the pol leadership
kaleva.fi/epapatevyys-ja… Zeitenwende is getting on slower than Germany’s partners would’ve liked to see because the challenge is simply enormous. Last year, all 🇩🇪 foreign policy principles fell one after another:

1) “diplomacy first”: diplomatic efforts failed to prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

In Finland, a “post mortem” process has begun re: Finland’s long road to NATO. Several people have been unusually outspoken in their criticism of President Niinistö for “keeping Finland out of NATO” after 2014.

Some thoughts about whether Finland could & should’ve joined before: First off: there is a deep sense of gratitude towards Ukraine. It was absolutely decisive that Kyiv didn’t fall in the first days of the Russian invasion.

Finland’s NATO process would likely have been much less smooth or potentially even impossible without Ukraine’s resistance

Very late to the party but I absolutely must hype this:

Macron’s speech at GLOBSEC was remarkable (worth reading completely). And I hear that France is pushing for Ukraine’s NATO perspective ? What a time to be alive !

elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-ma… I can’t emphasise enough how good it feels to see this development in France. And the long-term financial commitment for continued military aid to Ukraine from Germany (€11bn for 2023 and beyond).

Hard to overstate what a geopolitical mic drop it was for 🇺🇸 Secretary of State @SecBlinken to say this in Helsinki of all places:

“The Kremlin often claimed it had the second strongest military in the world […] Today, many see Russia’s military as the second strongest in 🇺🇦.” Blinken also explains admirably why Finns relate so strongly with Ukraine: because we’ve been there and done that.

And the examples of civilian terror in our wars in the 1940’s show that the more Russia changes, the more it stays the same.

Warum es für die baltischen Staaten so wichtig ist, Truppen in den Ländern stationiert zu haben: weil bspw. bei der „Griffin Lightning“ Übung im März es 4 Tage gedauert hat, Bundeswehr-Truppen nach Litauen zu verlegen. Klar, im Kriegsfall wären Transportbedingunen anders. Aber…

https://twitter.com/phil_ipp_fritz/status/1664642205263314944

Wenn Litauen tatsächlich angegriffen würde, hätte es keine 4 Tage Zeit zu warten, wahrscheinlich nicht mal 2. Es müsste sofort verteidigt werden und zwar direkt an der Grenze. Sonst gibt es nach 4 Tagen kein Litauen mehr.
bundeswehr.de/de/aktuelles/m…

Excellent analysis of Germany by 🇫🇮 @yleuutiset Europe correspondent @suviturtiainen who’s been in Berlin for 5 years:

Germany is becoming a “normal country” in that there’s a realisation that 🇩🇪 isn’t a model or end goal but instead needs to catch up
areena.yle.fi/podcastit/1-65… While Merkel was in power, she was well respected, but after her leaving the stage the mess she left behind has become evident. Not only re: Russia relations but also the lack of investments into things relevant for the future: digital & physical infrastructure, education etc.

The role of nuclear weapons in future security arrangements in Europe and globally are understandably a point of contention. Russia’s effective nuclear blackmail has for its part potentially triggered a new era of global proliferation and we need to understand the repercussions There was a heated debate in Finland recently about the recommendation by a group of experts strongly opposed to nuclear weapons that Finland should keep out of NATO’s nuclear deterrence arrangements pugwash.org/2023/03/17/sta…

Excellent “how to deal with Russia” programme by @bctallis.

Discussions on EU-Russia relations tend to go round in circles along the lines “Russia is our neighbour” and “we can’t change geography”. Some thoughts from me to add to Ben’s thread:

https://twitter.com/bctallis/status/1660896948897869825

As a Finn it’s borderline gaslighting to hear these statements from esp Germans and French, as Russia *actually* is our neighbour (which it is not, contrary to popular belief, to Germany or France) and we very well know that we can’t change geography.

Germany’s Zeitenwende was getting on so slow last year that it inspired German observers to coin the term “Zeitlupenwende” (slo-mo change).

However, the dynamic has changed this year and although I’m ready to be disappointed again, currently my glass is half full. Why ? As I mentioned in the @WarOnTheRocks Warcast w/ @aaronstein1 on Friday, Germany doubled its military aid to Ukraine with the latest package - from ~3 bn € to now ~6 bn. But what is more: Germany has earmarked 11 bn for 🇺🇦 military aid for 2023 & beyond
bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/aktuelle…