News that Russia is firing S-300 surface-to-air missiles (Ukrainian example shown below) at ground targets is producing quite a lot of comments along the lines of 'OMG Russia is desperate'. I think that view is mistaken. A short 🧵. /1
It's easy to picture a surface-to-air missile: it's a ground-launched rocket that flies at extremely high velocity to target and destroy enemy air vehicles. But the Russians did things a bit differently with the S-300. /2
Designed in the late 1960s and 1970s, the S-300 uses over 20 missile variants. Russia currently uses the 5V55K, 5V55R, and 48N6 missiles with high-explosive fragmentation warheads weighing up to 144 kg. /3
It's a very effective system which is part of a wider complex including a long-range surveillance radar, command vehicles and engagement radar in addition to the launch vehicle. The elements of the system can be placed as much as 40 km apart. /4
The long-range radar can track objects up to 300km (185 miles) away. Each battalion has 6 launch vehicles with 2 missiles each. At the instruction of the command vehicle, the best-placed launchers fire at the target. The engagement radar can guide up to 12 missiles at once. /5
It's a widely-used system with 16 communist or former communist countries, in addition to Russia, operating it. Three NATO countries currently or formerly operated it: Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece. Slovakia has donated its battery to Ukraine. /6
The Greek battery arrived there by an odd route: it was originally purchased by Cyprus in 1997, but following a crisis that nearly led to a war with Turkey, it was transferred instead to Greece in 1998 (and is shown here being test-fired). Why was Turkey so upset about it? /7
The S-300, with its range of up to 150km, could have denied Turkey access to its own airspace – Cyprus is only 75 km away. But even more dangerously, its relatively little-known ground attack capability could have been used to attack ground targets inside Turkey. /8
According to Belarussian reports, the S-300 can hit ground targets up to a range of 120 km. In fact, it can go much further – tests in the 1980s showed it could travel 400 km on a ballistic trajectory, reaching an altitude of 70 km. /9
The main limitation is the guidance system. Although the Soviets designed the S-300 with a ground-to-ground capability, they had little practical use for it and did not bother developing it. They relied instead on dedicated ground-to-ground systems like the OTR-21 Tochka. /10
By the 2010s, the situation had changed: the Tochka was being phased out, to be replaced by the more expensive Iskander, and Russia had large stocks of S-300s in its arsenals, which were being replaced by more capable S-400s. The S-300s were therefore expendable.
According to the Ukrainian government, the Russians have retrofitted S-300s with satellite navigation units. The missiles are now capable of carrying out ground attacks with a greater (though still limited) accuracy than was possible with unmodified S-300s. /12
This is not a new capability. In October 2011, the Belarussian armed forces practiced hitting "important ground targets on the territory of a potential enemy" with modified S-300s. /13
A similar exercise took place in Russia in May 2017, when Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported that units of Russia's Eastern Military District fired five S-300 missiles at a simulated "unknown armed formation" of enemy vehicles during a training exercise. /14
According to RIA Novosti, the S-300s "receive their coordinates from reconnaissance units of the ground forces." Belarussian media sources say that the S-300 uses the target’s coordinates, set before the launch, to guide its onboard inertial system. /15
The coordinates can be updated in flight via a radio link. In the terminal phase, the missile uses semi-active radar homing to bring it onto the target. /16
S-300s have reportedly been used to hit ground targets in the Lugansk, Donetsk and in the last few days Mykolaiv regions, though according to Mykolaiv's governor their accuracy and effect has been low. /17
Their effect is also likely to be quite limited - one of the buildings hit in Mykolaiv, a hotel, suffered only fairly modest damage. A 144 kg warhead isn't a joke but it's small compared to bigger missiles like Kalibr. /18
I don't think Russia using these missiles is a sign of desperation. It has a large stock of them, probably tens of thousands, and it's using all the assets at its disposal to win its war in Ukraine. If it has plentiful expendible missiles, why not use them? /19
Given its inaccuracy and small warhead, I don't think the S-300 is likely to be very useful as a ground attack weapon. It's more likely being used simply because it's available, and more as a terror weapon than to achieve purely military goals. /end
Looks like Ukraine is hitting back at S-300 batteries being used for ground attacks:
1/ Why does the Russian government appear to be so clueless about the role Telegram plays in military communications? The answer, one warblogger suggests, is that the military leadership doesn't want to admit its failure to provide its own reliable communications solutions. ⬇️
2/ Recent claims by high-ranking officials that Telegram isn't relevant to military communications have prompted howls of outrage and detailed rebuttals from Russian warbloggers, but have also pointed to a deeper problem about what reliance on Telegram (and Starlink) represents.
3/ In both cases, the Russian military has failed abysmally to provide workable solutions. Telegram and Starlink were both adopted so widely because the 'official' alternatives (military messngers and the Yamal satellite constellation) are slow, unreliable and lack key features.
1/ Telegram is deeply embedded into Russian military units' internal communications, providing functionality that MAX, the Russian government's authorised app, doesn't have. A commentary highlights the vast gap that is being opened up by the government's blocking of Telegram. ⬇️
2/ The Two Majors Charitable Foundation writes that without Telegram, information exchange, skills transfer, and moral mobilisation work within the Russian army will be crippled:
3/ "I'd really like to add that for a long time, we've been gathering specialized groups in closed chats, including those focused on engineering and UAVs, to share experiences and build a knowledge base. Almost everyone there is a frontline engineer.
1/ Russia's Federal Customs Service is seeking to prosecute Russian volunteers who are importing reconnaissance drones from China to give to frontline troops. It's the latest chapter in a saga of bureaucratic obstruction that is blocking vital supplies to the Russian army. ⬇️
2/ Much of the army's equipment, and many of its drones, are purchased with private money by volunteer supporters or the soldiers themselves. High-tech equipment such as drones and communications equipment is purchased in China or Central Asia and imported into Russia.
3/ However, the Federal Customs Service has been a major blocker. Increased customs checks on the borders have meant that cargo trucks have suffered delays of days or even weeks, drastically slowing the provision of essential supplies for the Russian army.
1/ Leaked casualty figures from an elite Russian special forces brigade indicate that it has suffered huge losses in Ukraine, equivalent to more than half of its entire roster of personnel. Scores of men are listed as being 'unaccounted for', in other words having deserted. ⬇️
2/ The 10th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (military unit 51532) is a special forces (spetsnaz) unit under the GRU. It is a 2002 refoundation by Russia of a Soviet-era spetsnaz unit that, ironically, passed to Ukraine when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991.
3/ Since the invasion of February 2022, the brigade has been fighting on the Kherson front, which has seen constant and extremely bloody fighting over the islands in the Dnipro river and delta. Russian sources have reported very high casualties.
1/ Russian warbloggers are continuing to provide examples of how Telegram is used for frontline battlefield communications, to refute the claim of presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov that such a thing is "not possible to imagine". ⬇️
2/ Platon Mamadov provides two detailed examples:
"Example number one:
Aerial reconnaissance of Unit N spotted a Ukrainian self-propelled gun in a shelter in the middle of town N."
3/ "Five minutes after the discovery, the target's coordinates and a detailed video were uploaded to a special secret chat group read by all drone operators, scouts, and artillerymen in that sector of the front.
1/ The Russian army faces a crisis with obtaining aid for its soldiers, who are dependent on volunteers to provide them with everything from socks to Starlink terminals. Russian warbloggers say that the blocking of Telegram will wreck voluntary assistance efforts. ⬇️
2/ 'It's time ZOV to go home' writes:
"Since 2022, Telegram has become the primary source of funds for the front. Numerous units and volunteers have created their own channels."
3/ "This has enabled us to address a colossal number of issues that needed to be addressed right then and there. It's impossible otherwise: when a fundraising campaign begins, it means the fundraising item was needed yesterday, and there's no time to waste.