In the economics debate, there are two opposing viewpoints:
On one hand, economists including @PikettyLeMonde@gabriel_zucman@dannyyagan & Saez have argued that wealth gains due to rising valuations are a big shift of resources toward the wealthy.
A frequent next step in the argument is that these should be taxed, e.g. by means of a wealth tax or a tax on unrealized capital gains.
On the other hand, @JohnHCochrane@paulkrugman and others have argued that these wealth gains are just “paper gains”, with no effect on actual income flows and therefore welfare.
Which (if any) of these two opposing views is correct?
Who are the winners and losers of from rising asset valuations?
That's what this paper is about.
Our main contribution is a simple sufficient statistics formula for the money metric welfare gains/losses from asset price changes...
... which we then use to quantify these welfare gains/losses in Norway for the period 1994 to 2015.
The formula looks like this (in the special case of one asset) where
- i = individual
- T = sample period
- R = discount rate
- Sales_it = net sales of asset (Sales_it< 0 = purchase)
- Price Deviation_t = change in asset price relative to a baseline scenario
Importantly, the welfare gain is computed holding the asset's cash flows constant so that price deviations represent a pure valuation effect: a change in price without a change in cash flows.
In the data, we've seen a lot of this, eg due to the secular decline in interest rates.
"Money metric" here means welfare gains are in dollar terms. Like equivalent and compensating variation from intermediate micro (which are equivalent to 1st order)
The formula follows straight from an application of the envelope theorem and thus holds for small price deviations.
The welfare formula generates two main insights:
1. What matters are asset transactions not asset holdings.
Example: for someone who never sells an asset, rising asset prices are indeed just "paper gains".
But they *do* benefit prospective sellers and harm prospective buyers.
The most intuitive example is housing: skyrocketing house prices, say in London or Paris, benefit people who bought a house 30 years ago and now want to downsize, eg old people whose kids have moved out. But they hurt people who want to buy a house or upsize, eg young people.
2. Asset price changes are purely redistributive.
That's because they redistribute from buyers to sellers. But there's a buyer for every seller (once you include foreigners, the government etc).
Hence also our title "Asset-Price Redistribution"
With this in mind, let's come back to the two opposing viewpoints I mentioned above.
In a nutshell: both are incomplete and miss important parts of the equation.
Most of the intuition for our results can be seen in a simple two-period model. See section 1.2.
I particularly like a simple graphical intuition due to Whalley (1979). I've written about this paper before. Make sure to check it out. It's a gem.
People often ask: if I have an asset whose price increases so that market value of my wealth increases, how can that possibly be bad for me?
Answer: while the price increase raises your initial asset return, it *decreases* future returns. You're forgetting the second effect.
Note: our baseline formula abstracts from some important considerations, eg risk, bequests, rising asset prices loosening collateral constraints, people using "buy, borrow, die" strategies, wealth in utility, etc
Section 2.4 covers these extensions and shows how formula changes.
To implement our formula empirically we turn to Norway. Why Norway? Simply because they have 👌 data.
In particular: administrative panel data on all asset transactions over a 20 year time period. And remember: data on transactions is exactly what we need for our formula!
To isolate pure valuation effects, we compute price deviations as deviations from a baseline with prices growing at the same rate as dividend (or rents in the case of housing). For example here are Norwegian house prices, rents and the implied price deviations.
First main finding: rising asset prices have large redistributive effects.
Check out the histogram...
... which is even heavily truncated: the money metric welfare gain is −$280,000 at P1, about $1,000,000 at P99, and about $5,000,000 at P99.9 (i.e., for the top 0.1%).
As expected, the histogram is also centered around zero reflecting the redistributive nature of asset price changes.
Where do these large gains and losses come from? Answer: mostly housing and debt.
Importantly though: welfare gains differ substantially from naïvely calculated wealth gains (i.e. unrealized capital gains).
So does the identity of winners and losers implied by the two approaches. The two quantities are correlated but very far from equal.
Second main finding: large redistribution across cohorts, in particular from the young to the old.
That should be unsurprising given the important role for housing.
Interestingly, declining mortgage rates partly offset the welfare losses of the young due rising house prices.
Third main finding: large redistribution across the wealth distribution, from the poor to the wealthy.
Note that this isn't obvious: it comes from rich people
- selling houses
- holding lots of debt through private businesses and thus benefiting from low interest rates
Fourth main finding: some redistribution across sectors. Declining interest rates benefited households at the expense of the government.
Note that the Norwegian case is a bit unusual here, partly because of the large sovereign wealth fund. We still need to dig deeper here.
Our findings build on a large literature, including some classics.
For instance, I highly recommend the very lucid discussion of related issues in Kaldor's 1955 book "An Expenditure Tax", see benjaminmoll.com/kaldor/. As well as the Whalley paper I already mentioned.
In summary: asset price changes have large redistributive effects.
But it's a bit subtler than just: those who own assets become wealthier and therefore win.
Let me conclude with a question: what does this mean for optimal taxation? Some speculative thoughts below.
But to do this properly we need to finally put the "finance" into "public finance" in the sense of studying optimal taxation in environments with changing asset prices!
In case I managed to wet your appetite, also make sure to tune in tomorrow for my coauthor Emilien presenting in @glviolante@GregWKaplan and Hurst's group, also on the @nberpubs YouTube channel youtube.com/nbervideos
🤓 Nerd tweet for the heterogeneous-agent macro crowd
You like sequence-space Jacobians? But you also like working in continuous time?
Then I have just the thing for you! 🤓
Two very nice recent papers and some code:
1. René Glawion's very nice continuous-time implementation of the @a_auclert @BardoczyBence Rognlie @ludwigstraub sequence-space method:
- “Sequence-Space Jacobians in Continuous Time”
- GitHub repository with codes papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf… github.com/reneglawion/Se…
2. @AdrienBilal and Shlok Goyal's paper on the same topic
- "Some Pleasant Sequence-Space Arithmetic in Continuous Time"
It's about Bob's incredible gift as a writer and his generosity toward his students.
It's the fall of 2009 and I'm a grad student at the University of Chicago. Bob is on my thesis committee.
I've just finished a first draft of my job market paper with which I will be applying for assistant professor jobs. I've put *a ton* of work into the paper and I'm pretty happy with it overall. I email it to Bob asking whether he could take a look, hoping for some verbal comments
Below is what it looked like at the time.
A day later Bob emails me back saying "Come by my office, I've got some minor comments."
Here is a collection of some of the most extreme doomsday predictions. Two reasons:
- provide a benchmark to which to compare the substantial economic costs 🇩🇪 has seen
- the hope that the worst offenders (particularly those with ulterior motives) will lose some credibility
1. @BASF CEO Martin Brudermüller said an end to Russian gas would cause "the largest economic crisis since World War II" adding "Do we knowingly want to destroy our entire economy?"
My reason for taking another shot at explaining this: if people don't understand the policy, then it won't work as intended. So communication is key. Just as @R2Rsquared writes here.
Main points: this is
- a lump-sum scheme
- NOT a price cap / subsidy
- NOT a non-linear pricing scheme, e.g. a cap on 80% of past consumption
-- > people can save a lot of money on their energy bills by reducing their gas consumption also below 80%