Thread by @StratStability

Now for a #Ghana 🧵 as this keeps being raised and I want to discuss two big shifts in JNIM strategy since 2021: /1

1) from the west, Katibat Alidougou has moved into Cote d'Ivoire's NE Bounkani and Zanzan Depart in 2020/2021 where there is some early evidence that they are penetrating Ghana’s Upper West region (ungoverned space around Dollar Power) and then freely move up to Burkina Faso. 2/

2) Meanwhile, JNIM is moving westward from the WAP park complex; in May JNIM moved their Ansarul Islam factions into the Koulou triangle, in presumably a deliberate move to localize the insurgency, and free up their katibats to move westward towards SW Burkina and Ghana /3

#Ghana is now central to JNIM’s strategy. This is concerning because of Ghana's historic chieftaincy conflict in northeastern #Bawku, which have drawn in displaced persons that now have generational ties to Burkina Faso. /4

In the past this chieftaincy conflict has drawn in external parties to the violence from Burkina Faso. And we found in previous research that JNIM was eyeing this conflict as a means to gain influence and build a local insurgency in Ghana. /5

The research, done through our consortium with @ElvaTeam by @abernard, found early evidence of JNIM deploying surveillance campaigns and recruitment in and around Bawku, as early as 2020/2021. /6

Why #Ghana? There are not many hot intercommunal 'wars' in the littorals that VEOs can latch onto and exploit, like ISGS did in 2016 with Gorgabe Peuhl in northern Tillaberi. Bawku’s old chieftaincy war is a big one though, drawing on transnational sectarian & ethnic issues /7

Bawku's chieftaincy conflict is also transnational with a sizable displaced community located in Burkina Faso, and has been raging for decades, with minimal successes made by #Ghana to sustainably degrade it. /8

Coopting the Bawku Chieftancy conflict is not a risk for JNIM. In fact, it’s much less risky than their insurgency has been in previously calmer spaces like northern Cote d'Ivoire or Benin, for example, where there was not intercommunal violence that JNIM could jump into. /9

In sum, Bawku could become the next stronghold for JNIM if they move south of the Littoral 'shelf' past the 'north-south' divide, positioning themselves as the champions of ‘self-defense’ auxiliary support to one side of the conflict, while pushing a terrorism insurgency. /end