Thread by @MarkHertling

It's been a while since I’ve provided thoughts on Ukraine (again, due to work/travel), but perhaps it’s time for a new thread on Ukraine.

I'll start with a few comments on this terrific interview of a defense official reported by @nickschifrin of @Pbs

A 🧵 1/20

https://twitter.com/nickschifrin/status/1550475245227687937

1st, a “defense official” could be anyone in DoD…military, civilian, high rank/medium rank in intel community, etc.

2d, if he/she is talking to the press, they are likely discussing very sanitized summaries of intelligence.

Having said that, their thoughts raise some ?'s…2/

When the official says “85% of RU military is committed," what's that mean?

Is that 85% of all RU military (army, navy, air)? Percentage of all Units? Reservists? Equipment? Munitions? Ships?

What "borders" are they "removed" from?

It's likely ground forces & it's high 3/

Yes, past “estimates” indicated RU firing 8-12,000 artillery/missile rounds per day.

RU has MANY artillery and rocket units in & outside Ukraine.

They have fired significantly more “dumb” projectiles than “smart” (GPS/laser)…mostly at civilians.

4/

Is RU now firing less artillery? Yes.

Are they “running out?” That depends. Likely yes for precision ammo. Likely no for dumb rounds.

What is critical is RU ammo dumps being hit & the need for repair/replacement of artillery tubes & rocket firing (MRL) platforms. 5/

It's difficult to sustain that rate of fire, and resupply the associated CSR (critical resupply rate).

Also, RU claims to use“rolling barrages” as part of their doctrine. But if you don't support w/ combined arms after the barrage, it's for naught. 6/

RU doesn't need to be "precise" to hit most civilian targets. (BTW, that's a war crime).

Barrages against the UA have been less effective, as the UA withdraws, then returns when the arty stops. Make no mistakes, UA has taken casualties...but RU effectiveness is lacking. 7/

Additionally, RU hasn’t “figured out combined arms” (as stated in the interview) because it takes a long time to "figure it out" during war.

If you don't know & practice how to "combine" tanks, inf, eng, log, air defense, aviation, BEFORE the war starts, you'll not recover. 8/

RU won’t “figure it out” anytime soon. IMO, their senior & junior leaders don't have that background or capacity.

UA has a slight advantage here, but - truthfully - not at the scope & operational scale needed. But the UA DOES have potential to improve on what they have. 9/

As for HIMARS - w/ fewer rounds, greater range, precision accuracy - it's a game changer.

But…a pet peeve of mine (for reporters & others):

“Taking out” implies dating.
“Taking down” implies wrestling.

HIMARS destroys things, kills people. We ought use those terms. 10/

Another announcement today from @secdef on more HIMARS & ammo going to Ukraine.

That includes spare parts & repair equipment

My sources tell me UA has established "tele-repair" (like telemedicine) sites to keep equipment running.

That's the kind of adaptation needed in war.11/

As the article says, RU has sustained significant # of leader casualties/day.

But “leaders lost” at any level -especially in the RU army- is tough. Leader replacement is hard in war.

It's an exponential factor in combat. 12/rferl.org/a/senior-us-of…

Those losses are also an exponential factor when weighing morale.

RU morale is low; soldiers don't understand the plan, units aren’t moving, supplies aren't getting through (& that's getting worse).

Units are disobeying orders, running away.13/ newsweek.com/putin-unable-m…

Add to that, we're at month 6, when it was predicted RU sanctions are increasingly taking a bite.

At the last multinational cooperation session, there was reportedly no “slow down” in alliance support for UKR. 14/

eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions…

Which brings us to ANOTHER factor in RU losing credibility:

Just 24 hours ago, RU signed a deal for shipment of grain. This morning in Odesa, they launched four Kalibre missiles at UKR grain silos.

Proof to the west: DO NOT TRUST ANY DEALS W/ PUTIN! 15/
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/…

BTW, regarding grain...not enough has been made of the UKR strategic retaking of Snake (Zmiinyi) Island.

SW of Odesa, this UK to again using the Bystre/Danube Canal from the Black Sea…Romania is instrumental in opening that route for grain into Europe, & beyond.16/

With that as background, here are some final thoughts:
1. In the Donbas slugfest, RU has gained very little. Few tactical success, but operational & strategic failure.
2. In the Donbas, UA is contesting every foot of ground along a wide front.
3. Donbas remains an arty...17/

...and logistical, not a combined arms, fight. HIMARs is helping UA gain the advantage.
4. I mentioned weeks ago UA might attempt opening a "2d front" to stretch RU capabilities.
(The great @IAPonomarenko has a superb piece on one approach:
-kyivindependent.com/national/what-…) 18/

5. There's been rumors of Ukraine getting ATACMS long-range missiles; and this week GEN Brown "teased" delivery of western jet to UKR. I'd bet neither will happen soon.

Rather, that's long term planning, indicative of US assisting UA to build a new future force structure.19/

Anyway, those are todays' thoughts.

Russia is in dire shape & losing, Ukraine is adapting to the fight & winning, the world is increasingly seeing/recording Putin's war crimes & realizing he must never be trusted, we must continue support & there is still much to do. 20/20