Thread by @MarkHertling

1 more 🧵today, inspired by @IAPonomarenko insightful piece, below.

In 2003-4, I was the ADC-S (Assistant Division Commander, Support) for @1stArmoredDiv in Iraq.

We had 30,000 soldiers in Baghdad & were about to leave after a 12 month deployment. 1/5

kyivindependent.com/national/why-i…

.@1stArmoredDiv had a high-performing Division Support Command of 5000 soldiers, a well-oiled supply chain process that had operated at utmost efficiency, proven junior & senior leaders, & we were familiar with the territory and supply routes.

Then...the Sadr revolt. 2/

As we maneuvered to counter Sadr's rebellion, his followers begun messing with our supply lines.

-planting IEDs on routes and in culverts
-targeting contract truck drivers
-attacking resupply nodes
-focusing their efforts not on fighters, but on logisticians. 3/

Though we had savvy logisticians, hardened supply routes & a professional support organizations, Sadr's "army" played hell w/ our ability to resupply.

RU did NOT have savvy logisticians, hardened supply routes, or professional support organizations from the beginning. 4/

RU has had severe challenges with supporting their army in the fight from the start.

As @IAPonomarenko points out in the middle of his well-written piece, HIMARS is causing even more dysfunction in how they support their force.

They are finding it very hard to adapt. 5/5