My new piece: how heavy are Russian casualties in Ukraine, and how do we know? It depends greatly on the assumptions one makes about wounded-to-killed ratios in war, which in turn hinges on military medicine and the evolution of tactics over the invasion. economist.com/europe/2022/07…
In the first & second world wars, roughly three soldiers were wounded for every one killed. That soared over the 20th century, as @tanishafaza's research shows. But the Russian ratio is lower: three to one, according to @CIA director Bill Burns last week. economist.com/europe/2022/07…
Other estimates posit a higher wounded to killed ratio. It's probably risen as artillery, which wounds through shrapnel, has come to play a dominant role. But high ratios that mean even modest numbers of deaths can equate to enormous casualties overall. economist.com/europe/2022/07…
.@tanishafazal's excellent paper on the topic is below. She points out: "because of improvements in military medicine, the same conflict that produced 1,200 fatalities in 1860 is likely to have produced 800 fatalities in 1980". But relatively more wounded. belfercenter.org/sites/default/…
.@KofmanMichael's thread from May is here. He notes: "The problem with higher range KIA counts is that you quickly develop input/output problems. There are more casualties than could feasibly be involved in the fight...certain numbers become implausible"
And now we have another US casualty estimate, which reinforces my point that Bill Burns’ public figure of 15,000 Russians killed & 60,000 casualties overall was chosen from the *lower* end of the US spectrum.
I’m going to go mad tracking these casualty estimates. Because a few weeks after the CIA director said 60,000 Russian casualties, DoD says 70-80,000. Different people plucking figures from across the estimated interval?
Pentagon briefing: “I know that battle damage is of great interest. Final battle damage will take some time, but initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.”
Pentagon briefing: “In total, US forces employed approximately 75 precision guided weapons during this operation. This included, as the President stated last night, 14 30,000 pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance penetrators, marking the first ever operational use of this weapon.”
Pentagon briefing: “our initial assessment… is that all of our precision munitions struck where we wanted them to strike and had the desired effect, which means especially in Fordo, which was the primary target here, we believe we achieved destruction of capabilities there”
1. Useful details here. “While some American officials find the Israeli estimate credible, others emphasized that the U.S. intelligence assessment remained unchanged” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
2. “American spy agencies believe that it could take several months, and up to a year, for Iran to make a weapon.” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
3. “new [White House] assessments echoed material provided by Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, which believes that Iran can achieve a nuclear weapon in 15 days.”
But: “None of the new assessments on the timeline to get a bomb are based on newly collected intelligence”
'To reach even [Natanz] all the weapons available to the Israeli Air Force, and all except the 30,000 lbs GBU-57/B and the 5,000 lbs GBU 72/B available to the United States, would likely require several impacts into the same crater to ‘burrow’ down...' rusi.org/explore-our-re…
"For the FFEP [Fordow] and new facility at Natanz at an estimated 80-100 meters, possibly with layers of reinforced concrete, even the GBU-57/B [carried by B2/B21] would likely require multiple impacts at the same aiming point to have a good chance of penetrating the facility."
"Strikes with lesser penetrating weapons could still collapse entry and exit tunnels...However, unless a longer-term campaign were mounted with regular follow-up strikes, efforts to dig down...to re-establish access and supplies would likely begin almost immediately."
🧵A few other random observations from the Strategic Defence Review that caught my eye.
"much more rapid progress is needed in [carrier strike] evolution into ‘hybrid’ carrier airwings, whereby crewed combat aircraft (F-35B) are complemented by autonomous collaborative platforms in the air, and expendable, single-use drones"
Pretty interesting, but v non-committal.
"Exploring possible development from a Type 45 destroyer to a minimally crewed or autonomous air dominance system that could integrate directed energy weapons"
1/ Very important signal that UK might return to air-launched tactical nuclear forces by buying F-35A and participating in US nuclear sharing arrangements. There had been indications that UK was preparing to be able to host B61 tactical nuclear weapons. thetimes.com/uk/defence/art…
2/ UK participation in nuclear sharing would have limited impact in itself, since weapons remain under US custody & control, and several other European countries already host B61s & practice delivering them. This doesn’t mitigate against withdrawal of US nuclear umbrella. But …
3/ Having the Royal Air Force prepare for & be capable of handling, carrying, delivering & planning non-strategic nuclear use could make it easier in the long term to develop a (vastly more expensive & currently unviable) sovereign air-launched tactical nuclear leg, like France.
An interesting essay on how US intelligence agencies judged Soviet intentions and capabilities & how that changed over time. "...probably incorrectly believing there was also a Soviet proclivity to prepare to launch a war if conditions seemed propitious" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"...considerable [Soviet] exaggerations of Western bellicosity and capabilities, including planning for initiation of war. Soviet intel estimates, like those of the United States and NATO, were always predicated on initiation of war by the other side" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
'It is clear in retrospect that what had been needed in 1976 was not a hard-line Team B, but a more imaginative and far-seeing "Team C."' cia.gov/resources/csi/…