1] The Siege of #Abuja has begun, we can draw interesting parallels with the 1969 siege of Owerri by Biafran forces in that you have a nominally weaker force, gradually encircling a much more powerful and well equipped one in order to destroy it but I would rather not.
2]Lets address the nature of this fight, I believe the enemy (or enemies) have broken the campaign down into several phases (1) Preparation of the Battlespace (2) Shaping the Battlespace (3) Isolating the Battlespace (4) The Attack (5) Exploitation.
3]I believe we are currently in Phase2/3.
Phase 1: The preparation of the battlespace has been going on for many years. There have been Boko Haram, ISWAP, Ansaru Darul Islam etc elements in the States surrounding Abuja for decades. They have been mostly benign,
Phase 1: The preparation of the battlespace has been going on for many years. There have been Boko Haram, ISWAP, Ansaru Darul Islam etc elements in the States surrounding Abuja for decades. They have been mostly benign,
4]in that they do not overtly confront the security forces or the state. But this presence has allowed them to build camps & structures, recruit, familiarise themselves with the terrain, depopulate areas , proselytise & reduce the presence of the state (little that it was).
5]As they became stronger, they began to deny the security forces mobility & access through ambushes, IEDs and attacks. The end state is that they are firmly encamped in Niger, Nasarawa, Kogi & Kaduna States & the hinterland of the FCT.
6]Phase 2: the enemy has sought to shape the battlespace strategically & operationally. Operationally this has taken the form of attacks on villages & security forces, putting them on the defensive & forcing them to devote combat power to force protection & defending major roads
7]Deliberate attacks, are usually road bound & thus easy to spot. All of this leaves the population & minor roads & villages free for the enemy to plan, hide, manoeuvre & operate. Strategically they have shaped the information battlespace with spectacular attacks
8]of which the #AbujaKaduna train & Kuje prison attacks are examples. The Abuja- Kaduna train attack stands out as the op that heralded the start of Phase 3. The enemy has past experience with the government & clearly knows they rarely negotiate seriously or in good faith,
9]thus their objectives might not be what they ask but to exploit the attack to underline the governments powerlessness, extract maximum ransom from the victims & tie up government resources trying to react or respond.
10]I am fairly sure they didn’t factor in this level of disinterest & ineptitude but their actions thus far do not indicate disarray. If they genuinely wanted to pressure the government they would have executed hostages by now. Instead they have held onto them for months.
11]It is instructive that the hostages are wealthy & middle class, many of whom have personal links to the ruling class, the psychological effect on the government & its supporters should not be discounted as a very potent outcome of this hostage taking.
12]Combined with attacks within Abuja & the FCT itself, it generates a fairly believable narrative of the enemies capability, impunity & presence. Fear & panic can be extremely useful allies for a weaker force.
13]Phase 3: has begun I believe but will increase with attacks on the roads to Abuja as well as attacks within Abuja. These attacks will again seek to suck in government combat power to protect the roads as well as set up checkpoints to try and defend the city.
14]again leaving the outskirts undefended. A spectacular attack on Abuja airport is highly likely in order to increase the feelings of isolation & impotence & operationally to damage/ neutralise NAF equipment.
15] Phase 4: These attacks will increase with IEDs, ambushes, marauding gunmen etc until Abuja ceases to function as people flee, businesses & schools close down. It’s unlikely there will be an attempt to capture Abuja.
16]Such an attack would be very costly for the enemy & pointless as they can essentially neutralise the city without it. Phase 5 is again not chronological, as the exploitation of their actions for money & publicity is ongoing & continuous.
17]I began with the siege of Owerri & I’ll briefly return to it. By the end of the siege after @NigAirForce tried air dropping supplies, their radios had died, 3Marine Commando Div in Port Harcourt assumed the troops trapped in Owerri (14 Bde led by Lt Col Etuk) had been lost
@NigAirForce 18]Etuk refused to surrender or be killed & organised his men for a withdrawal. The Biafrans promptly attacked & 14 Bde reacted so aggressively that the Biafrans resolved to simply allow them to leave the city rather than risk more men trying to defeat them.
@NigAirForce 19]Etuk withdrew with his surviving men, heavy weapons, casualties, stores & the body of his popular 2IC Major Hamman. The Biafrans attempted to ambush him on his way to Port Harcourt, but 14 Bde fought its way to the city & reported to an extremely surprised Benjamin Adekunle.
@NigAirForce 20]Owerri fell to Federal forces a few months later and the war soon ended.
The lesson of the Siege of Owerri is that even when surrounded, cut off & left for dead the fight is not over until you say it is
The lesson of the Siege of Owerri is that even when surrounded, cut off & left for dead the fight is not over until you say it is
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