Don't want to sound alarmist, but IMO it's notable that at this time of US-China tension, 3 of China's largest/newest roll-on/roll-off civilian ferries appear to be off their normal routes and are in or have moved south toward the Taiwan Strait. All 3 are associated with the PLA.
The first of these ferries is the ZHONG HUA FU XING. Built in 2019, it's owned by the Bohai Ferry Group (as are all 3 ferries), which is organized as the 8th Transport Group of the PRC Maritime Militia. It was used to transport tanks in a 2021 exercise. taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4318076
@MarineTraffic AIS data shows that this ferry left the Bohai Gulf after a port visit to Tianjin (near where it loaded tanks in 2021) and is now transiting southbound toward the northern approaches to the Taiwan Strait. Its destination is Shantou, across the Strait from S Taiwan.
ZHONG HUA FU XING appears to normally operate on a route between Dalian and Yantai (across the Yellow Sea), so this is a significant departure from its normal operating pattern.
Next up: BO HAI MA ZHU, another large Bohai Ferry vessel, built in 2015. It appears to have also departed its normal route between Dalian and Yantai, and is now down at Qingdao. Its specific location at Qingdao is not the normal ferry landing, it looks like a commercial port.
The 3rd ferry of interest is BO HAI ZUAN ZHU, also operated by Bohai Ferry and built in 2015. It appears to have loaded in Tianjin & is now in the Strait, headed for Guangou—near Shantou on the southern end of the Strait. It also normally operates between Dalian and Yantai.
So, what does this all mean? First, I think it's highly likely that these ferries ARE engaged in some sort of operation for the PLA, as they're way off their normal routes at the same time. It could be part of a long-planned exercise, or perhaps a reaction to recent events. 🤷♂️
To be sure, these ferries alone cannot carry a large enough force to invade Taiwan itself, and the rest of China's ferries appear to be on their normal routes for now. But perhaps they could carry enough to assist in seizure of a smaller island. I guess we'll see...
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.
What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).
They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".
I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.
Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.
Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.