Don't want to sound alarmist, but IMO it's notable that at this time of US-China tension, 3 of China's largest/newest roll-on/roll-off civilian ferries appear to be off their normal routes and are in or have moved south toward the Taiwan Strait. All 3 are associated with the PLA.
The first of these ferries is the ZHONG HUA FU XING. Built in 2019, it's owned by the Bohai Ferry Group (as are all 3 ferries), which is organized as the 8th Transport Group of the PRC Maritime Militia. It was used to transport tanks in a 2021 exercise. taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4318076
@MarineTraffic AIS data shows that this ferry left the Bohai Gulf after a port visit to Tianjin (near where it loaded tanks in 2021) and is now transiting southbound toward the northern approaches to the Taiwan Strait. Its destination is Shantou, across the Strait from S Taiwan.
ZHONG HUA FU XING appears to normally operate on a route between Dalian and Yantai (across the Yellow Sea), so this is a significant departure from its normal operating pattern.
Next up: BO HAI MA ZHU, another large Bohai Ferry vessel, built in 2015. It appears to have also departed its normal route between Dalian and Yantai, and is now down at Qingdao. Its specific location at Qingdao is not the normal ferry landing, it looks like a commercial port.
The 3rd ferry of interest is BO HAI ZUAN ZHU, also operated by Bohai Ferry and built in 2015. It appears to have loaded in Tianjin & is now in the Strait, headed for Guangou—near Shantou on the southern end of the Strait. It also normally operates between Dalian and Yantai.
So, what does this all mean? First, I think it's highly likely that these ferries ARE engaged in some sort of operation for the PLA, as they're way off their normal routes at the same time. It could be part of a long-planned exercise, or perhaps a reaction to recent events. 🤷♂️
To be sure, these ferries alone cannot carry a large enough force to invade Taiwan itself, and the rest of China's ferries appear to be on their normal routes for now. But perhaps they could carry enough to assist in seizure of a smaller island. I guess we'll see...
Some folks may recall this article I wrote last year in @WarOnTheRocks on how the PRC could use civilian shipping—and especially roll-on/roll-off ferries & vehicle carriers—to augment traditional PLA Navy amphibious sealift capacity in a Taiwan invasion. warontherocks.com/2021/08/mind-t…
Since it's been roughly a year since I conducted the survey of Chinese-owned Ro-Ro ferries and vehicle carriers that supplied the key data to the article, I thought it might be useful to do such a survey again and see how things have changed over the last year or so.
Once again I used Automatic Information System (AIS) data from @MarineTraffic, only counting vessels in active use—either broadcasting AIS data in real-time or having done so within the last few weeks. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
Surprise, surprise...despite both Cambodian and Chinese denials, Western official have confirmed that China is building a naval base in Cambodia, with a groundbreaking ceremony to occur this week. 😐 washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
This 👉 "...the PLA does not regard civilian shipping as a stopgap measure
until more PLAN amphibious shipping can be built, but as a central feature of its preferred approach."
To be blunt, w/ evidence we now have from years of watching PLA exercises using Ro-Ros, plus what we now know about the organization & scale of the maritime militia, to say "the PLA Navy doesn't have enough amphibs" is to reveal you're not paying attention.digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-…
Interesting. @TheEconomist, bulwark of the liberal order and self-styled champion of freedom, gives a by-invitation platform to a former PLA officer currently serving as a fellow at a PRC state-funded university think tank. economist.com/by-invitation/…
Unsurprisingly, Col Bo’s essay is well-written and contains a fair bit of truth, including a notable (from a Chinese voice, at least) admission that Putin has failed in Ukraine.
But in the end he gets to use @TheEconomist’s pages to present a bottom line that the PRC—a genocidal, revanchist state that claims the entire South China Sea as its own & regularly threatens its democratic neighbor with the choice of surrender or invasion—is a “stabiliser”. 🤔
@AndrewSErickson and Gabriel Collins have produced here a highly granular and sensible to-do list that Taiwanese and U.S. defense decision-makers would be wise to read carefully - and enact ASAP. warontherocks.com/2022/04/eight-…
Amen to this: “Russia’s initial experiences in Ukraine will likely lead China’s military to conclude that attacking Taiwan would require deploying overwhelming fires up front, instead of holding back like Russia did initially.”
It isn’t just Taiwan that needs to do a LOT more of this: “Passive hardening, dispersion, and decoys would also function as a form of ballistic missile defense...”
U.S. and allied bases and facilities are under mortal threat from the PLA Rocket Force as well.
Some fresh imagery (3/2022) from the new PLAN nuclear submarine shipyard at Huludao. It looks like they're just about done building the last big building (at bottom).
This is a big facility - for comparison see the Electric Boat final assembly facility at Groton, CT, 2nd image.
Before you @ me...yes, I'm aware EB is building a new South Yard for Columbia (in construction in the pic above), and has a whole other module building facility at Quonset Pt, RI, etc. 😉
China has other submarine building facilities, too. Any way you cut it, this is a big yard.
You can now see the transfer setup where they'll take roll the submarines out on tracks from the right and into the blue transfer dock, then lower that into the larger drydock. The transfer dock is about 33mx215m, should be big enough for SSBNs and other large submarines.