1/ Why do Russian soldiers break on the Ukranian battlefield? This third 🧵 in a series looks at at how their personal experiences of war have prompted some Russian contract soldiers to refuse orders, resign from their contracts and try to go home.
2/ For the first part, a look at the factors motivating ordinary Russian soldiers to fight in Ukraine, see below:
3/ In the second part, I've looked at the demoralising effect of inadequate training and lack of equipment for volunteers, as well as their supplies being looted before they even reached the front lines:
4/ It's worth noting at the outset that the nature of the Ukraine war is different from anything that Russia has experienced since the 1940s. Even those who have fought in the Caucasus or Middle East have never seen anything like the full-scale industrial war in Ukraine.
5/ The chances of becoming a casualty in Ukraine are far higher than in any of Russia's post-WW2 conflicts. On present trends, the Ukraine war is likely to become one of the deadliest conflicts globally in the last 200 years. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…
6/ In my first thread, I noted that many Russian soldiers are motivated by money, ideology, comradeship and/or experience. But none of those matters if you come back in a coffin. Motivation often falters in the face of certain death, especially if it's due to bad leadership.
7/ I've been looking at the war through the eyes of Viktor Shayga, a Russian who volunteered to join the army as a contract soldier in March 2022. He entered Ukraine in early April and fought with the 752nd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment near Izyum, east of Kharkiv.
8/ Russia has suffered heavy casualties in repeated attempts to capture the villages of Sulyhivka and Dovhen'ke south of Izyum. After 3 months of fighting, Sulyhivka is still contested. (Video shows artillery destroying Russian armour in Dovhen'ke).
9/ Shayga's company consisted of 13 people, supplemented after a week by 13 more newly recruited volunteers who had been sent directly from Russia with minimal training. Before the group moved to the front line, they were given the option of refusing to fight.
10/ "In the morning, our regiment’s zampolit [political officer] arrived. He said we are going to Satan’s ass, so those who want can refuse right here at the farm, since later he won’t be taking anyone back if someone wanted to return.
11/ One man refused – praporshik [ensign] Vasiliy from Moscow. Everyone else went."
It wasn't a good sign that the unit's senior NCO didn't want to fight. Shayga later found that its starshina [first sergeant] also kept himself out of the fighting.
12/ Their first offensive action was an attempt to take the Ukrainian-held village of Dovhen'ke. However, they came under heavy bombardment as they entered nearby Sulyhivka and got no further.
13/ "As we walked, the Ukrainian army noticed us and started shelling us from Grad [BM-21 multiple rocket launchers] and mortars.
14/ During the second, rather massive shelling I already said goodbye to my life – I thought that was it, that the next bomb will either rip my legs off or kill me instantly. It was really scary."
15/ The aborted attack was postponed until the next day, 20 April. However, there was not much enthusiasm for it among the Russian soldiers.
16/ "Many company commanders in the two battalions of the 752th regiment told their fighters that we are being sent to a sure death, since the Ukrainians are well prepared."
17/ "So they said – decide for yourself if you want to go or not. Four fifths of us (if not more) refused to go. So did I ... because I simply had no physical energy to keep going into an assault."
18/ The regiment did find enough volunteers, but seem to have had no vehicles. Instead they walked 7 km – taking 6 hours – across the open countryside to Dovhen'ke, under constant mortar, shell and tank fire. Many were killed; many more were wounded, including Shayga's commander.
19/ "When we reported to our battalion commander Major Vasyura about dead and wounded, he cursed: ‘leave them and keep advancing!!!’."
20/ The inexperienced officers didn't know what to do and turned to one of the volunteer contract soldiers, a 40-year-old combat veteran, who said: "Guys, we need to fall back, otherwise we will be smashed with mortars and those who stay alive will be finished off".
21/ They retreated to Dovhen'ke, only returning at 23:00. "One of the volunteers, Andrey from Kursk who came together with me said that many simply ran off while retreating. He yelled at them to help pull out the wounded, but they didn’t help."
22/ "He said he wanted to grab an assault rifle and start shooting in their backs… Thus, the grenade launcher platoon commander, Captain Nikolaev who was dragged for 4 hours, died from blood loss."
The next day, almost everyone from Shayga's unit refused to join another attack.
23/ Other units attacked Dovhen'ke, but with no more success. In one attack, "8 tanks and infantry entered Dovhen'ke but decided to keep going rather than taking positions, so the tankmen went forward and almost all of them got hit, and then the infantry was also pushed out".
24/ Special forces (spetsnaz) and airborne units also attempted to take Dovhen'ke but were repulsed. A unit of trained reservists arrived and spent a month assaulting the village. "In total, 340 of them arrived in Ukraine. After a month of shelling only 57 remained."
25/ "Moreover, half of the survivors were at the headquarters. Most of them were wounded. They never had a single firefight, all the losses came from Ukrainian artillery fire."
26/ New volunteers were immediately thrown into the attack on Dovhen'ke when they arrived in Ukraine. By May, all of the officers had either been killed, wounded or were refusing to attack.
27/ "There were no more officers so they were picking the most hardened ones among the volunteers (ones who fought in Chechnya and Syria), appointed them as seniors, gave them radios and sent them to assault Dovhen'ke."
28/ In one failed assault, described in the Russian Telegram channel 'Military Informant', a group of volunteers was sent to assist a Russian company – normally about 100 soldiers – that was down to 20 infantrymen, 4 BMP infantry fighting vehicles and one tank.
29/ Fierce Ukrainian resistance pinned the Russians down and forced them to retreat. "The tank had not even begun to work on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the BMP distinguished itself only by shelling its own [side]." The plan of attack quickly failed.
30/ The unit's wounded commander was left in the village with only a grenade to blow himself up. Three Russians were killed. Every surviving Russian combatant was wounded. Not even veterans of the Donbas, Syria, Libya and Chechnya had experienced such intense combat before.
31/ Some of the shell-shocked remnants from the assaults, including Shayga, hitched rides on trucks back to Izyum. Others "scattered around the forests after those insane assaults by our unit."
32/ "They fled because they were immediately thrown into battle and they didn’t even know each other all that well. I’ve heard they now wander in the forests in small groups, not letting anyone approach them. If someone yells at them – ‘We’re yours!’, they start shooting anyway."
33/ Contrary to popular myth, the Russian army doesn't have WW2-style 'blocking units' which shoot deserters. Instead, Shayga says, "one of our PMCs [Private Military Companies = mercenaries] had an objective of collecting such people in the forests and fields of our area."
34/ (This was likely the notorious Wagner Group, whose soldiers were photographed in the forests east of Dovhen'ke in early June.)
35/ "They picked up two of our guys in shrubbery near Sulyhivka… They fed them, gave them new uniforms, since after two weeks in Sulyhivka their uniform was completely worn out, and brought them to Izyum."
36/ Back in the rear, Shayga and other 'refusers' were used as a labour battalion. "We dug trenches, carried earth bags to reinforce division headquarters, sawed pines for dugouts. Nearly every day they were bringing new ‘refusers’ to us."
37/ A steady stream of arrivals with stories "even more tragic than ours" further demotivated Shayga and his comrades. Coincidentally, the Ukrainian authorities intercepted a phone call from another soldier of the 752nd GMMR talking about his experiences, likely at Sulyhivka:
38/ "There were 107 people [in my company], 10 remain. From them 4 have left, 6 of us have stayed. From the 1st platoon I’m alone left. In the 1st platoon we’ve had 22 people, I am the only one left."
39/ "There was an offensive here two days ago, 752 [regiment] were attacking the ukrops and 25 people died. 25. 25 fucking guys have died. Simply, 25 have died, all “200” [dead]. It’s a complete slaughter. Total ass. What they are telling you on the TV, don’t believe it, don’t."
40/ "It’s a complete ass here. A fuckload of dead, a fuckload of fucked up tanks, it’s a fucking ass."
One of these attacks was filmed by the Ukrainians. Reportedly 5 BMPs and an unknown number of Russian soldiers were destroyed by Ukrainian artillery.
41/ After so many failed assaults, the area around Dovhen'ke resembled a slaughterhouse. Shayga heard from troops involved in subsequent attacks that when they approached the village, "very close to it there are bodies of our dead soldiers lying around."
42/ "Some have already begun decomposing and swelling back then. Some also said they saw bodies of our dead piled up in shrubbery, some were also tied to the trees ... They said our wounded were in one of the trenches for three days and no one could pick them up."
43/ Not surprisingly, Shayga is contemptuous of his commanders' decisions – a common theme in many Russian soldiers' accounts of the war. In the next thread, I'll look at what Russian soldiers have said about their side's poor command, tactics and strategy in the war. /end
Translations provided by the estimable @wartranslated – if you're not following him, you should!
1/ A Russian military police officer who stole 2 million rubles from a mentally disabled recruit was sent to an assault unit. However, illustrating the current state of morale on the front lines, he and three comrades reportedly blew their own legs off to avoid going to fight. ⬇️
2/ Russian warblogger 'BCh3' tells the story in three posts:
"We usually write about heroes, but here we have an anti-hero. One of those who profit from war; one of those who ‘while some suffer, others benefit’. Meet one of the staff officers of the Military Police."
3/ "Briefly, the situation...
A training ground. New arrivals are undergoing training. One of the fighters is a quiet guy, but something is wrong with his head. He is unwell.
1/ Why aren't Russia's treaty partners helping it in the war against Ukraine, ask Russian warbloggers. They wonder what use the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is if it can't even help Russia to conquer a neighbouring state. ⬇️
2/ The CSTO was established in 2002 as a military alliance of six post-Soviet states – Armenia (which is in the process of withdrawing), Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Its charter requires participants to abstain from the use or threat of force.
3/ Despite this, Russian warbloggers can't seem to understand why none of the CSTO states will provide military assistance against Ukraine. 'Direct Action Z' laments:
1/ Russia is constructing shelters for its heavy bomber aircraft to protect them from Ukrainian drone strikes, such as the famous 'Operation Spider's Web'. However, Russian warbloggers say it's too little, too late. ⬇️
2/ The shelters are being constructed at the Engels air base near Saratov, which has previously been attacked by fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs. It houses the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, which includes a single squadron of Tu-160s and another of Tu-95s.
3/ At least 17 shelters are being built to accommodate the strategic bombers housed at the base. Reportedly, the work began in April 2025, before the June 2025 'Spider's Web' attacks.
1/ Wounded Russian soldiers are having to wait for anything from 48 hours to a remarkable 90 days for evacuation from the battlefields of Ukraine. Russian medical specialists say that there is a widespread lack of field medical expertise, likely dooming many of the wounded. ⬇️
2/ The Bulletin of the Russian Military Medical Academy has published a new report "On the Impact of the Nature of Combat Operations on the Structure of Medical Losses and the Organization of Surgical Care for the Wounded." However, commentators say it doesn't reflect reality.
3/ The data in the report is old, covering 2022-2024, and for some reason was not published until now. As the specialist military-medical warblog '5mg. KGV.' notes, it's not representative of the current situation on the battlefield. The blog's author writes:
1/ Russian warblogger Nikita Tretyakov is "thinking the unthinkable" about the war in Ukraine and its disastrous consequences. He lists a long series of catastrophes that he says have befallen Russia since February 2022, and the Russian weaknesses that they have exposed. ⬇️
2/ Tretyakov quotes Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov's recent comments on the failed negotiations with Donald Trump in Anchorage on 15 August 2025, in which Lavrov implicitly accused Trump of betraying Putin's trust:
3/ “I don’t even want to suspect that Alaska, like the European actions, was conceived to buy time for the Kyiv regime to be armed; I don’t even want to think about it, but in reality, that's how it turned out.”
1/ Russia's blocking of Telegram has had a disastrous impact on the reach and income of many Russians. This includes Russia's professional warbloggers, who have suffered a drastic drop in income that threatens to make their work financially unviable. ⬇️
2/ The 'Novorossiya militia reports' Telegram channel has been active online for 12 years. Its operators say it now faces a battle for its survival following the block on Telegram and an apparent algorithmic downranking on VKontakte (VK).
3/ An appeal to its readers for funds highlights how some are now struggling to make ends meet, and also provides an insight into the workings of professional warblogging outfits: