1/ Overnight news of a devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a Russian ammunition train suggests to me that the Ukrainians have been rather clever in exploiting the limitations of the local rail network.
2/ The attack took place at Brylivka railway station, south-east of Kherson. Coincidentally, it's an area I remember from a visit many years ago. The whole area is a vast, flat, arid and frankly mononous farming region watered by irrigation canals.
3/ Brylivka owes its existence to the railway line, which was built in 1944 under Stalin to provide a second rail route to Crimea (the main line is further east, running from Melitopol to Simferopol). The village was founded the following year, presumably to house railway staff.
4/ But the line at Brylivka has three peculiarities. First and most importantly, the entire line from Kherson to Dzhankoy is only a single track line. Single track lines have a very limited capacity to carry trains. (Thanks to bueker.net for the map.)
5/ There had been a plan to upgrade the line to double tracks with electrification during the 2010s, but this fell through due to Russia's seizure of the Crimea in 2014.
6/ Second, Brylivka is equipped with a large set of passing loops (or passing sidings) which are long enough for large freight trains. Passing loops allow trains to pass in both directions on a single-line track. The Russian ammo train would have been stopped here.
7/ Third, Brylivka is just south of the North Crimean Canal, which waters the entire area (and Crimea). The railway line crosses it on a single-tack bridge – given its strategic importance, I wouldn't be surprised if Mr HIMARS paid it a visit soon.
8/ The line has not been very busy in recent years. Russia's takeover of the Crimea meant that long-distance and freight traffic ceased in 2014. Prior to the 2022 invasion, it reportedly only had 2 passenger trains a day between Kherson and Vadim, the last Ukrainian-held station.
9/ However, given Russia's dependency on railways for its military logistics (as noted by @TrentTelenko and others), the Russians are likely to have been making heavy use of the line to resupply their forces in occupied areas of Kherson oblast.
10/ They have also within the last month reopened the line from Kherson to Dzhankoy for passenger traffic, though I would imagine the timetable will be somewhat disrupted now. ria.ru/20220630/melit…
11/ So I think it's likely that the Ukrainians could predict where the ammo train would be stopping, because the single-track layout of the line likely required a stop at Brylivka's passing loops.
12/ The damage at Brylivka certainly looks severe, though I would imagine the Russians will be able to repair the track within a few days. But there's nothing they can do about the track's layout.
13/ Whatever else happens, the track is likely to remain single, there will continue to be a need for a passing loop at Brylivka, and trains will continue to need to stop there to allow other trains to pass. So this vulnerability isn't going to go away. /end
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1/ Simply travelling to and from the front line in Ukraine is a deadly task, due to the wide-ranging presence of drones. Many soldiers are killed before they even get near a frontline position. An account from a Russian warblogger highlights the work of "killzone runners". ⬇️
2/ 'Voenkor Kotenok' writes:
"On the front lines, they're often called "runners." They're supposedly special forces/semi-combatants on errands. They're supposedly as nimble as sperm, evading even drones."
3/ "The attitude is somewhat dismissive, as if they're not second-class citizens, but rather just helpers. They say there are "tough guys," assault troops, a military elite (and there is one, right?), and then there are the runners, the lackeys. You get the idea.
1/ Telegram will not be restored in Russia, and tighter restrictions will be imposed on mobile phone ownership, says Sergey Boyarsky, head of the State Duma IT Committee. He cites scammers, pro-Ukrainian sabotage, and drone attacks as the reasons behind these moves. ⬇️
2/ In a wide-ranging interview with the St Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka, Boyarsky has explained the thinking behind the government's new restrictions on Telegram. He says that "Telegram doesn't comply with Russian Federation law, and hasn't done so for many years."
3/ "The requirements are simple, basic: localise user data within the Russian Federation, remove prohibited information (extremism, terrorism), and cooperate with law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes (for example, the Crocus [terroist attack] case)."
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.