1/ Overnight news of a devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a Russian ammunition train suggests to me that the Ukrainians have been rather clever in exploiting the limitations of the local rail network.
2/ The attack took place at Brylivka railway station, south-east of Kherson. Coincidentally, it's an area I remember from a visit many years ago. The whole area is a vast, flat, arid and frankly mononous farming region watered by irrigation canals.
3/ Brylivka owes its existence to the railway line, which was built in 1944 under Stalin to provide a second rail route to Crimea (the main line is further east, running from Melitopol to Simferopol). The village was founded the following year, presumably to house railway staff.
4/ But the line at Brylivka has three peculiarities. First and most importantly, the entire line from Kherson to Dzhankoy is only a single track line. Single track lines have a very limited capacity to carry trains. (Thanks to bueker.net for the map.)
5/ There had been a plan to upgrade the line to double tracks with electrification during the 2010s, but this fell through due to Russia's seizure of the Crimea in 2014.
6/ Second, Brylivka is equipped with a large set of passing loops (or passing sidings) which are long enough for large freight trains. Passing loops allow trains to pass in both directions on a single-line track. The Russian ammo train would have been stopped here.
7/ Third, Brylivka is just south of the North Crimean Canal, which waters the entire area (and Crimea). The railway line crosses it on a single-tack bridge – given its strategic importance, I wouldn't be surprised if Mr HIMARS paid it a visit soon.
8/ The line has not been very busy in recent years. Russia's takeover of the Crimea meant that long-distance and freight traffic ceased in 2014. Prior to the 2022 invasion, it reportedly only had 2 passenger trains a day between Kherson and Vadim, the last Ukrainian-held station.
9/ However, given Russia's dependency on railways for its military logistics (as noted by @TrentTelenko and others), the Russians are likely to have been making heavy use of the line to resupply their forces in occupied areas of Kherson oblast.
10/ They have also within the last month reopened the line from Kherson to Dzhankoy for passenger traffic, though I would imagine the timetable will be somewhat disrupted now. ria.ru/20220630/melit…
11/ So I think it's likely that the Ukrainians could predict where the ammo train would be stopping, because the single-track layout of the line likely required a stop at Brylivka's passing loops.
12/ The damage at Brylivka certainly looks severe, though I would imagine the Russians will be able to repair the track within a few days. But there's nothing they can do about the track's layout.
13/ Whatever else happens, the track is likely to remain single, there will continue to be a need for a passing loop at Brylivka, and trains will continue to need to stop there to allow other trains to pass. So this vulnerability isn't going to go away. /end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Ukraine's drone strikes on the Russian Baltic port of Ust-Luga have prompted a familiar refrain from Russian warbloggers: what air defence doing? One warblogger sees a dire future ahead for Russia in the face of its enemies in the Baltic region. ⬇️
2/ On Telegram, the Russian journalist Yuri Kotenok (writing as 'Voenkor Kotenok') comments:
"The strikes on Ust-Luga are an extremely alarming symptom, or rather, a signal, not only because they are aimed at destroying Russia's global infrastructure."
3/ "Yes, these are extremely large losses and have serious consequences. But the traces of the raids will sooner or later be cleared up, repaired, and perhaps even reinforced and secured.
1/ Iran is seeking to establish a pay-to-sail regime in the Strait of Hormuz, under which it could earn over a quarter of a billion dollars a day. A senior member of the Iranian parliament says that vessels seeking to transit the strait will be charged $2 million each time. ⬇️
2/ The Financial Times and Rudaw report that the Iranian government intends to fully monetise the strait by forcing passing ships to pay a fee for each passage. The "new regime" has been announced on state television by Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a senior Iranian parliamentarian.
3/ Boroujerdi, a member of the parliament's National Security Committee, said that "For some ships which cross, for whatever reasons, Iran is charging them $2 million for the crossing ... In practice we have established a new regime governing the Strait of Hormuz after 47 years."
1/ Claims by pro-Russians that Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian Baltic ports went via Poland and the Baltic states have been met with scepticism by warblogger 'Fighterbomber'. If that's so, why has Russia not protested to those states?, he asks. ⬇️
2/ 'Fighterbomber', who has close links with the Russian Air Force, points out what Conan Doyle might have called the dog that didn't bark: the fact that the Russian government has said nothing about Ukrainian drones supposedly being routed over NATO territory:
3/ "Well, first of all, the airspace bordering Russia has been closed in countries like Poland and the Baltics for a long time.
Accusations from beauty bloggers that drones are being launched from the territory of these countries have been circulating for several years as well.
1/ With American ground forces building up in the Gulf region, much attention has been paid to Kharg Island in the northern Persian Gulf. But what about the Iranian-held islands in the Strait of Hormuz? Here's why they might be a higher priority for possible landings. ⬇️
2/ Seven Iranian-controlled islands punctuate the narrow strait between Iran and Oman: from west to east, Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb, Qeshm, Hengam, Larak and Hormuz itself. All are part of Iran's Hormozgan province.
3/ Two more Iranian islands, Bani Forur and Sirri, are located further west, in the Persian Gulf proper. They have strategic value as locations for reconnaissance, surveillance of shipping traffic, and possible interdiction. Both have an Iranian military presence.
1/ The Ukraine war is a "dead end" which "could last for a hundred years", according to a gloomy Russian commentary. The transparency of the battlefield and its domination by drones has made large offensives "downright impossible" and is causing vast numbers of casualties. ⬇️
2/ 'Voenkor Kotenok' has written a long and detailed analysis of the situation at the front lines, following similarly gloomy outlooks by other warbloggers (see the thread below).
3/ "I have repeatedly pointed out that the front in the Ukrainian theatre of military operations is in a stalemate. This situation took shape last year, marked by the Battle of Pokrovsk.
1/ An experiment by Russia's FSB has indicated that thousands of Russians are likely to be willing to carry out sabotage attacks on behalf of Ukraine or other foreign actors. In only three hours, the FSB recruited ten would-be saboteurs via Telegram. ⬇️
2/ Russia has experienced regular sabotage attacks carried out by people who have been recruited by foreign agents over the Internet, usually via Telegram. They are sometimes tricked into thinking they are working for the Russian security forces.
3/ More often, however, saboteurs act purely for money. Russia has used the same methodology to recruit saboteurs in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.