1-10
I am going to triple-down on this, because Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine reveals the moral failure of international organisations, and quite specifically of current interpretations of humanitarian and human rights principles. And there is a structure to it.
2-10
What do I mean? Well, go over to the #ICRC website - another august institution whose reputation has been severely damaged in 2022 due to its attitude to the Russia-Ukraine war.
3-10
ICRC page:
"IHL applies to the belligerent parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes for which they are fighting... otherwise, implementing the law would be impossible, since every party would claim to be a victim of aggression."
4-10
Let's unpack that nonsense. By the same argument of every party making claims, one would also not bother with IHL - it happens *all the time* that one party says the target over there was a legitimate military target, the other side says it wasn't. Do we give up on IHL too?
5-10
Of course ICRC, AI, and others do not - it's their bread-and-butter. But note the dishonest argumentation. I suspect that they over-emphasize the disconnection between jus ad bellum and jus in bello because they deal only with the latter and want to insert themselves...
6-10
...and be relevant in as many cases as possible. From a good place of aiming at reducing human suffering? Yes I believe that is the *initial* motivation for those who work for such organisations. But specialisation leads to lack of moral and legal clarity and courage.
7-10
I reject the notion that jus in bello should be assessed irrespective of "the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes". Sure, we must have universal principles that apply to all parties. For example no to summary executions or torture of prisoners of war.
8-10
But a *complete* separation of the two bodies of law is nonsensical because it destroys elementary context and effectively switches off an entire body of law. How can that be a sensible approach?
9-10
How can core IHL principles such as necessity, proportionality, or distinction be applied *identically* to two warring nations, in the case where one of them launched an unprovoked war of aggression while the other is purely in self-defence on its own territory?
10-10
Both logic and the common human yearning for justice compels us to demand that IHL be reconnected with jus ad bellum considerations, and that the distorting purism of organisations such as @ICRC and @amnesty be brought to an end.
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1-8 This is the reasoning used over at @amnesty, which reveals an inadequate understanding of the concomitant IHL principle of necessity.
If Ukraine followed AI's line, it would directly help the aggressor to win, itself a crime, and thus generating yet more crimes.
2-8 RUS knows where the military bases are, where the frontline is. Nearby woods or isolated structures would leave a tell-tale logistics trail RUS would rapidly identify. So, AI's point is wrong from an IHL perspective, because necessity isn't correctly assessed.
3-8 Necessity has many practical components for a defending nation, which furthermore has an inherent legal right to commandeer its civilian resources and facilities to aid the war effort and increase the survivability of its forces so that they live to fight another day.
(2-13)
Even if Ukraine's chances of survival looked bleak on 21 January, it was a matter of both deterring *further* adventurism and of moral principle to supply it with what means of defence one could.
Meanwhile, he had a headline to his name saying it won't matter.
(3-13)
As a result, his work is instinctively disliked by many Ukrainians and friends of Ukraine.
But the stances he tends to take are also viewed negatively by many others in Central and Eastern Europe - because they seem to promote insufficient deterrence against Moscow.
1-7 I see verbal dog-fights about tourism visas or other visas to Russian nationals.
The yes camp's arguments (I perceive):
Ethics: not all Russians are pro regime;
Economic: brain draining Russia;
Ideological: walls is not who we are.
2-7 The no camp's arguments (I perceive):
Security: pro-regime Russians may come in, including agents of the RUS state;
Economic: denying access to EU also like an econ. sanction;
Political: make ordinary tourists understand their state is a pariah
3-7 I stress a key security variable: Baltics especially have very small populations plus large pre-existing Russian communities. It would not take a large number of new agitators to create large problems. Easy to be high-minded in Paris. Riga a different reality.
This is a prospective scenario-based analysis. That's a great methodology. But it is odd in the sense that *all* the scenarios are escalation scenarios. None assume Russia giving up / conceding / retreating / cutting its losses.
3-7
Neither within the scenarios nor more broadly in the text do the authors provide a conceptual model of Russia's goals, incentives, and constraints.
Instead, the authors seem to have an 'implicit model' of an actor that could be goaded into choosing escalation without...
The Putin project switched to a 21st century version of national socialism in 2014: gather Russian lands & people using force. The project is now in its historically decisive phase. 2022 is a chosen make-or-break moment for the new Nazi project.
2-10
How *not* to think:
"It can't be viewed as Nazi because..."
1-they don't have Auschwitz
2-they have alliances with non-white nations
3-they're too corrupt and money-obsessed
4-RUS can't be Nazi because Nazis were bad to them
3-10
Counters:
1-irrelevant. Massacres happening, more are likely
2-NS Germany allied with expansionist Japan
3-Nazis were corrupt & stole properties, businesses, gold, fine art, at home & abroad, by the train-load
4-The Nazi mind is that of the predator not the prey