Thread by @MarkHertling

It's unfortunate, but I'm just now seeing this magnificent 🧵 by my friend @warinthefuture.

MG (ret) Ryan provides comments on changes in RU's warfighting approach...and this is a keeper/must read.

Hoping Mick doesn't mind, but I'd like to add a few thoughts.

A new 🧵1/

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1553973368809918464

Yes, RU had an initial plan in Feb. I did a brief for some folks showing my thoughts on original operational & strategic objectives.

See the 2 charts below.

RU assigned 190,000 forces on 9+ avenues of approaches on exterior lines...and were rebuffed for a variety of reasons. 2/

As noted in March, the myriad reasons for RU failure:
-Poor command & control
-lack of preparation (training & exercises) to the planned maneuver
-dysfunction logistics system
-practice not following doctrine
-ineffective combined arms maneuver & air support
-etc, etc, 3/

In early April, RU announced a "planned 2d offensive," which had obvious reduced operational & tactical aims.

At that time, I summarized those actions with these 2 charts.

After several "operational pauses," RU gained very little ground & were repulsed on most fronts.4/

The factors critically important during this phase were:
1. the logistics battle (who would get their supply system working)
2. the attrition fight.

-RU continued to be challenged w/ logistics flow
-UKR began turning the tide w/ introduction of long-range/precision arty. 5/

There have been myriad articles (some good, some very bad) about how new HIMARs contribute to both these areas, but this one by @IAPonomarenko is one of the most succinct:
kyivindependent.com/national/why-i… 6/

If 12 (now 16) HIMARS (& MLRS from other NATO nations) were good, more would be better, right?

I addressed that in the below thread about rockets, rocket pods & production rate, giving insight into other factors of war that need consideration. 7/

https://twitter.com/markhertling/status/1551668596803358724?s=21&t=zU123A-MWPJXBFgwIB13yQ

Which brings me to comment on MG Ryan's phrase "simple military strategy of corrosion."

I don't believe it's helpful to offer this term (which actually applies to equipment), when there are other factors causing things to happen.ampp.org/resources/what…

What do I mean? 8/

Yes, RU has reassessed & changed strategic (as well as operational & tactical) approaches throughout.

And, results of battles do reshape political objectives.

And, as MG Ryan implies, Ukraine’s military approach has been replete with courage, discipline & effectiveness… 9/

However, I'd say (please bear w/ me) what armies will study in the future & what may give us indicators of what will happen in phase 3 is based on 3 things:

1. Clausewitzian principles
2. Failure of RU military to adapt
3. Ability of UKR military to execute & transform 10/

Clausewitz warned armies must understand:
1) Friction ("countless minor incidents a commander can never foresee that combine to lower the general level of a force's performance").
2) Chance ("...makes everything in war uncertain & interferes with the course of events")...11/

...and finally,
3) Fog ("War is the realm of uncertainty; 3/4s of the factors on which actions in war are based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."

These 3 are equally present on both sides. They are on every battlefield, usually when least expected. 12/

Clausewitz notes that strong will, preparation of the forces, support of the people and the government (and allies) may help counter the effect of these factors.

This is where I believe UKR continues to hold the advantage. 13/

Which brings us to #2: RU's inability to adapt.

Russia's force depletion is significant. The sanctions are hindering their economy and their ability to repair or rebuild their army...at least in the near term.

Putin is increasingly a pariah. 14/ businessinsider.com/russia-pariah-…

The estimate of RU dead & wounded varies, but low & high end estimations of RU soldiers killed are staggering for 5+months of fighting.

Russia is forcing volunteer battalion & reports indicate their battalion tactical groups are way understrength.

https://twitter.com/whereisrussia/status/1552971826875322368?s=21&t=kqCIAgTvU3uQfL6-yZ8AfQ

15/

RU would like to adapt, but as stated previously their command structure, force & reserve organization, leadership ability, supply systems and national leadership will find adaptation difficult in the short or long term. 16/

So what about the UA ability to continue to execute & transform?

As @WarintheFuture said, they have executed magnificently.

In Phase 1 (Feb-Apr) they executed a masterful & doctrinally-correct, infantry-centric, *active defense* on multiple axis in a target-rich environment 17/

The UA & territorial defense actions N. of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Mykolayiv & numerous other places will be studied by ALL armies of the world in the future.

The use of dismounted infantry w/ precision AT weapons (Javelin), various UAS, & soviet weapons was brilliant. 18/

In Phase 2 (Apr-Jul), their combined doctrinally-sound *deliberative defense*, *hasty attack*, & eventual *counterfire operations* were brilliant in the Donbas...in the battles near Izyum, Slov'yans'k and Syeverondonets'k.

The rapid integration of HIMARS was impressive.19/

Now, President Z directed new battles in the south...likely in Kherson.

(BTW, for US audiences...when "Kherson" is mentioned, it means the entire Kherson "Oblast" (Oblast=province/state).

Kherson is = to our state of Maryland; Kherson City is 1/2 the size of Baltimore. 20/

What would a battle in Kherson Oblast look like?

Again, our friend @IAPonomarenko has provided us a preview: kyivindependent.com/national/what-… 21/

While this article provides good info, it doesn't list the operational/strategic damage to the RU force (capturing the territory that borders Crimea to the S; trapping several thousand Russians in the Mykolayivs'ka Oblast to the W; blocking the supply lines from the E)...22/

It also doesn't state the further adaptation the UA must make to execute this offensive:
-combine active forces w/ territorial defense & resistance
-conduct combined arms attacks w/ tanks, inf, arty
-conduct insurgency operations against RU political offices
-shift logistics 23/

For the UA to conduct *deliberate attacks* mixed with relatively untrained territorials & resistance forces will be hard.

There's much more training & preparation for combined arms deliberate attacks than were required in the two previous phases. 24/

Key to this fight will be movement, maneuver, precision fires, artillery (and air) support, speed & effectiveness of logistics, good command and control.

It may take a while & it will be bloody...but UA is prepared for this fight. 25/25