Sunday update--again little map change, but important shift to the south and west (Kherson) and what that means. Ukraine and the strategy of telegraphing intentions (or not).
Like last week, there has been little shift in the front line between the two forces. Indeed the area of engagement in the Donbas seems to have shrunk noticeably in the last two weeks. The north end of the Donbas salient (Siversk-Slovyansk) seems to have gone very quiet.
What Russian offensive action there is is concentrated on Bakhmut and pushing forward from Donetsk. @TheStudyofWar map.
This limitation of areas of offensive has gone hand in hand with a decrease in concentrated ranged fire (imho) by Russia everywhere (though some people seem to be arguing the opposite). Might be easier to show you a three week FIRMS map from July 17 to now (when Russia pause was
...declared over and three weeks back from July 9. This long period will compensate somewhat for weather differences. If you look 3 weeks from July 9 backwards, you see a red mass of fire which basically follows the front line in the Donbas. Heavy Russian artillery throughout.
Now in the three weeks back from today--very different. Lots of fire everywhere (so its getting through the cloud cover, but very evenly spaced throughout the region. Much seems to be burning farm fields after harvest. Lots of fire where there isnt even fighting.
Kherson front just as different. From July 9 backwards, fire concentrated on a clear front line--deep and red. Now, spread everywhere but not nearly as concentrated. Indeed more fires recorded away from the front line (east bank of Dnipr) than along it.
Russian ability to have sustained, ranged attacks that allowed for their earlier, small advances in the Donbas, seems to have been effected significantly from the Ukrainian logistics attacks (depots, rail lines, bridges). Looks like front line units are getting smaller resupplies
Another reason for Russian decreasing attacks is that it seems the Russians have been rushing forces to the Kherson front. One osint assessment from @DefMon3 has the Russians with more than a third of their forces either on one of the banks of the Dnipr
Of course on one hand this makes lots of sense, as the Ukrainians have been talking up a major offensive of their own in Kherson oblast for well over a month. They are basically screaming at the Russians--we are coming! Its amazing.
So the Russians certainly believe them--and have reacted accordingly. This has led to speculation as to why the Ukrainians have been so open--I tried to summarize some ideas here.
I think the Ukrainians are doing this not because they are about to launch some large, combined arms, armor assault (I think such attacks are very difficult in this war). I think they are doing it because they view the Kherson front as a far better area for them...
...to keep doing what they have been doing in the Donbas--only better. Its far safer for them to operate their ranged forces and ground forces in Kherson as opposed to the Donbas. In the latter they were in a salient pushed into Russian lines and close to Russia itself.
In Kherson the Russians are exposed, pushed forward, and the Ukrainians can operate from their interior more easily. Moreover, the supply issue for the Russians is far trickier with rivers where bridges can be severed and only a few heavy rail lines.
The Ukrainian offensive should not be conceived of as an offensive in a modern combined arms manor. Its basically a form of accelerated attritional warfare. What they have done is tried to tempt the Russians into sending forces into an area where its easier for Ukr to do this
And the Russians have obliged. So my guess is that the Ukrainians will not rush forward in Kherson over the next week--they will take advantage of the fact that the Russians are giving them much easier targets to hit from a safer Ukr perspective.
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Russo-Ukraine War (will try to stick to this name now) update from the Pentagon briefing yesterday--which might be termed escalatory briefing. Here is the whole text. There is lots on China-Taiwan as well btw. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
One of the big changes since the start of the war is that the USDOD is willing to put things on the record with very senior officials. Its no longer using anonymity to provide some protection. IOW, they are feeling increasingly confident of their analysis.
Yesterday's briefing was by Dr Colin Kahl, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (basically number 3 in the Pentagon on the civilian side. So this info/analysis comes from the top. defense.gov/About/Biograph…
A thread, primarily for those in Ukraine whose opinion I would really value. Its about what we should call this war we are in. Lots of people use different names, Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine-Russian War, Putin's war, etc.
At some point we will inevitably settle on one name (though that can change over time, see Great War to First World War). I was thinking from now on of just using the name: The Ukraine War. My thinking was as follows.
1. This war is ultimately about the future of Ukraine, it was an attempt by Putin's Russia to conquer and erase the country politically.
And if this video is indeed near Kherson and is recent, it shows the almost total failure of Russian airpower (one of the reasons the Ukrainians are more likely to counterattack in Kherson oblast. This is a long column, out in the open on a very sunny day.
Been trying to think of the different reasons that the Ukrainians have been trying to persuade the Russians to send mass reinforcements to Kherson (because clearly they have). I think there are 3.
I know there is alot of talk about increased Russian ranged fire this week, however there is still strong evidence that Ukrainian depot attacks are limiting significantly the intensity of what the Russians can sustain.
If you look at a week long FIRMS map (which should compensate for some weather differentiation) in the greatest fighting area of the Donbas and compare it to early July, the intensity/concetration of Fires is significantly down--if the spread is as wide.
Map is slightly moved to take into account that the area of fighting has changed--however the concentration of fire is way way down. Russia does not seem to be able to maintain fire in anything like the intensity of early July--so we need to be cautious in talking about it.
Why this report really gets it wrong is that Amnesty is basically criticising Ukraine for fighting to try and win the war. The Ukrainian strategy of fighting for their cities has been crucial to their successes so far.
When I first heard of the Amnesty report, I could not believe it really said what the headline reported, but then I went and checked Amnesty’s own website, and to be frank, it’s worth. Here is the headline.
It doesn’t say Russia is commiting the most horrible crimes but Ukraine could be doing better (which by the way would still be problematic) the report is a full throated attack on how Ukraine has fought (with a pitiful Russia comment at the end)
The war that was almost impossible to foresee, in two tweets. The extraordinary difficulty of advance into the face of modern defensive weaponry, even with mass artillery advantage. Was struck this morning by the @GeneralStaffUA briefing twitter.com/GeneralStaffUA
In particular this mention of a repulse of Russian forces trying to take the very small town of Berestove (see near bottom). twitter.com/GeneralStaffUA
Berestove is on the road from Bakhmut to Lysychansk, and first was approached by the Russians in May. Put a circle around it. If you look at the map. its about 10 kilometres from Popasna.