/long thread/ While I dont think attack helicopters (AHs) are dead, IMO Chieftan is in this video way overestimating their viability on a modern peer and near-peer conventional battlefield
He starts with the "It can do thing that nothing else can" argument, but without acknowledging that the amount of things that attack helicopters can do that other assets or combinations of assets are unable to do has shrunk a lot in recent times.
The Polish order for 96 AH-64s is repeatedly brought up as an argument for AHs being just fine, but that order appears to be an outlier and subject of uncertainties that could see it scaled down or cancelled.
/thread/ There has been a lot of talk recently about vulnerability of European armies regarding functionality of the US made weapons (and US componenets/data used in non-US weapons) with the F-35 being the prime example.
In this thread I want to explain how things are.
1. There are no "kill switches" - people should not be mixing movie/game stories and reality 2. But unless we are able to source everything (parts, software, data) needed for a weapon system to work, we are dependant on the manufacturers support,
including permissions of the government of the country manufacturer is bases in. That level of dependancy can vary based on how much we are not able to obtain or find workarounds for.
@shashj I disagree with how some things are presented/claimed
1. The current NATO requirements, including US forces are for comfortably curb-stomping Russia
@shashj 2. The whining about the number of brigades is extremely stupid because it always only counts our peacetime forces - ignoring our mobilization plans and potential.
@shashj 2. We would currently be able to defend against Russia - it just wouldnt look nice or be an easy, low-casualty war.
/short thread with statistics for 3rd aniversary of the start of the war/
Russian and Ukrainian visually-confirmed equipment losses since the start of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine by category
Since people are asking for Starlink alternatives, here is their current status.
No satellite service comes even close to Starlinks capabilities and capacity and that wont change for years (and one of those that might become competitive, Amazon Kuiper, would also be a US system)
The best alternative is to lay optical fibers and other "normal" connections to Ukrainian positions and ensure that there is a good LTE (it has decent speed and better coverage than 5G) connectivity for mobile users.
Just for pure regundancy reasons, I would expect at least the fixed Ukrainain positions in the rear areas to already have some "normal" alternative. Without Starlink, the worst affected would be mobile users near the frontline.
This thread presents arguments why IMO the reconstitution of the Russian military after the war in Ukraine is likely to take a long time.
Some fo these factors are interconnected and can involve disruptive feedback loops.
note: I am not an expert on Russian politics or military
This should not be mistaken for encouraging Western governments to slow-walk increasing military spending, reforms, creating new units, etc.
After all, even in its weakened state, Russian military will still be a dangerous opponent - especially if US support would be uncertain.
1. The Russian budget and economy are highly dependent on oil prices and while predicting (with reasonable reliability) the oil price isnt possible, it is IMO fair to acknowledge that the massive gloval growth in adoption of renewables and EVs will impact oil demand.