As usual, there are a bunch of problems with this CNN report:
1. The Russian figure is supposed to be all-calibers while the Western figure is 155mm only - The Russian equivalent (152mm) is around half of those 3M.

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1767100170972348498

2. Western artillery supplied to Ukraine is more accurate - so you need fewer rounds to achieve the same effect

/Thread/Rant/
About expanding the Ukrainian mobilization and gross incompetence in the management of some parts of the military: 1. Delaying expanding mobilization because it will be unpopular is beyond idiotic - you will still need to do it later anyway and by delaying the decision you will meanwhile take more casualties and lose more territory than you otherwise would

This is the important point - given the prevalence of GPS jamming and SpaceX only knowing the approximate location of terminals, SpaceX can either provide service coverage over the frontline which means also Russians who are close to UA positions, or not provide service to anyone in the area. And figuring out which terminals are operated by Russians and which by Ukrainians is non-trivial. If you want to avoid accidentally cutting off UA units from service, you can't afford to make mistakes.

Whoever believes the nonsense written in this thread should check if their theories are at all viable in the physical reality we inhabit.

Not only that thread completely ignores aspects like the time and resources Russia will need after the war in Ukraine (whenever it ends)

https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1746589423251403236

to rebuild its forces enough to even begin to contemplate ideas about even a limited clash with NATO, but the theory it presents is pretty much just a wish for the (much more powerful) opponent to just give up

/thread/ This was overall an excellent article from @Justin_Br0nk , but I would poke a few holes into it:

https://twitter.com/Justin_Br0nk/status/1732769398945935788

1. Since most of the US ground forces would have a minimal role to play against China and the USAF asset reallocation would be limited by what airbases in the region would be made available

Your regular reminder that Starlink is a usually (unless obtained as ITAR-restricted version) a civilian service with terms of service that ban integrating terminals into weapons. Musk is often behaving like a fool but 99.9% of Starlink terminals were unaffected by restrictions.

https://twitter.com/snlyngaas/status/1699751290178351467

Ukraine has been able to continue conducting naval drone strikes - either with the US DoD Starlink terminals or some alternatives.

If you think Elon has too much power over Starlink, ask relevant governments to build something comparable.

IMO, this article based on the @kielinstitute data that also cites our (@oryxspioenkop ) data is the work of people who are bad at math and missed multiple factors that invalidate their work.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/… 1. It doesnt account for equipment Russia pulled out of storage

2. It ignored that only some of the captured vehicles (IMO around 1/3) became operational with the side that captured them - the rest serving as sources of spare parts.

There are reports of 5 aircraft damaged/destroyed by the Russian missile strike in the Khmelnytskyi region - based on local reports likely at Starokostyantyniv airbase.
pravda.com.ua/news/2023/05/2… IMO (based on this old Google Maps image), given the numerous HAS I would expect that 5 wrecked airframes would be retired aircraft left outside (with usable aircraft being in HAS, but a new satellite image of the airbase might be necessary to determine what was damaged/destroyed

A thread about the current state of the international commercial space launch industry

(due to sanctions and legal issues, this mostly excludes Russian and Chinese rockets) It seems that the space launch industry is both significantly expanding and in a crisis and the roots of both lead to the period 8-10 years ago, when SpaceX while still a relatively small player became a threat against which established players started to struggle

Thread: I will try to explain what makes SpaceX Starlink special in general and especially about its utility for Ukraine during the current war - plus its limitations.

I will simplify technical/operational parts and obviously skip some info that falls under Ukrainian OPSEC. Starlink and other satellite internet services are most useful in areas without functional or reliable fixed telco infrastructure - so either remote areas where building infrastructure isn't profitable, or areas affected by natural disasters or wars.

/Thread/ My opinion on the Russian campaign of attacking Ukrainian energy infrastructure: it is both very damaging to the Ukrainian economy, but also a militarily a waste of resources that a competent opponent would be able to use to complicate things for the Ukrainian military. IMO, the campaign isn't even all that effectively run - multiple critical parts of the grid have not been hit (either because Russian missiles lack required accuracy or because of bad planning),

/thread/ My opinion on Russia's varying sensitivity to military casualties (I claim no expertise on Russia and its domestic politics - this is just how I see things): The way I see it, the Russian public and government have different sensitivity to casualties - contract soldiers and volunteer losses are seen as " they knew what risks they sign up for", nobody really cares about losses among LDNR, Chechen Rosgvardia, or Wagner troops,

#UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 08/08/2022

Full list: https://t.co/Im7m4cB2EMoryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…
#UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 09/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

#UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 04/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack… #UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 05/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

#UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 29/07/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack… #UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 30/07/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

/thread/ I want to use this article as an example to show how (for example) foreign policy folks often stretch their work too beyond what they know (at which point they should consult with specialists in that area).

cc @LianaFix @mkimmage - feedback is welcome

https://twitter.com/JacobHeilbrunn/status/1534285677290041345

"In recent days, many Western observers of the war in Ukraine have begun to worry that the tide is turning in Russia’s favor. Massive artillery fire is yielding incremental Russian gains in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, and Russia is bringing in new forces."

/thread/ An interesting @RUSI_org article about the Russian tank losses in Ukraine - but IMO some of its arguments are flawed.

rusi.org/explore-our-re… Authors make an argument that at the time when it was designed a T-72 was a good tank and a carousel autoloader was a reasonable design compromise. While that was true at that time, 50 years later that design is shit, and either its flaws should have been addressed ages ago

/thread/ Putin's options (IMO) and their respective complications considering that in early May the current Russian invasion force is likely to be too degraded to continue significant offensive operations: 1. Agree to a deal acceptable to Ukraine to end the war - it would mean acknowledging a big military defeat of the Russian military even if for the domestic public Putin's propaganda would come up with ways to pretend that it is a victory.

/A short thread/
In case some of you find it useful, here are numbers for the flight time and range of various ATGMs (data is from a mix of official and authoritative sources depending on what I was able to find): ATGM time of flight to max range:

9M14 Malyutka / AT-3 Sagger: 3000 meters - 26 seconds

9K111 Fagot / AT-4A Spigot A: 2000 meters - 11 seconds

9K111M Fagot-M or Faktoriya / AT-4C Spigot C: 2500 meters - 14 seconds

9M113 Konkurs / AT-5 Spandrel: 4000 meters - 20 seconds

/thread/ It has been almost 2 months since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and after observing it from the start and talking about it with (or listening to) some really smart people, here are IMO important lessons (new or old) from that conflict: 1. Even in smaller conflicts, U(C)AVs are making achieving air superiority, or at least denying it to the opponent, a lot more important than it used to be.

Here are my updated stats of visually confirmed regime armor losses since the start of the SCW:

Assad's regime armor losses per year:
2011: 22
2012: 605
2013: 749
2014: 558
2015: 408
2016: 390
2017: 294
2018: 88
2019: 75
2020: 164
--------------
total: 3353 Assad's regime armor losses per vehicle type:
BMP-1: 953
BMP-2: 24
BVP-1 AMB-S: 69
MTLB: 8
Shilka: 140
2S1 Gvozdika: 92
2S3 Akatsiya: 11
tank (type not IDed): 130
T-55: 681
T-62: 358
T-72: 826
T-90: 7
ARVs: 54
----------
total: 3353