@shashj I disagree with how some things are presented/claimed

1. The current NATO requirements, including US forces are for comfortably curb-stomping Russia @shashj 2. The whining about the number of brigades is extremely stupid because it always only counts our peacetime forces - ignoring our mobilization plans and potential.

/short thread with statistics for 3rd aniversary of the start of the war/
Russian and Ukrainian visually-confirmed equipment losses since the start of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine by category

Full UA list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

Full RU list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…
Detailed Russian tank loses by type and model:

Since people are asking for Starlink alternatives, here is their current status.

No satellite service comes even close to Starlinks capabilities and capacity and that wont change for years (and one of those that might become competitive, Amazon Kuiper, would also be a US system) The best alternative is to lay optical fibers and other "normal" connections to Ukrainian positions and ensure that there is a good LTE (it has decent speed and better coverage than 5G) connectivity for mobile users.

This thread presents arguments why IMO the reconstitution of the Russian military after the war in Ukraine is likely to take a long time.

Some fo these factors are interconnected and can involve disruptive feedback loops.

note: I am not an expert on Russian politics or military This should not be mistaken for encouraging Western governments to slow-walk increasing military spending, reforms, creating new units, etc.

After all, even in its weakened state, Russian military will still be a dangerous opponent - especially if US support would be uncertain.

While on paper this idea might make sense, multiple factors make it far less practical and/or difficult or implement:

https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1884537526318477786

The number of Russian T-55s and 62s in storage that is in repairable condition isnt all that great - and using them as APCs would mean that they cant be used to replace losses of tanks, ARVs, etc.

/thread/
An explanation of Oryx methodology regarding equipment losses: Oryx loss lists are based on visual evidence.

Exceptions where visual evidence isnt available are made only in rare cases where the losses are officially confirmed by the side that suffered them, or if confirmed by very reliable sources for the side that suffered those losses.

A long thread about commercial and government alternatives of Starlink mega-constellation - plus some info about Starlink and alternative approaches to build an alternative without breaking the bank. Let's start with the current status of Starlink and what makes building such a satellite mega-constellation so hard and expensive and how Starlink is unique (at least for now).

As usual, there are a bunch of problems with this CNN report:
1. The Russian figure is supposed to be all-calibers while the Western figure is 155mm only - The Russian equivalent (152mm) is around half of those 3M.

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1767100170972348498

2. Western artillery supplied to Ukraine is more accurate - so you need fewer rounds to achieve the same effect

/Thread/Rant/
About expanding the Ukrainian mobilization and gross incompetence in the management of some parts of the military: 1. Delaying expanding mobilization because it will be unpopular is beyond idiotic - you will still need to do it later anyway and by delaying the decision you will meanwhile take more casualties and lose more territory than you otherwise would

This is the important point - given the prevalence of GPS jamming and SpaceX only knowing the approximate location of terminals, SpaceX can either provide service coverage over the frontline which means also Russians who are close to UA positions, or not provide service to anyone in the area. And figuring out which terminals are operated by Russians and which by Ukrainians is non-trivial. If you want to avoid accidentally cutting off UA units from service, you can't afford to make mistakes.

Whoever believes the nonsense written in this thread should check if their theories are at all viable in the physical reality we inhabit.

Not only that thread completely ignores aspects like the time and resources Russia will need after the war in Ukraine (whenever it ends)

https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1746589423251403236

to rebuild its forces enough to even begin to contemplate ideas about even a limited clash with NATO, but the theory it presents is pretty much just a wish for the (much more powerful) opponent to just give up

/thread/ This was overall an excellent article from @Justin_Br0nk , but I would poke a few holes into it:

https://twitter.com/Justin_Br0nk/status/1732769398945935788

1. Since most of the US ground forces would have a minimal role to play against China and the USAF asset reallocation would be limited by what airbases in the region would be made available

Your regular reminder that Starlink is a usually (unless obtained as ITAR-restricted version) a civilian service with terms of service that ban integrating terminals into weapons. Musk is often behaving like a fool but 99.9% of Starlink terminals were unaffected by restrictions.

https://twitter.com/snlyngaas/status/1699751290178351467

Ukraine has been able to continue conducting naval drone strikes - either with the US DoD Starlink terminals or some alternatives.

If you think Elon has too much power over Starlink, ask relevant governments to build something comparable.

IMO, this article based on the @kielinstitute data that also cites our (@oryxspioenkop ) data is the work of people who are bad at math and missed multiple factors that invalidate their work.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/… 1. It doesnt account for equipment Russia pulled out of storage

2. It ignored that only some of the captured vehicles (IMO around 1/3) became operational with the side that captured them - the rest serving as sources of spare parts.

There are reports of 5 aircraft damaged/destroyed by the Russian missile strike in the Khmelnytskyi region - based on local reports likely at Starokostyantyniv airbase.
pravda.com.ua/news/2023/05/2… IMO (based on this old Google Maps image), given the numerous HAS I would expect that 5 wrecked airframes would be retired aircraft left outside (with usable aircraft being in HAS, but a new satellite image of the airbase might be necessary to determine what was damaged/destroyed

A thread about the current state of the international commercial space launch industry

(due to sanctions and legal issues, this mostly excludes Russian and Chinese rockets) It seems that the space launch industry is both significantly expanding and in a crisis and the roots of both lead to the period 8-10 years ago, when SpaceX while still a relatively small player became a threat against which established players started to struggle

Thread: I will try to explain what makes SpaceX Starlink special in general and especially about its utility for Ukraine during the current war - plus its limitations.

I will simplify technical/operational parts and obviously skip some info that falls under Ukrainian OPSEC. Starlink and other satellite internet services are most useful in areas without functional or reliable fixed telco infrastructure - so either remote areas where building infrastructure isn't profitable, or areas affected by natural disasters or wars.

/Thread/ My opinion on the Russian campaign of attacking Ukrainian energy infrastructure: it is both very damaging to the Ukrainian economy, but also a militarily a waste of resources that a competent opponent would be able to use to complicate things for the Ukrainian military. IMO, the campaign isn't even all that effectively run - multiple critical parts of the grid have not been hit (either because Russian missiles lack required accuracy or because of bad planning),

/thread/ My opinion on Russia's varying sensitivity to military casualties (I claim no expertise on Russia and its domestic politics - this is just how I see things): The way I see it, the Russian public and government have different sensitivity to casualties - contract soldiers and volunteer losses are seen as " they knew what risks they sign up for", nobody really cares about losses among LDNR, Chechen Rosgvardia, or Wagner troops,

#UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 08/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack… #UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 09/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

#UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 04/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack… #UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 05/08/2022

Full list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…