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Jakub Janovsky Profile picture
Jakub Janovsky
@Rebel44CZ
Military history, SCW, OSINT, space, electric cars. NATO/EU supporter. Former Bellingcat contributor. Oryx Blog Administrator. https://t.co/8gzCIdzfzB
Apr 20 • 7 tweets • 1 min read
Some long-discussed/planned changes that I am now starting to implement on the Oryx loss list for the war in Ukraine: Equipment that has, over time, turned into cheap consumables, and its documented losses became gradually more detached from real losses, will stop being added, and around the end of April or early May will be removed.
Apr 13 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
People often ask about the Ukrainian loss numbers being as bad or worse than the Russian list.

Obviously, the old 3:1 RU:UA loss ratio would be better, but I dont think this is too much of a problem, and I will explain in this short thread why. Russia is just using much fewer AFVs than during earlier parts of the war, now either using light infantry or ATVs, civilian cars, etc. which is equipment we dont add to the list.
Feb 23 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
/thread/
Since the start of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Oryx team (with help from our colleagues at @WarSpotting and many independent volunteers) has documented 35 579 equipment losses on both sides of the war. Here are some interesting data for the 4th anniversary of the start of the war

Splits by equipment type for both sides, and splits by status Image
Image
Image
Jan 22 • 33 tweets • 5 min read
/thread/

There is an ongoing debate about the current size of the Russian AFV fleet, losses it has taken, new production level storage+reactivation, etc.

Here is my take on the topic notes:

this is just my take on the "middle case " - so I am going for what is IMO the most plausible interpretation of the data, not hyper-optimistic/pessimistic interpretation of the data that some folks use.

I rounded the numbers slightly to make it easier to read
Jan 20 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
An interesting and long thread. While I agree with some parts, I disagree with others (hunting infantry is IMO necessary due to the very sparse infantry coverage of the FLOT)

So, here is my thread on this topic: IMO, the root cause of many current problems with drone use are the relative lack of resources and splitting of drone units among many organizations - with the resulting lack of any standardization and coordination.
Jun 27, 2025 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
In this thread I would like to highlihght the issues I have with this @WarOnTheRocks article
warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug… 1. The author is apparently making a judgement over a weapon system purely based on his own limited experience - with no references to any other sources, data, or analysis. That is an increasibly small (and rather falwed) sample size for judging a type of weapon systems.
Apr 3, 2025 • 26 tweets • 5 min read
/long thread/ While I dont think attack helicopters (AHs) are dead, IMO Chieftan is in this video way overestimating their viability on a modern peer and near-peer conventional battlefield He starts with the "It can do thing that nothing else can" argument, but without acknowledging that the amount of things that attack helicopters can do that other assets or combinations of assets are unable to do has shrunk a lot in recent times.
Mar 13, 2025 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
/thread/ There has been a lot of talk recently about vulnerability of European armies regarding functionality of the US made weapons (and US componenets/data used in non-US weapons) with the F-35 being the prime example.

In this thread I want to explain how things are. 1. There are no "kill switches" - people should not be mixing movie/game stories and reality
2. But unless we are able to source everything (parts, software, data) needed for a weapon system to work, we are dependant on the manufacturers support,
Feb 25, 2025 • 15 tweets • 2 min read
@shashj I disagree with how some things are presented/claimed

1. The current NATO requirements, including US forces are for comfortably curb-stomping Russia @shashj 2. The whining about the number of brigades is extremely stupid because it always only counts our peacetime forces - ignoring our mobilization plans and potential.
Feb 23, 2025 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
/short thread with statistics for 3rd aniversary of the start of the war/
Russian and Ukrainian visually-confirmed equipment losses since the start of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine by category

Full UA list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

Full RU list: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack… Image
Image Detailed Russian tank loses by type and model: Image
Image
Image
Feb 22, 2025 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Since people are asking for Starlink alternatives, here is their current status.

No satellite service comes even close to Starlinks capabilities and capacity and that wont change for years (and one of those that might become competitive, Amazon Kuiper, would also be a US system) Image The best alternative is to lay optical fibers and other "normal" connections to Ukrainian positions and ensure that there is a good LTE (it has decent speed and better coverage than 5G) connectivity for mobile users.
Feb 3, 2025 • 26 tweets • 5 min read
This thread presents arguments why IMO the reconstitution of the Russian military after the war in Ukraine is likely to take a long time.

Some fo these factors are interconnected and can involve disruptive feedback loops.

note: I am not an expert on Russian politics or military This should not be mistaken for encouraging Western governments to slow-walk increasing military spending, reforms, creating new units, etc.

After all, even in its weakened state, Russian military will still be a dangerous opponent - especially if US support would be uncertain.
Jan 29, 2025 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
While on paper this idea might make sense, multiple factors make it far less practical and/or difficult or implement: The number of Russian T-55s and 62s in storage that is in repairable condition isnt all that great - and using them as APCs would mean that they cant be used to replace losses of tanks, ARVs, etc. Image
Jan 12, 2025 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
/thread/
An explanation of Oryx methodology regarding equipment losses: Oryx loss lists are based on visual evidence.

Exceptions where visual evidence isnt available are made only in rare cases where the losses are officially confirmed by the side that suffered them, or if confirmed by very reliable sources for the side that suffered those losses.
May 15, 2024 • 32 tweets • 5 min read
A long thread about commercial and government alternatives of Starlink mega-constellation - plus some info about Starlink and alternative approaches to build an alternative without breaking the bank. Let's start with the current status of Starlink and what makes building such a satellite mega-constellation so hard and expensive and how Starlink is unique (at least for now).
Mar 11, 2024 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
As usual, there are a bunch of problems with this CNN report:
1. The Russian figure is supposed to be all-calibers while the Western figure is 155mm only - The Russian equivalent (152mm) is around half of those 3M. 2. Western artillery supplied to Ukraine is more accurate - so you need fewer rounds to achieve the same effect
Mar 4, 2024 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
/Thread/Rant/
About expanding the Ukrainian mobilization and gross incompetence in the management of some parts of the military: 1. Delaying expanding mobilization because it will be unpopular is beyond idiotic - you will still need to do it later anyway and by delaying the decision you will meanwhile take more casualties and lose more territory than you otherwise would
Feb 10, 2024 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
This is the important point - given the prevalence of GPS jamming and SpaceX only knowing the approximate location of terminals, SpaceX can either provide service coverage over the frontline which means also Russians who are close to UA positions, or not provide service to anyone in the area. And figuring out which terminals are operated by Russians and which by Ukrainians is non-trivial. If you want to avoid accidentally cutting off UA units from service, you can't afford to make mistakes.
Jan 14, 2024 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Whoever believes the nonsense written in this thread should check if their theories are at all viable in the physical reality we inhabit.

Not only that thread completely ignores aspects like the time and resources Russia will need after the war in Ukraine (whenever it ends) to rebuild its forces enough to even begin to contemplate ideas about even a limited clash with NATO, but the theory it presents is pretty much just a wish for the (much more powerful) opponent to just give up
Dec 8, 2023 • 23 tweets • 4 min read
/thread/ This was overall an excellent article from @Justin_Br0nk , but I would poke a few holes into it: 1. Since most of the US ground forces would have a minimal role to play against China and the USAF asset reallocation would be limited by what airbases in the region would be made available
Sep 7, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Your regular reminder that Starlink is a usually (unless obtained as ITAR-restricted version) a civilian service with terms of service that ban integrating terminals into weapons. Musk is often behaving like a fool but 99.9% of Starlink terminals were unaffected by restrictions. Ukraine has been able to continue conducting naval drone strikes - either with the US DoD Starlink terminals or some alternatives.

If you think Elon has too much power over Starlink, ask relevant governments to build something comparable.