When US Air Force F-16CM Falcon or US Navy EA-18G Growler fighters fly Wild Weasel missions they use Self Protect mode.
In this mode the Falcon's AN/ASQ-213 HTS R7 (to the left of the air inlet) and the Growler's AN/ALQ-218(V)2 (on the wingtips) sensor systems detect, locate, 2/n
analyze, and identify sources of radio frequency emission. Once a threat is identified the pilot transmits the target data to the missile and launches it.
There is no chance this would work with Ukrainian fighters as US sensor systems can't be installed on Ukrainian planes
3/n
and there is no way to transmit targeting data to the missiles.
Self Protect mode can also be used with aircraft like the F-15C, F-15E, F/A-18C (photo), which lack the aforementioned sensor systems.
In this case the aircraft's own less accurate, less powerful radar warning
4/n
receiver would be used to identify targets. This would also not work with Ukrainian planes as there is no way to transmit the targeting data to the missiles.
In the Target Of Opportunity mode the AGM-88's own passive radar homing seeker scans for and detects targets.
5/n
Once the missile detects a target it transmits the target data to the plane's avionics and the pilot decides if it is a threat. The pilot then fires the missile, which attacks the target autonomously.
This wouldn't work with Ukrainian planes either as the missile can't
6/n
transmit target data to the pilots.
BUT - most importantly: Self Protect and Target Of Opportunity modes are suicide UNLESS a plane carries a full range of jamming and self-protection pods. This is why the US nowadays only uses the AGM-88 with F-16CM and EA-18G planes.
7/n
F-16CM carry an ALQ-184 ECM electronic countermeasures pod and at least one AN/ALE-50 towed decoy system.
EA-18G carry three AN/ALQ-99F(V) tactical jamming system pods (photo: one centerline and two under the wings).
8/n
Without these systems planes will not survive flying high and deep into an enemy air-defense bubbles.
This leaves only the Pre-Briefed mode. In this mode a AGM-88 is programmed before the fighter departs from the air base with the coordinates of an enemy radar site.
9/n
Once in the air the fighter releases the AGM-88 at maximum speed and maximum altitude, giving the missile a range in excess of 150 km.
Once released the AGM-88 will fly towards the coordinates, and when it reaches lock-on range it will scan for, detect, lock on and attack
10/n
the target autonomously.
This mode works with Ukrainian fighters jets. All they have to do is lift the AGM-88 up, go supersonic, and release the missile.
While AGM-88B and AGM-88C-1 use INS to steer them towards a target area, where they then scan for targets, the
11/n
AGM-88D also includes GPS-guidance, which enables the missile to strike known radar and air-defense sites, even when they do not emit radio frequencies.
And C-1 and D also have the ability to home-on-jam, which forces russia to switch off it's electronic warfare systems.
12/n
And how does Ukraine know where to aim the AGM-88... I think there are two ways:
1) locals reporting the locations of russian air defense systems, radars, jammers, electronic warfare systems 2) US Air Force or UK Royal Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft, which are
13/n
used to detect, identify and geolocate electromagnetic signals.
US Air Force Rivet Joints have been used before to detected enemy radar and radio emissions and then vector AGM-88 carrying fighters towards these targets. However RC-135 flying over Romania can only scan the
14/n
Kherson Oblast... anything further is out of range.
Ukraine using AGM-88 forces the russians to switch off all their systems emitting radio frequencies. If they leave them on 24/7 as they did until now Ukraine will destroy them all with AGM-88.
15/n
And thanks to russia showing us the remnants of a AGM-88, we know that Ukraine received the D variant with GPS guidance.
So even if the russians switch their systems on and off, once the AGM-88D has locked on, there is no escape for the russians. Absolutely no escape.
16/end
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Italy has ordered its first KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles... but there is a twist.
As the Italian Army is in a rush to ready its forces to battle invading russians in the Baltics (& Finland), the first 5 × KF41 will arrive within weeks in the Hungarian configuration. 1/8
That means there won't be any Italianization of the first 5 × KF41. The Italian Army feels that it can't wait for that. Training has to start ASAP.
Therefore these 5 × KF41 will come with Rheinmetall's Lance Turret with 30mm MK30-2/ABM autocannon. Along with these KF41 Italy 2/8
will receive training and simulation systems to begin training troops ASAP.
This order also includes 16 × KF41 in a hybrid version: the chassis will come from the Hungarian production line, but these KF41 will receive Leonardo's Hitfist turret with Leonardo's 30mm X-Gun. 3/8
I am relaxed about the US ending the rotation of a light brigade through Romania.
Yes, it is bad optics and russia will use it for its propaganda, BUT two armored brigades, a combat aviation brigade, a division artillery, a division sustainment brigade, and a division HQ 1/4
continue to rotate to Poland and the Baltics.
Right now the:
• 3rd Infantry Division HQ (arrived in Poland 4 days ago - photo)
• 1st Armored Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
• 3rd Armored Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division
• 3rd Division Artillery
• 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade 2/4
are in Poland and the Baltics.
Ending the rotation of a light brigade to Romania is a far less bad than ending the rotation of the armored brigades. It is also understandable as the US Army's light divisions (10th Mountain, 25th Infantry, 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne) are
3/4
Of course russia can quickly seize the Suwałki Gap and cut of the Baltics from the rest of NATO... but have you had a look at Kaliningrad's border and the flat dry country beyond?
There are 9 Polish brigades in that area (and 11 in reserve, with 4 more forming). Sure russia 1/5
could move 50,000+ men to Kaliningrad to secure the border or build a defence line along the Pregoła river... but those need to be supplied from Belarus, which also is easily invaded unless russia sends 50,000+ troops to secure its flank there. A buildup of 200,000+ russian
2/5
troops in Belarus would be noticed by NATO (and ordinary people in Belarus, who would upload 100s of videos of the arriving russians).
In summary the main risk isn't that russia suddenly seizes and fortifies the Suwałki Gap... the main risk is that russia starts building up
3/5
The North Atlantic - one of the key battles in a russia-Europe war.
If Europe is defeated here, which with Europe's current forces and capabilities, is almost certain to happen... then russia can nuke the UK without fear of retaliation.
This will be a unsettling thread:
1/40
This battle will be very different from the battles in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, which I discussed in an early thread, which is linked below.
To understand the North Atlantic Battle we need to look at Imperial Germany's WWI submarine campaign,
2 days ago I did a thread about the reasons russia can't defeat Ukraine and yet is still a deadly threat to Europe and NATO (link to the thread the next tweet).
Today I will talk about three of the fronts of a russia-Europe war: 1) Black Sea 2) Baltic Sea 3) North Atlantic
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These three fronts will be air and sea battles, while Finland and the Baltics will be air and land battles; about which I will talk in another thread in the coming days.
I do not believe the US under control of Trump or Vance would come to the aid 2/n
• russia has no chance to defeat Ukraine
• russia is a deadly threat to NATO and the EU
Both of these are true... because as of 2025 Ukraine fields a far more capable military than NATO's 30 European members combined (!).
Let me explain.
1/39
As of August 2025 russia fields more than 1,3 million troops; at least half of which are fighting in or against Ukraine.
Ukraine has an estimated 1 million troops... maybe even 1,1 million troops. NATO's European members have double that: some 2.2 million troops, but 2/n
(there is always a "but" with European militaries):
• with more than double the personnel European NATO members manage to field only 20% more combat brigades than Ukraine. Partly because Western navies and air forces are bigger, but mostly because in all European militaries 3/n