When US Air Force F-16CM Falcon or US Navy EA-18G Growler fighters fly Wild Weasel missions they use Self Protect mode.
In this mode the Falcon's AN/ASQ-213 HTS R7 (to the left of the air inlet) and the Growler's AN/ALQ-218(V)2 (on the wingtips) sensor systems detect, locate, 2/n
analyze, and identify sources of radio frequency emission. Once a threat is identified the pilot transmits the target data to the missile and launches it.
There is no chance this would work with Ukrainian fighters as US sensor systems can't be installed on Ukrainian planes
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and there is no way to transmit targeting data to the missiles.
Self Protect mode can also be used with aircraft like the F-15C, F-15E, F/A-18C (photo), which lack the aforementioned sensor systems.
In this case the aircraft's own less accurate, less powerful radar warning
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receiver would be used to identify targets. This would also not work with Ukrainian planes as there is no way to transmit the targeting data to the missiles.
In the Target Of Opportunity mode the AGM-88's own passive radar homing seeker scans for and detects targets.
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Once the missile detects a target it transmits the target data to the plane's avionics and the pilot decides if it is a threat. The pilot then fires the missile, which attacks the target autonomously.
This wouldn't work with Ukrainian planes either as the missile can't
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transmit target data to the pilots.
BUT - most importantly: Self Protect and Target Of Opportunity modes are suicide UNLESS a plane carries a full range of jamming and self-protection pods. This is why the US nowadays only uses the AGM-88 with F-16CM and EA-18G planes.
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F-16CM carry an ALQ-184 ECM electronic countermeasures pod and at least one AN/ALE-50 towed decoy system.
EA-18G carry three AN/ALQ-99F(V) tactical jamming system pods (photo: one centerline and two under the wings).
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Without these systems planes will not survive flying high and deep into an enemy air-defense bubbles.
This leaves only the Pre-Briefed mode. In this mode a AGM-88 is programmed before the fighter departs from the air base with the coordinates of an enemy radar site.
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Once in the air the fighter releases the AGM-88 at maximum speed and maximum altitude, giving the missile a range in excess of 150 km.
Once released the AGM-88 will fly towards the coordinates, and when it reaches lock-on range it will scan for, detect, lock on and attack
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the target autonomously.
This mode works with Ukrainian fighters jets. All they have to do is lift the AGM-88 up, go supersonic, and release the missile.
While AGM-88B and AGM-88C-1 use INS to steer them towards a target area, where they then scan for targets, the
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AGM-88D also includes GPS-guidance, which enables the missile to strike known radar and air-defense sites, even when they do not emit radio frequencies.
And C-1 and D also have the ability to home-on-jam, which forces russia to switch off it's electronic warfare systems.
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And how does Ukraine know where to aim the AGM-88... I think there are two ways:
1) locals reporting the locations of russian air defense systems, radars, jammers, electronic warfare systems 2) US Air Force or UK Royal Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft, which are
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used to detect, identify and geolocate electromagnetic signals.
US Air Force Rivet Joints have been used before to detected enemy radar and radio emissions and then vector AGM-88 carrying fighters towards these targets. However RC-135 flying over Romania can only scan the
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Kherson Oblast... anything further is out of range.
Ukraine using AGM-88 forces the russians to switch off all their systems emitting radio frequencies. If they leave them on 24/7 as they did until now Ukraine will destroy them all with AGM-88.
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And thanks to russia showing us the remnants of a AGM-88, we know that Ukraine received the D variant with GPS guidance.
So even if the russians switch their systems on and off, once the AGM-88D has locked on, there is no escape for the russians. Absolutely no escape.
16/end
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Please stop saying Europe should cancel weapons deals with the US.
Yes, we should not sign new weapon deals with the US; but canceling existing deals will hurt Ukraine and also Europe.
And there are 3 reasons for that. Let me explain.
1) Europe's armed forces have nearly
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0 spare equipment, as almost everything taken out of service over the last 35 years was either sold off or scrapped. Europe must continue to support Ukraine and therefore Europe needs to buy whatever weapons it can get it hands on to free up equipment to donate to Ukraine. 2/n
I.e. you can't demand that Belgium cancel its F-35A deal and demand that Belgium must donate its F-16 to Ukraine...
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands could donate their F-16 to Ukraine, because they already received enough F-35A as replacement. 3/n
🇬🇧 @Keir_Starmer is NOT increasing defence spending this year.
🇬🇧 @Keir_Starmer is NOT increasing defence spending next year.
🇬🇧 @Keir_Starmer is increasing defence spending FROM (!) April 2027 by 0.2%.
This means that for
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the next two years the British Armed Forces get nothing. They will remain as broken as they are.
The British Army has 78,000 troops of which just 18,000 are combat capable (the remaining 60,000 (= 77%) lack the materiel, training, equipment, etc. to be useful).
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The situation is even worse for the Royal Navy.
Next year the British Armed Forces actually get even LESS money than this year (inflation is 10 times higher than GDP growth and so inflation cuts into the defence budget).
Then from April 2027 the situation will begin to
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Yesterday I posted a thread about American weapons and components in fighter aircraft and how Europe has to wean itself off them.
Today let's look at transport, tanker, maritime patrol, and airborne early warning aircraft.
(Tomorrow then trainer aircraft and drones)
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Transport aircraft come in two sizes: for strategic airlift or tactical airlift.
Simplified: strategic airlift transports materiel between continents and tactical airlift within a theater of operations.
For strategic airlift the choice for Europe is easy: A400M Atlas, because 2/n
it is the only strategic airlifter in production (C-17 Globemaster production ceased in 2015) and because the French were involved in its design the A400M Atlas comes with all key parts "Made in Europe".
Yes, it carries only half the payload of the C-17 Globemaster, but for 3/n
Let's talk about American weapons and how Europe has to wean itself off them.
Part 1 of a long thread; this one looking at fighter jets.
First and foremost: Europe has to get all American made components out of all weapon systems produced in Europe. If Trump can shut down a
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European production line by withholding a component, then that component has to replaced... and if that is impossible, then that weapon system has no future and production has to end.
As for the F-35... Europe has nothing even close in combat capability. Best course will be 2/n
to see the existing deals through and then focus on acquiring Eurofighters and Rafales, both of which are way more capable than whatever junk russia sends up in the air.
The main issue will be that the Rafale's production line is running already at full capacity, while the 3/n
The Gripen was designed by Sweden for Sweden's Bas 90 air base system and - truly - Sweden built the perfect fighter for Sweden's Bas 90 system... which resulted in a fighter no one but Sweden needs.
Bear with me as I explain a few things @Saab doesn't want you to know.
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Bas 90 was developed in the 1970s, when the Swedish Air Force was flying the Viggen (and some upgraded Draken). Bas 90 consisted of some 30+ reserve air bases with a 2,000+ metres (6,600+ ft) long main runway and 2-3 short runways of 800 metres (2,600 ft). 2/n
Here are the airbases of Kubbe (63°37'59.81"N 17°56'10.79"E) and Jokkmokk (66°29'48.43"N 20° 8'45.17") with the short runways highlighted in red.
Some of the short runways used public roads, but most were built specifically for the Bas 90 system in the 1980s. 3/n
I set out to create a table showing the reduction in British Infantry units between 1989 and 2025...
After doing Scotland, Wales and Yorkshire - I gave up.
For three reason:
a) the sheer size of it! The British Army had 100 infantry battalions in 1989 (not counting the 1/8
nine battalions of the Ulster Defence Regiment).
b) the British Army's habit of reroling battalions every four years.
c) the disbanding of volunteer regiments in the early 1990s, then the merging of volunteer battalions into new volunteer regiments in the mid 1990s, and then
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the disbanding of these new volunteer regiments some 5-6 years later, followed by the de-merging of some of the volunteer battalions.
In short: it was all very haphazard and chaotic!
So, instead here come the numbers about the British Army's infantry decline between 1989
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