I recently described how ๐บ๐ฆ has sought to cut off ๐ท๐บ in northern Kherson Oblast by blasting two strategic bridges over the Dnieper (and another over the Inhulets). This follow-up ๐งต examines the third and last Dnieper crossing - the Nova Kakhovka Dam. 1/21
As the 6th and southernmost dam on the Dnieper, the Nova Kakhovka Dam was finished in 1956 as part of a hydroelectric plant with a reported capacity of 335-357 MW. It is just north of Nova Kakhovka city (pop. 45,000), now held by ๐ท๐บ's 22nd Army Corps. 2/21 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakhovka_โฆ
Located 60 km northeast of Kherson city, the dam was a key target for ๐ท๐บ forces, who seized it already on 24 February. The P47 regional road (and adjacent railway) on the dam has helped them to supply their troops on the northern bank of the Dnieper. 3/21
The Kakhovka Reservoir is also the source of the North Crimean Canal, which begins at Tavriisk, 2 km southeast of the dam. Before ๐บ๐ฆ closed it in 2014, the canal supplied 85% of water in Crimea. Since early March, 1.7 million mยณ of water has been sent to Crimea daily. 4/21
With the situation now increasingly dire for ๐ท๐บ troops in Kherson Oblast, the dam has come to represent a possible 'emergency exit' in case of an evacuation south of the Dnieper. As Sun Tzu says: "When you surround an army, leave an outlet free". 5/21
To soften ๐ท๐บ defences at Nova Kakhovka, ๐บ๐ฆ forces have in recent weeks used long-range, high-precision HIMARS rocket launchers to wreak havoc on selected military depots and equipment. The success of these artillery strikes has been evident. 6/21
These ๐บ๐ฆ bombardments have also successfully targeted the dam itself - not its walls, but a narrow road-rail bridge on top that straddles the canal locks, which connects the 18 kmยณ Kakhovka Reservoir with downstream Dnieper and its estuary. 7/21
In a variation on this theme, ๐บ๐ฆ also hit another part of the dam complex earlier this week, namely a curved road section / bridge closer to the main dam walls. This section will prove significantly more difficult, yet not impossible, to repair. 8/21
With their movement now restricted, ๐ท๐บ has continuously sought to carry out repairs. Unlike the two large Dnieper bridges near Kherson, it is not infeasible to fix the two small dam bridges, but fresh ๐บ๐ฆ attacks continue to nullify such efforts. 9/21
Some trigger-happy Twitterati have entertained the thought that ๐บ๐ฆ forces could bring down the entire dam complex, 617 Squadron style, to easier surround and annihilate nearby ๐ท๐บ troops. So why not blow the whole dam(n thing) to smithereens? Well, because it is a bad idea! 10/21
In 1941, the massive DniproHES dam on the Dnieper near Zaporizhzhia was dynamited by retreating Red Army in an attempt to cut off the advancing German forces. Thousands of civilians perished in the resulting deluge downstream. 11/21 rferl.org/a/european-remโฆ
On 29 April, the ๐บ๐ฆ online newspaper Vgoru posted an article in which a purported expert, the anonymous "Mr Vitaly", offered his insight on the likely consequences of any significant damage being inflicted on the Nova Kakhovka Dam. 12/21 vgoru.org/post/obstrili-โฆ
He argued that a 1941 scenario is unrealistic due to a low likelihood of a total dam collapse. External shocks would be unlikely to breach the dam walls due their massive clay-and-concrete construction. Only an internal, deliberate demolition might be able to destroy them. 13/21
A more realistic scenario could be a breach of the dam locks. This would result in significant flooding downstream, but hardly a tsunami-like wave as in 1941, since the water would simply โseep outโ. So what would the effects of such a limited breach look like? 14/21
According to "Mr Vitaly", low-lying areas the southern bank would be amongst the first areas to fall victim to the rising waters. This would include parts of Nova Kakhovka itself, but also the stretch from Oleshky to Hola Prystan, directly across from Kherson city 15/21
On the northern shore, some areas in Kherson city would also be flooded, notably the Ostriv (Korabl) Microdistrict. It is mainly an industrial area with a shipyard, but also contains a residential zone that is home to Kindergarten No. 82 and School No. 57 in Kherson. 16/21
A month ago, I spoke to a ๐บ๐ฆ diplomat from Kherson. She told me that the Antonovskyi Bridge used to be known, in peacetime, as the backdrop of a nice river beach in the suburb of Antonivka. The beach and nearby residential areas could also be flooded if the dam locks break. 17/21
โMr Vitalyโ notably toned down the effects of a (limited) dam breach, arguing that damage would be severe, but not disastrous. Still, being unable to destroy the dam itself, a possible ๐บ๐ฆ breach of the dam locks would achieve little and cause unnecessary civilian suffering. 18/21
So what about a ๐ท๐บ destruction of the dam (locks) to cover a retreat south of the Dnieper? Firstly, this could affect the water supply to Crimea. Secondly, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant relies on water from the Kakhovka Reservoir for cooling. 19/21
Of course, ๐ท๐บ often acts irrationally, for example when disallowing dam repairs in May thus causing some flooding) or by threatening to plant explosives at the nuclear power plant. Anyway, I personally doubt that blowing up the dam is a ๐ท๐บ priority. 20/21 odessa-journal.com/it-became-knowโฆ
Now, I am no dam engineer and do not possess the background to judge whether โMr Vitalyโsโ assessment is correct. But AFAIK, it so far represents the only real deliberation of what an attack against (or deliberate demolition of) the Nova Kakhovka Dam might incur. End of ๐งต. 21/21
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As ๐บ๐ฆ prepares to push out the ๐ท๐บ occupiers in northern Kherson Oblast, a lot of focus has recently been on three only crossings on the first 300 km stretch of the Dnieper River. This ๐งต represents the first half of a quick โbeginnerโs guideโ to these infrastructure assets. 1/11
First a little background context: As one of the largest rivers in Europe, the Dnieper is a salient feature of the region, bisecting Ukraine. Near its estuary in Kherson Oblast, it is very wide and virtually impossible to traverse with mobile bridges. 2/11
Running from east to west, the Dnieper also bisects Kherson Oblast. The ๐ท๐บ troops on its northern bank (including in Kherson city) thus rely on just three crossings for supply and replenishment, which has put them in an increasingly tenuous position. 3/11
A recent sabotage action appears to have effectively broken the back of the ๐ท๐บ-controlled 'land bridge to Crimea'. Depending on sources, the destruction of a key railway bridge between Melitopol and Tokmak was attributed to either partisans or ๐บ๐ฆ SOF. 1/5
Due to several villages in the area being named Lyubymivka, there was some initial confusion over the location. But it is almost certainly the steel bridge over the Molochna River at 47.078779, 35.486520 - in fact closer to the town of Svitlodolynske. 2/5
If so, this brazen attack might effectively block any ability by ๐ท๐บ to transfer goods between southwestern and southeastern ๐บ๐ฆ by train without using the Crimean Bridge. (Image below based on map by @BruckenRuski - destroyed bridge marked with blue circle.) 3/5
Speculative ๐งต: In recent weeks, most of the fighting in ๐บ๐ฆ (and subsequent media attention) has focused on the Donbas and Kherson fronts. In between lies the fairly stagnant Zaporizhzhia front. Could this 'land bridge to Crimea' hold any potential for an offensive by ๐บ๐ฆ? 1/16
Recalling the (admittedly oft-criticised) 3:1 rule of combat, ๐บ๐ฆ would likely be unable to allocate enough manpower for an attack before the โheavily populatedโ Donbas front has been stabilised through tactical retreats and an influx of heavy weapons. 2/16
This is arguably already happening, with the arrival of ๐ซ๐ท CAESARs, ๐ต๐ฑ Krabs and ๐ฉ๐ช/๐ณ๐ฑ PzH 2000s and a looming evacuation of Severodonetsk. But what would ๐บ๐ฆ gain from an attack on the Zaporizhzhia front some weeks down the line? And is it feasible? 3/16