Pax Lusitanica Profile picture
OSINT enthusiast and armchair strategist. Reading the news, looking at maps. 🇩🇰 expatriate in 🇵🇹, married to a 🇹🇼, closely following events in 🇺🇦
Apr 28, 2024 13 tweets 5 min read
The city of Bryansk (pop. ~400,000) is a regional industrial hub with a number of valuable targets for the 🇷🇺 military-industrial complex (MIC). As 🇺🇦 continues to expand its drone strike capabilities, it is possible that Bryansk will become one of the most coveted targets. 1/13 Image Barely 100 km from 🇺🇦, Bryansk has been hit by drone strikes before. Still, it remains more unscathed than for instance the closer city of Belgorod. The campaign against oil / gas industry targets across 🇷🇺 has also minimally impacted Bryansk, which has few such facilities. 2/13 Image
Sep 20, 2023 25 tweets 11 min read
As OSINT analysts pore over every field between Robotyne and Verbove, 🇺🇦's counteroffensive near Tokmak is receiving plenty of attention. But the Azov Sea is still terribly far away, so how to properly deal with the 🇷🇺 land bridge to Crimea? A🧵: 1/25 This 🧵is based on my earlier ones about Tokmak and later comments made in various contexts. It addresses the premise that @GeoConfirmed has outlined in the quoted post above. In short, it proposes one objective: Hit the bridges. Then hit them again. 2/25
Feb 19, 2023 17 tweets 6 min read
Pro-Z agitprop comes in many guises. The TV show 'Evening with Vladimir Solovyov' on Russia-1 is well-known for its host and guests casually engaging in nuclear threats and weird behaviour. But what about other kinds of 🇷🇺 propaganda? A view from 🇵🇹. 1/16
On a bimonthly basis, the Embassy of 🇷🇺 in Lisbon issues the magazine 'Rússia'. Its sleek, colourful design suggests a fair amount of effort in its creation. Let us look at the December 2022 edition, issued in 1,500 copies. What awaits us inside? More Solovyov-esque vitriol? 2/16
Oct 8, 2022 9 tweets 4 min read
With today’s strike against the Crimean Bridge, I would like to revisit my ‘Tokmak thesis’ from June. Basically, it argued that a possible 🇺🇦 offensive towards Tokmak, 30 km from the front and 50 km from Melitopol could help to block 🇷🇺 supply lines. 1/9 Tokmak has recently surfaced as a topic on Twitter due to speculation that it might serve as a 🇺🇦 springboard to Melitopol. Also, heavy bombardment of nearby 🇷🇺 storage depots (including in the Tokmak Forging and Stamping Plant) has been reported. 2/9
Sep 24, 2022 16 tweets 7 min read
With all eyes now on the Battle of Lyman, the notion of a 🇺🇦 push in northern Luhansk Oblast may also be worth considering. If 🇺🇦 can extend control over the area east of the Oskil River, it might be better suited to address 🇷🇺's mobilisation. A🧵: 1/16 The region under consideration here consists of the two northernmost raions (districts) of Luhansk Oblast, namely Svatove Raion and Starobilsk Raion. It is sparsely populated with a total of 205,000 inhabitants across 8,671 km2 - a population density like Sweden or Iowa. 2/16 Svatove Raion (northwest) and Starobilsk Raion (northeast).
Aug 11, 2022 21 tweets 8 min read
I recently described how 🇺🇦 has sought to cut off 🇷🇺 in northern Kherson Oblast by blasting two strategic bridges over the Dnieper (and another over the Inhulets). This follow-up 🧵 examines the third and last Dnieper crossing - the Nova Kakhovka Dam. 1/21 Image As the 6th and southernmost dam on the Dnieper, the Nova Kakhovka Dam was finished in 1956 as part of a hydroelectric plant with a reported capacity of 335-357 MW. It is just north of Nova Kakhovka city (pop. 45,000), now held by 🇷🇺's 22nd Army Corps. 2/21 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakhovka_…
Jul 30, 2022 12 tweets 6 min read
As 🇺🇦 prepares to push out the 🇷🇺 occupiers in northern Kherson Oblast, a lot of focus has recently been on three only crossings on the first 300 km stretch of the Dnieper River. This 🧵 represents the first half of a quick “beginner’s guide” to these infrastructure assets. 1/11 Image First a little background context: As one of the largest rivers in Europe, the Dnieper is a salient feature of the region, bisecting Ukraine. Near its estuary in Kherson Oblast, it is very wide and virtually impossible to traverse with mobile bridges. 2/11 Image
Jul 5, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
A recent sabotage action appears to have effectively broken the back of the 🇷🇺-controlled 'land bridge to Crimea'. Depending on sources, the destruction of a key railway bridge between Melitopol and Tokmak was attributed to either partisans or 🇺🇦 SOF. 1/5 Due to several villages in the area being named Lyubymivka, there was some initial confusion over the location. But it is almost certainly the steel bridge over the Molochna River at 47.078779, 35.486520 - in fact closer to the town of Svitlodolynske. 2/5
Jun 22, 2022 16 tweets 8 min read
Speculative 🧵: In recent weeks, most of the fighting in 🇺🇦 (and subsequent media attention) has focused on the Donbas and Kherson fronts. In between lies the fairly stagnant Zaporizhzhia front. Could this 'land bridge to Crimea' hold any potential for an offensive by 🇺🇦? 1/16 Recalling the (admittedly oft-criticised) 3:1 rule of combat, 🇺🇦 would likely be unable to allocate enough manpower for an attack before the ‘heavily populated’ Donbas front has been stabilised through tactical retreats and an influx of heavy weapons. 2/16