Today 🇬🇪celebrate #Didgoroba. Didgoroba marks King David IV's defeat of the Seljuk Turks in the battle of Didgori, which ultimately led to the reconquest of Tbilisi,and brought about the Georgian Golden Age and is celebrated in the Georgian chronicles as a "Miraculous Victory" 1/
The Muslim powers became increasingly concerned about the rapid rise of the Christian state in the southern Caucasus and even considered it a greater threat than the Crusaders in Palestine, whom they managed to contain on the coast. 2/
In 1121, Sultan Mahmud Muhammad declared a holy war on 🇬🇪and rallied a large coalition of Muslim states led by the Artuqid Najm al-din El-ğazi and Toğrul Muhammad, the Seljuqid ruler of Arran and Nakhichevan.The coalition was also supported by lesser but important local rulers 3/
including the King of the Arabs Dubays Sadaqa and Tughan-Arslan,lord of Arzin, Bidlis and Dvin. Najm al-din El-ğazi had just celebrated his great victory over the Crusaders under King Roger of Antioch at Balat in 1119 & enjoyed the reputation of an experienced Muslim commander
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The size of the Muslim army is still a matter of debate with numbers ranging from a fantastic 600,000 men (Walter the Chancellor’s Bella Antiochena, Matthew of Edessa) to 400,000 (Smbat Sparapet’s Chronicle) while estimates of Georgian historians vary between 100,000–250,000. 5/
Muslims made massive preparations, gathered an army that was several times larger than any engaged in the Holy Land, and vastly outnumbered the Georgians. In mid-summer 1121, the Muslim troops advanced along various routes and Entering Georgian territory 6/
On 10 August, the enormous Muslim army bivouacked on a vast field near Didgori, about a day’s march from Tbilisi.
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🇬🇪 battle plan involved a cunning move.On the morning of 12 August, some 200 cavalrymen departed the Georgian camp and rode to the enemy side,indicating they wanted to defect.The Muslim commanders,surprisingly, not only allowed them into the camp but also gathered to meet them 8/
At a signal, the Georgians suddenly unsheathed their swords and attacked them, killing and wounding most of them. Observing the confusion in the enemy camp, King David ordered a general attack on the enemy positions while his son Prince Demetre charged the enemy flank. 9/
With their leadership in disarray, the Muslims in the frontline failed to organize any resistance, while those in the back soon became so disorganized that the entire battle lasted only three hours before the enemy army fled in disorder.
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According to the Georgian chronicler, King David’s troops pursued them for three days, “putting all of them to the sword and leaving them to the carnivorous beasts and birds of the mountains and plains.”
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The Armenian historian Matthews wrote that “terrible and savage slaughter of the enemy troops ensued and the [enemy] corpses filled up the rivers and covered all valleys and cliffs,” and claimed that less than a hundred men survived from every thousand.
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The Muslim commander-in-chief El-ğazi himself was wounded and fled with the few surviving escorts while his son-in-law Dubays Sadaqa barely escaped. The Georgians captured the entire enemy camp and the fabulous riches it contained.
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The unification of Georgia and the elimination of Muslim authority was completed in the year following the battle at Didgori. David laid siege to and captured the city of Tbilisi which became a royal town, the capital of Georgia, "for ever an arsenal and capital for his sons" 14/
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WHY THE “SECOND STRONGEST ARMY IN THE WORLD” FAILED TO CONTROL THE SKIES OVER KYIV REGION
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On February 24, 2022, russian aviation entered Ukrainian airspace with a sense of total impunity. In the aggressor’s headquarters, there was confidence that the first waves of “Kalibr” and “Iskander” strikes would paralyze Ukraine’s command system, destroy its air defenses, disable airfields, and open the way for an airborne assault on Kyiv. According to this plan, the “second strongest army in the world” expected to dictate the terms within the first hours of the war.
Instead of the anticipated collapse over Kyiv region, the enemy encountered a completely different kind of defense—mobile, coordinated, and composed. Ukraine’s system did not fall apart under the first удар; it held, adapted quickly, and began operating in ways no russian scenario had anticipated.
What was supposed to be a lightning-fast air blitzkrieg turned into one of the most intense air battles of the 21st century—one that Ukraine won not through sheer numbers of missiles and aircraft, but through intelligence, flexibility, and resilience.
Every timely maneuver by air defense units saved thousands of lives in the capital. Every sortie by aging MiGs disrupted enemy doctrine and shattered the myth of invincibility.
🔵 The First Strike: The Fight for Command and Control
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In the opening hours of the invasion, russian forces launched massive missile strikes against command centers, radar stations, air defense units, and airfields. The goal was clear: “blind” Ukraine’s defenses and disorganize resistance. A key focus was the Hostomel airfield, intended as a staging ground for an airborne assault.
But the system held. Within the first two days alone, the attacker lost 14 aircraft, 8 helicopters, and dozens of missiles. What was expected to be an easy operation turned into exhausting air combat, where numerical superiority could not make up for a lack of adaptability.
🔵 S-300: Staying One Step Ahead
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Dozens of missiles were launched at fixed S-300 positions—but most struck empty revetments. Ukrainian command had already dispersed its assets in advance.
The S-300 systems forced enemy aircraft to abandon high-altitude operations, effectively closing off the upper airspace and denying safe bombing runs. As a result, russian aviation was pushed down to lower altitudes—straight into the range of tactical air defenses.
🔵 Buk-M1: Ambush Tactics and Mobility
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While S-300 units controlled higher altitudes, Buk-M1 systems relied on ambush tactics. Mobile units kept their radars off most of the time, activating them only briefly based on observer reports, firing, and then quickly relocating.
This approach proved highly effective against a numerically superior enemy and worked in coordination with Ukrainian fighter aviation.
For russian pilots, this meant one thing: there were no safe routes over Kyiv region. These “roaming hunters” brought down multiple Su-34s and Su-35s, turning them into burning wreckage in fields near Makariv and Borodianka.
🔵 The “Ghost of Kyiv”: A Myth That Became a Weapon
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With one Ukrainian pilot often facing five or six enemy fighters, the legend of the “Ghost of Kyiv” was born. It became a collective symbol of the pilots of the 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade and other units defending the capital.
Flying older MiG-29s and Su-27s, and often outmatched technologically, Ukrainian pilots forced close-range dogfights. Using terrain masking, they flew low to ambush enemy aircraft and effectively channel them into air defense kill zones.
The legend itself had a psychological impact. Reports of Ukrainian fighters in the area sometimes caused russian pilots to jettison their bombs prematurely and turn back before reaching their targets.
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🔵 Strike Power: Su-24M and Su-25 vs. Long Columns
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While fighters engaged in air combat, Su-24M bombers and Su-25 attack aircraft played a key role in disrupting enemy logistics.
During critical weeks, Ukrainian pilots flew at extremely low altitudes through dense air defense fire, striking long columns of armored vehicles near Hostomel, Bucha, and Makariv. Combined with artillery and drones, these strikes helped break the momentum of the offensive and threw enemy logistics into chaos.
Each sortie was extremely dangerous—pilots operated under constant threat to give ground forces a chance to counterattack.
🔵 Why Did They Lose the Skies Over the Capital?
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On April 2, 2022, Kyiv region was fully liberated from russian forces—marking a turning point in the early phase of the war.
The failure was not due to a lack of equipment or manpower, but to systemic issues: overconfidence, outdated doctrine, and rigid centralized command that limited adaptability.
In contrast, Ukrainian forces operated with flexibility and initiative. Local commanders made rapid decisions, while air defense and aviation units constantly repositioned. Most importantly, every servicemember understood what they were fighting for.
🔵 The Foundation of Today’s Strength
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The battle for Kyiv was won not only with missiles, but through the relentless work of technicians, communications specialists, and operators who maintained a unified system under constant pressure.
With growing combat experience and support from partners, Ukraine’s air defense became stronger. Today’s capabilities rest on the foundation laid by those S-300s, Buk systems, and MiG-29s that held the sky in the spring of 2022.
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🔵 THE FORMULA FOR SUCCESS: WORDS FROM THE COMMANDER
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“At the time, we had neither Western fighters nor modern systems like Patriot. We used everything we had—deception, demonstrative actions, false radio traffic. We deliberately created a distorted picture of the air situation for the enemy.
We knew the first strikes would target command and airfields. So hours before the attack, we dispersed our forces. Air defense and radar units moved to alternate positions, aircraft relocated to backup airfields. When the first missiles hit empty revetments, our defense was already in motion.
The first air encounter happened within an hour and a half. The enemy followed standard doctrine, assuming our defenses were suppressed. We proved otherwise. When our fighters moved to intercept, the enemy chose not to engage.
Commanders at all levels were given autonomy. Even with limited information, they could act independently. At the same time, we continuously analyzed the enemy, identified weaknesses, and adapted quickly.
Conditions were extremely difficult—fog, freezing temperatures, poor visibility. But not a single mission failed.
Thanks to this system, the determination of our pilots, and the resilience of our air defense crews, the enemy’s air blitzkrieg failed.
The sky over the capital was not luck. It was the result of decisions, preparation, and responsibility. We didn’t just hold the sky—we broke their belief in their own invincibility.”
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🇺🇦🫡A 19-year-old serviceman of the ruSSian army helped eliminate at least 150 of his fellow soldiers and later surrendered to Ukrainian forces, according to the I Want to Live initiative.
Artem, a soldier from the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 150th Division of the 1/
🇷🇺 army, reportedly made contact with the project in November 2025 and said he wanted to help. For nearly 3 months, he provided up-to-date information on infantry and equipment positions, as well as movement routes of occupying forces within his unit’s area of responsibility—
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around the settlements of Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka.
Based on his coordinates, Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed 4 UAV crews, 4 mortar teams, an MLRS and 2 tanks. In addition to around 150 killed, his information is said to have resulted in at least 50 more being wounded.
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Due to effective Ukrainian counter-battery fire, ruSSian artillery is increasingly forced to switch to more guerrilla-style tactics. This time, they have essentially reinvented the 9P132 Grad-P.
The system is called “Kozerog-1” (Capricorn-1). It is an artillery mount designed 1/
to fire rockets from the BM-21 Grad MLRS. It consists of 3 main parts:
- a platform with stabilizing LEGS
- HORNS for vertical elevation with a subframe
- and launch rails taken from the Grad — up to 6 can be mounted on the carriage.
When disassembled, the Kozerog reportedly 2/
fits easily into a Bukhanka. A 3 man crew can bring it into combat readiness in about 15mins.
The system can use the full range of rockets designed for the BM-21, incl. the 9M22U w/ a range of up to 20km. It features coarse vertical elevation mechanisms as well as handwheels 3/
A group of militants under the command of Ruslan Gelayev on the Chechnya-Georgia route through the Caucasus Mountains, footage from August-September 2002.
During their activities, Chechen militants established several routes through the Caucasus Mountains, reaching the 1/
territories of two Transcaucasian countries, namely Georgia and Azerbaijan. These routes served as supply lines.
These photos are the final ones taken by Roddy Scott (He was a journalist) before his death in 2002. Scott had travelled to 🇬🇪and embedded himself w/in a Guerilla 2/
unit that was operating out of the Pankisi Gorge and preparing to cross the mountains into Chechnya, and then into Ingushetia.The above photos chart that perilous journey the group took and, show how amazing a feat it was, and is, to cross such a natural barrier into a warzone 3/
The USAF last days began a large-scale redeployment of aircraft and logistical assets toward the Middle East. Judging by the structure of the flight activity, this appears to be a planned reinforcement phase rather than scattered, unrelated movements.
Within a 24-hour period, 1/
several aerial refueling aircraft—four KC-46 Pegasus tankers and one KC-135—departed from Homestead Air Reserve Base and Roosevelt Roads as part of CORONET East 035.
Notably, there is no formal confirmation of fighter aircraft being redeployed together with the tankers.However
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the flight routes and callsigns suggest a possible accompanying transfer of Vermont Air National Guard F-35A fighters.
Against this backdrop, the intensified activity of U.S. Army heavy airlift aviation is even more telling. From Robert Gray Army Airfield (Fort Hood), home to
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