A really interesting analysis by @IAPonomarenko about how Ukraine is trying to cope with Russian artillery strength and what it needs to do it better. Worth a close read as there are many important points.
Throughout the story the theme is that Ukraine must improve its counter battery capabilities (hitting Russian artillery once it fires and reveals itself) to try and counter Russian numerical superiority in guns
HIMARS and other ranged attacks have made a significant difference in Russian artillery capabilities, but the Russians can still mass artillery in certain areas. As for the state of the artillery war, for the first time I saw hard estimates from Ukr.
The first was that the depot attacks have reduced daily Russian artillery fire in the Donbas by half to two thirds. From 12-15k Russian rounds a day to 5-6k
Overall Russian artillery piece superiority has also been reduced but is still there. 2000 Russian artillery pieces to approx 500 Ukr. I haven’t seen such definte figures for a while
However even with the reduction in Russian fire, they can still generate heavy, demoralising fire at certain parts of the front. Not like before when compared to the large cities of Severodonetsk being hammered, but still significant.
The powerful description was of a Russian artillery attack on the small town of Pivka.
How should Ukr respond. Also important. The Ukr military is attempting a really tricky adjustment, from a highly centralised Soviet style command to a more decentralised NATO one. This poses problems as there is not one place for artillery expertise.
In particular the decentralised system means it’s difficult to create counter battery expertise to be shared amongst the army. Basically the expertise needed is complex and they haven’t been able to train consistently enough at it
In that way, what it needs is clear, Ukraine needs the equipment and training to improve counter battery skills. They need specialist training; shared expertise and better drone technology. Together that helps with fast identification of a target and rapid fire in return.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Sunday update (a little later, sorry was travelling). There seem to be two different narratives emerging--Russians pushing forward a little in the Donbas/Donetsk, Ukrainians setting up for a wasting campaign against the Russians in Kherson.
In the Donbas area the Russians over the last week have claimed to have moved forward towards Bakhmut and Siversk, and many pro-Russian outlets are making much of these claims. The truth seems that they have pushed a few kilometres forward in areas, but not as much as claimed.
This is quite a useful @TheStudyofWar interactive map of today. The yellow is what the Russians are claiming, the broken red line is where the ISW calculates where they are. You can explore the map here. storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6…
Some reports of explosions in Belarus military facilities. Wouldn’t be surprised if Ukraine is putting pressure on a Lukashenko, or if Belarussians are doing it themselves.
Wouldn’t be surprised if Ukraine was putting pressure on Lukashenko to show how weak his position is. They don’t believe he can afford to enter the war (he can’t) but wonder if he might send volunteers . news360.es/ukraine-rules-…
And guess what, if Lukashenko comes under pressure, who saves him? Putin has his whole army basically in Ukraine. Will the Belarus people fight for Lukashenko? Might actually be time for Ukraine to apply a little pressure.
A really interesting thread with the first satellite pictures from Russian air base on Crimea, which was (now clearly shown) heavily damaged with the loss of a great deal of expensive equipment, including base logistics.
The thread also starts discussing what kind of attack it was, and tbh, it’s still not clear. I’ve seen a number of options presented, all of which have some supporting evidence. Ukr Spec Forces, UAVs, long range rockets (even ATACMS), homegrown Ukr missiles…
The Ukrainians aren’t saying, and tbh, they shouldn’t. The gravity of this attack can’t be underestimated, and if the Russians don’t even know how it was launched, it’s impact will be magnified.
Russo-Ukraine War (will try to stick to this name now) update from the Pentagon briefing yesterday--which might be termed escalatory briefing. Here is the whole text. There is lots on China-Taiwan as well btw. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
One of the big changes since the start of the war is that the USDOD is willing to put things on the record with very senior officials. Its no longer using anonymity to provide some protection. IOW, they are feeling increasingly confident of their analysis.
Yesterday's briefing was by Dr Colin Kahl, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (basically number 3 in the Pentagon on the civilian side. So this info/analysis comes from the top. defense.gov/About/Biograph…
A thread, primarily for those in Ukraine whose opinion I would really value. Its about what we should call this war we are in. Lots of people use different names, Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine-Russian War, Putin's war, etc.
At some point we will inevitably settle on one name (though that can change over time, see Great War to First World War). I was thinking from now on of just using the name: The Ukraine War. My thinking was as follows.
1. This war is ultimately about the future of Ukraine, it was an attempt by Putin's Russia to conquer and erase the country politically.
Sunday update--again little map change, but important shift to the south and west (Kherson) and what that means. Ukraine and the strategy of telegraphing intentions (or not).
Like last week, there has been little shift in the front line between the two forces. Indeed the area of engagement in the Donbas seems to have shrunk noticeably in the last two weeks. The north end of the Donbas salient (Siversk-Slovyansk) seems to have gone very quiet.
What Russian offensive action there is is concentrated on Bakhmut and pushing forward from Donetsk. @TheStudyofWar map.