1,002 people total
- 49.5% are men = 466 people
- Of those, about 62% are fathers, according to the Census. = 288 people IF the sample is representative of parenthood (it's not)
= margin of error of 12 points on the margin between Ds and Rs
The margin of error roughly doubles again when you looking at differences between margins. So the 28pt "swing" from the may to August poll could be as small as 4pts (likelier) or as big as 52 (hell no).
And again this is IF you assume Census proportions (which is not correct)
in other words, the Dads Bounce narrative is a bad use of polling
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Lots of pollsters aren't doing what is TBH the bare minimum at this point to even try to adjust for partisan nonresponse outright or disclose whether they detect it in their data. This is perhaps the biggest story with polls right now — and most are just shrugging their shoulders
To be clear, this is not an easy problem to solve! (I report on some potential improvements in chapters 6 & 7 of gelliottmorris.com/strength_in_nu….) But I don't think consumers of polls really know how big the effects of residual partisan biases in samples are right now.
It's also not clear to me, FWIW, that nonresponse bias will always favor Republicans. Several pollsters have shared data w me at this point showing a GOP differential in responding over the last few months, especially among strong Republicans. That is the mirror opposite of 2020!
Do you remember an article from earlier this week that claimed one million voters switched to the GOP last year? Turns out it was completely wrong. The authors mistook modeled party ID scores for actual party registration. Political numeracy matters!
I do think that the AP should probably issue a correction to their story — or maybe even retract it altogether, given how erroneous the analysis it’s based on is
Completely separate issue but: This story has some implications for the ongoing debate about persuadable moderate voters, too — namely that actual party-switching in registrations appears to be down somewhat compared to 2016-2018
I do not think this is right. If the QPac poll is suffering from partisan nonresponse, that means it has a group of very engaged and liberal Dems answering it. Those are also the Dems most likely to disapprove of Biden right now.
Kemp's approval in other polls is closer to +10, so this actually does track somewhat.
But really I just think this is noise and that people shouldn't great a +10 poll with a 14 pt margin of error as a +10 poll with a 0 pt margin of error
NEW The Economist/YouGov poll fielded after SCOTUS struck down Roe v Wade
- 49% of adults disapprove of the decision (42% approve)
- 57% support Congress legalizing abortion in the 1st trimester (32 oppose)
- 53% support a federal law ensuring a right to an abortion (37 oppose)
More:
- 5% of adults say abortion should be banned always
- 36% call themselves "pro-choice" v 25% "pro-life. "Pro-choice" is up from 32% last week.
- 47% say they would vote "for or against a candidate just on the basis of their position on the abortion issue?"
- 39% say they approve of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job. That is unchanged since last week.
- Disapproval of the Court is up from 39% to 49%
- The share of adults saying they "strongly disapprove" of SCOTUS rose from 20% in last week's survey to 35% this week
- The House is fairer in terms of Dem % of seats in a tied year
- BUT they need to win by a slightly *HIGHER* margin to control the majority of seats
- GOP has drawn many more solid R seats, decreasing responsiveness
.@_rospearce is primarily responsible for these beautiful visualizations; shapefiles and data from @FiveThirtyEight's redistricting tracker (we did the simulations ourselves)
There are quite a few other ways to show what's going on (not everything fits on the page.) This shows differences in seat partisan leans between 2020 and 2022. You can clearly see the GOP shoring up margins in competitive red seats by carving out votes from their ultra-safe ones
This has always been very tempting to believe — especially given federal policy incongruence on some large issues, such as abortion, guns, & health care — but the research McKay cites obfuscates the reality of policy responsiveness in a few important ways. 1/4
2/4 A reanalysis of the 2014 Gilens and Page data suggest that when the rich, middle-income and poor favor a policy, it has a 40% chance of passing. When the rich and middle class disagree, there is close to a 50-50 chance of either side winning. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/po…
3/4 So IMO the real takeaway is that, while the rich do get what they want more often, policymakers are unresponsive to Americans _as a whole_. Any given majority-favored policy has less than a 40% chance of passing. That is not very responsive! But it’s also not “zero effect.”