Thread by @MassDara

Below, I discuss the critical period ahead for the war in Ukraine. Russia lays ground for annexing parts of Ukraine. However, there is, again, a mismatch between the Kremlin's goals and the exhausted forces it has remaining to deliver those goals (1/). foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia…

For months, Russia has installed Russian officials to administer occupied regions, changed area codes and ISPs to Russian ones, confiscated Ukrainian passports, imported teachers, + more, to "harmonize" the regions with Russia. This is most likely annexation groundwork (2/)

Why would Russia annex these oblasts? For many reasons, but the one I focus on is this: the Kremlin needs this phase of the war to end so it can repair and regenerate forces. I use the word phase because Russian goals for Ukraine are long-term and probably unchanged.(3/)

Russia may think annexation, followed with nuclear saber-rattling about territory that the Kremlin defines as Russia, may shock the system into slowing foreign weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Or would freeze the line of contact. Kyiv has already said no to that. (4/)

Ukrainian and Russian goals through the end of 2022 are therefore on a collision course: Ukraine seeks to prevent the conflict from ossifying along a frozen line of contact, and Russia is accelerating its efforts to attain that outcome. (5/)

If Russia annexes these territories, Moscow would need a large force to hold a highly contested front line and cope from organized partisan attacks within occupied Ukrainian regions. Where will this force come from, when....(6/)

Russia is already scraping the bottom of 9 barrels for personnel and taking old equipment in various states of serviceability from long term storage right now (7/)

Russian armed forces in Ukraine are depleted and need time to repair and regenerate. Russia's ad-hoc approach to finding more men, missiles, and equipment is keeping them afloat in the near term but in the mid or long-term requires a different strategy (8/)

I see signs they are attempting to kick start their defense industry to regenerate. But mass orders of new or modernized equipment is not so simple due to bottlenecks, setting aside sanctions and import restrictions (9/)

In my assessment, Russia is muddling through. Its adhoc approach to replacing personnel and equipment risks overcommitting its remaining forces to missions it could struggle to bear, and Russian armed forces are weakest in the next 1-2 years, assuming they can recapitalize (10/)

Moscow has not ordered a mobilization which could unlock a lot of resources for them in a way it's shadow/ad-hoc efforts cannot. Even if they did, it would probably take up to a year to see any benefit because their mobilization base has been dormant for so long (11/)

Ukrainian forces face significant challenges also. Both sides, from what I can observe and from soldiers' accounts, could struggle with large-scale offensives or counteroffensives. But there are opportunities for Ukrainian forces (12/)

The Russian General Staff is still capable of understanding when its objectives are at risk of collapse, through complicated assessments and mechanisms by which it judges combat effectiveness. I assume it pulled back from Kyiv and Kharkiv for these reasons/internal forecasts(13/)

Localized attacks on key locations, as Ukraine has been doing in western Kherson, can be a viable strategy, which I discuss in the article. (14/)

In sum, I flag probable Russian efforts to shock the system via annexation in the months ahead. Russia appears to be overcommitting its forces again to a difficult mission. Ukrainian and Russian forces are tired but for different reasons. The months ahead are critical (15/end).