There's an uptick in media reports regarding Ukraine Army actions in Kherson. Rightfully so.
Many (me included) watching this closely. Will provide thoughts in a few days. But could be a mini-Falaise pocket (WWII reference) as UA has brilliantly attacked RU LOCs....1/2
...while using terrain/rivers to their advantage. It also appears Putin refuses to allow his generals to withdraw (like Hitler before him w/ Marshall von Kluge)
Back then, the Germans were trapped west of the Seine. This time, it will be the RU west of the Dnipro.
2/2
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This 25 tweet 🧵by my Australian friend MG (ret) Mick Ryan @WarintheFuture is succinct, descriptive of campaign planning & operational art, and a phenomenal discussion of Ukraine's potential plans in the south.
Hope Mick doesn't mind, but I'll add a few additional comments. 1/
In the past few hours many of us have watched the discussion regarding classified documents & their appropriate storage.
Since like most senior officers I had some experience in this area, I thought it would be helpful to provide some BASIC info.
So, this new 🧵is born! 1/21
1st, there are three levels of security classification for the US Government:
-Classified
-Secret
-Top Secret
Each one of those have increasing degree of sensativity.
I'll cover those first 3, but please know there are "additional" descriptors confusing levels we'll get to.2/
CLASSIFIED is the lowest classification level. It's information that might "damage or disclose" an element of national security.
Classified document may address particulars about a weapon system (e.g., max range of a missile) or #'s of soldiers deployed. 3/
Lots of discussion about the documents. @BrynnTannehill thread is conjecture, but if true (likely as this is the kind of classified documents high level officials receive) is incredibly dangerous. She says “SAP.” Those Special Access Programs are known by very few…1/5
Even saying the “code word” associated with them to others not “read in” on the program is a security violation punishable by prison. Given @JaxAlemany’s report that written lists compiled at the scene could not include some documents seems to indicate SAP. 2/
To read SAP documents requires a Top Secret Clearance, to be “read on” regarding the details of the program, and understanding the special rules of safeguarding the particulars. How do I know this? I’ve been “read on” to many, couldn’t talk about it to anyone outside a SCIF…3/
Yes, RU had an initial plan in Feb. I did a brief for some folks showing my thoughts on original operational & strategic objectives.
See the 2 charts below.
RU assigned 190,000 forces on 9+ avenues of approaches on exterior lines...and were rebuffed for a variety of reasons. 2/
As noted in March, the myriad reasons for RU failure:
-Poor command & control
-lack of preparation (training & exercises) to the planned maneuver
-dysfunction logistics system
-practice not following doctrine
-ineffective combined arms maneuver & air support
-etc, etc, 3/
Last night I was w/ a group of sparkly-smart PMBA students.
During a break, one said: "Your 🧵s on Ukraine are understandable for those who don't normally study this stuff, could you do one on China?"
While admittedly not a China expert, here are some thoughts. 1/
As background, I was a LTC at the National War College in 1998. At the end of the course, the class separates and travels to different parts of the world for a few weeks to see analyze security challenges the US faces.
Having spent so much time in EU, I volunteered for China.2/
Six of us traveled to several cities to observe military, economic & diplomatic elements of PRC's national power.
One place we visited was the Chinese War College in Nanjing, where we received information about their emerging national security strategy & 20 year plan. 3/