So what comes next in the Trump DOJ investigation? One critical initial step will be conducting a classification review of any potentially classified records that were seized at MAL. How will that work? Follow along... 1/
After the filter team completes its review, FBI agents will comb through the materials to ID any potentially classified records. Some records should be clear from their markings, but FBI will closely review handwritten notes & everything else, which could also be classified. /2
Even though the Espionage Act refers to "national defense" info instead of "classified" info, DOJ will still want to determine whether a given document is currently and properly classified. You can't trust markings for this, which may have been misapplied or become outdated. /3
Documents are typically derivatively classified by officials who aren't classification experts, and they often get it wrong. And even when they get it right, it's possible that subsequent events or disclosures will mean that the document is no longer classified. /4
For this reason, DOJ will likely want to know what the documents' classification status was on both Jan. 20, 2021 and today. DOJ can't make this determination itself, so it will need to farm the docs out the agencies with "equities" in the information contained in the docs. /5
Sounds easy in theory, but it gets complicated quickly when documents contain multiple agency equities. Intel docs prepared for POTUS are typically all-source, and could contain classified info from CIA (HUMINT), NSA (SIGINT), NGA (GEOINT), State (FGI), DoD, and others. /6
It's even more complicated here bc of the sensitivity of this investigation. DOJ will rightly want the docs to be extremely close hold - only going to the min. necessary number of people. There's a trade-off to this though - more secrecy means key SMEs might get left out. /7
For these reasons, I suspect DOJ will look to ODNI to help lead the classification review. If they can find the right classification expert at ODNI, that person(s) will be able to identify individual agency equities and consult with the right people at each agency. /8
Agency lawyers will help quarterback this effort. 1. They are the appropriate POCs for DOJ. 2. They help ensure that people don't unnecessarily create discoverable material. 3. They help ensure rigor on the classification review -- good lawyers are great at quality control. /9
The "classification experts" will do their work, but it's possible they'll need to consult with operators/analysts to understand the current state of play with the subject matter in the real world. They wouldn't do this for a FOIA case, but they might here given the stakes. /10
Throughout, DOJ and agency lawyers will be nervous about creating discoverable materials. Pretty much everything about the reviews will be discoverable if there's a prosecution, and that's fine, but the lawyers will want to prevent the reviewers from doing stupid shit. /11
That means telling the people involved: 1. Don't email or instant message about the reviews - meetings and phone calls only. 2. Keep in mind that each draft is discoverable - limit the number of versions you make. 3. Don't speculate or opine on things beyond your purview. /12
Oh, the White House/NSC will have zero involvement in all this. Really. It's also best if the political appointees at the agencies don't get involved as well -- leave it to the career professionals (plus, this means you don't get subpoenaed by Jim Jordan next year). /13
The end result will be informing DOJ of the classified status of each doc as Jan. 20 and today (assuming no Trump declass order). It's possible they'd portion mark the docs too, identifying the class. level of each paragraph, to allow DOJ to zero in on the sensitive aspects. /14
Notwithstanding what some have said, there will be no formal "damage assessment" (more on that later). The standard for classification under EO 13526 is "reasonably could be expected" to damage national security. It's theoretical. Actual damage is irrelevant under the EO. /15
There still may be "damage control" efforts, however. Agency CI professionals will want to understand what's in the docs so they can protect sources, take down platforms/devices, etc., if they think they've been compromised. This is different from a damage assessment though. /16
As you can tell, the number of people who ultimately get involved (reviewers, lawyers, SMEs) is quite large. These are not folks who leak things (and most are poly'd), so if you start seeing leaks about the results, my guess would be FBI (sorry FBI friends). /17
Sadly, everyone involved - career professionals just doing their jobs - will be a target for harassment by GOP-controlled committees if they take over. For this reason, the agencies will likely offer professional liability insurance to everyone, to help pay for their lawyers. /18
All-in-all, it's a very professional effort, and very complicated. It could take at least 2-3 weeks or so, as every step will be deliberate (e.g., the docs will likely be transported by hand only). Most importantly, I can guarantee you that the process will be free of politics. /
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As mentioned in my previous thread, notwithstanding some of the commentary you've seen, I think it's unlikely that there will be a formal damage assessment relating to the MAL documents anytime soon, but there may still be damage control/mitigation efforts. I'll explain why. /1
Some members of Congress and Twitter experts have been clamoring for a "damage assessment" in wake of the MAL fiasco. To do this, the affected agencies (or ODNI) would normally convene a mix of analysts & operators to assess impacts to both sources/methods & foreign relations. /2
They'd eventually produce a report with key assessments about the damage, while also documenting mitigation efforts. Depending on the nature of the compromised info, the report could be very sensitive, as it would go deeper & discuss classified info not in the docs themselves. /3
Here's one early way you'll know that DOJ is dead serious about prosecuting Trump or someone on his team for obstruction: if lead DOJ prosecutor Jay Bratt recuses himself from the investigation bc he's a key witness to the obstruction. I'll explain. 1/
Prosecutors try very hard to avoid become witnesses in their own cases. If they become a witness who might have to testify, then (a) they might have an ethical conflict and (b) it opens them up to all sorts of discovery obligations (re things they read/heard) and cross-exam. /2
The primary way prosecutors avoid this is by having FBI agents present whenever they are engaging in any conduct that might open them up to being a witness -typically interviews, but could be evidence collection too. This way, the FBI agent will be the witness if needed. /3
1. There is NO required process that Presidents have to follow when declassifying information. They SHOULD follow a process, but don't have to.
2. But there has to be evidence that declassification actually happened. You can't just make shit up. Focus on this instead. /1
I'm one of the few people on here who actually used to work on classification for the government. I'm happy to be proven wrong, but I'm not aware of anything in EO 13526 or any other authority that requires the President to follow a certain process when declassifying info. /2
So-called experts on Twitter keep saying there is a required process, but it's not true. Presidents SHOULD follow a process, but they are not required to. Yes, no one wants to concede a point to Trump's idiotic defenders, but on this one they are right, but only to an extent. /3
Yes, the destruction of records during the transition can be a crime, but there are things that House Dems and FOIA requesters can do now to help deter that destruction, while bolstering a future prosecution if it occurs anyway. Check out my Lawfare article for an explainer. /1
First, FOIA requestors should consider seeking preservation orders in pending cases. That way destruction would violate a court order and could result in contempt proceedings against Trump officials. You piss off a federal judge at your own peril. /2
FOIA requesters can insist that these preservation orders be served on outgoing Trump officials. This will increase the likelihood of contempt if they proceed, as well as prosecution. Once served, there will be no question that the officials knew destruction was unlawful. /3
Please check out my article in Lawfare about Ratcliffe's recent declassification of Russian intel on Hillary Clinton. Much of the outrage has been focused on him spreading disinformation, but this argument is misplaced. If it's not disinformation, it's even more outrageous./1
The article makes several points. First, if this was disinformation, it means Russia wanted us to find it, so there's no harm in revealing that we did. But Ratcliffe denies that it's been assessed as disinfo, and the IC hasn't pushed back. So it's likely unverified intel. /2
So if it wasn't disinfo, then we just blew a collection source/method against an adversary. Others have made this point but it can't be stated enough. The Ratcliffe letter actually pinpoints a 3-5 window in which the info was collected. Morons. Russia will figure this out. /3
I seriously doubt a prosecutor would want to charge Bolton for what's in his book. Even if it contained classified, the fact that the lead NSC classification official told him she did not believe it contained classified info would be enough to tank a successful prosecution. 1/
Instead it looks like DOJ may be focused on going after Bolton for what he shared with S&S in the early draft manuscripts, which presumably contained much more class info. This may be facially legitimate since it's an unauthorized disclosure, but it would be unprecedented. /2
To my knowledge DOJ has never prosecuted someone for sharing with their publisher (or a ghost author) too early in the pre-publication review process. The dirty secret is that this happens ALL THE TIME, esp. with former senior officials, and the gov't turns a blind eye to it. /3