1/ TASS: Executive director of Kurganmashzavod (KMZ) appears to have been asked by the Russian MOD to resume production of "earlier generation BMPs", likely meaning BMP-2's (overhauls and possibly new builds). Currently, they produce mainly BMP-3's/BMD-4M's. Possible explanation
3/ Last run of new build BMP-2's for Russian military was 2005-2006, last for export 2002. Spare parts production continued to maintain existing vehicles. Upgrade programs also existed, the most significant/successful being the BMP-2M.
4/ The BMP-2M includes the Berezhok module and generally the UTD-23 engine, improving firepower and mobility. Algeria purchased Berezhok module for its BMP-2's starting in 2005. Russia began its procurement later 2017-2018, reaching operational status around 2020.
5/ KMZ however may be (possibly) be reluctant about devoting resources away from BMP-3 production for several reasons. Foremost, the cost of reopening large scale production of the BMP-2 or greatly expanding the 2M may be prohibitive.
6/ Quote from Petyr Tyukov "But one must understand that the price of such products will be much higher than for new mass-produced vehicles that are produced according to plan, such as the BMP-3 and BMD-4M."
7/ Although the BMP-2 would be simpler and cheaper than the BMP-3 once production is set up, the matter of reestablishing the production line with the machinery and expertise needed is complex, time consuming, and costly.
8/ $ at play: The BMP-2 export market is primarily third world countries. Example: Yemen bought 188 BMP-2s for $40 million in 2005 ($58 million inflation adjusted). $308k per unit (assuming the cost did not include much in the way of support/spare parts).
9/ The BMP-3 has several wealthy operators, such as the UAE and Kuwait. Russia itself perhaps pays roughly $1.1 million per base BMP-3 based on state orders as of 2021. There's also the spare parts; UAE pays $10-15 million annually for its ~600 BMP-3's as of 2019.
10/ Russia's MOD surely knows this and the BMP-3's general superiority over the base BMP-2 (~100 BMP-2M's in Russian service being approximately equal in combat value). This raises the question of why they might need more BMP-2's than 3's at this point.
11/ @oryxspioenkop data as a baseline suggests BMP-3 losses (~132, 20% of Russia's existing BMP-3's) may have been higher proportionally than BMP-2 losses (~400, 10-15% of Russia's existing BMP-2's). This could be due to a variety of factors of course.
@oryxspioenkop 12/ KMZ BMP-3 production maxed out at roughly 250 a year, both export and state defense contracts. Usually, it was less than this. Regardless, they may have the ability to replace most BMP-3 losses thus far, assuming @oryxspioenkop data is about 70% of all actual BMP-3 losses.
@oryxspioenkop 13/ But without restarting BMP-2 production, reactivating BMP-2's from reserves, and increasing the pace of 2M upgrades, replacing BMP-2 losses may actually be more difficult that the BMP-3 with KMZ's existing production set up.
@oryxspioenkop 14/ Why don't Russian units simply upgrade to the BMP-3 after losing their BMP-2's? There are (possibly) training/logistical constraints on that. A unit that previously used BMP-2's would need some amount of training to transition.
@oryxspioenkop 15/ A BMP-3 is more complicated. Its armament is widely different than the BMP-2. It also requires more maintenance. Although the BMP-3 is more capable of taking on the latest NATO vehicles, Ukraine is largely operating older equipment, including large numbers of its own BMP-2s
@oryxspioenkop 16/ The (possible) calculation Russia MOD is although there may be greater short term costs for reactivating BMP-2 production, in the longer term dynamics of the war, it is more cost effective to continue fielding large number of the older BMP-2 than adopt the BMP-3 army wide
@oryxspioenkop 17/ How serious the proposal to restart BMP-2 production is remains to be seen. The fact KMZ thinks it may be a possibility made it worth addressing though. The fact this is being considered initially seemed far fetched, but I've attempted to put forth a possible reasoning.
1/ Hi all, haven't tweeted in a while. I've had some exceptionally bad luck with health recently. I'm fairly confident I got food poisoning over the weekend so I'm out of commission again. I never really expected to get this many followers and I know some of you reached...
2/ out asking where the updates are. I've been working on some projects, but the main thing troubling me lately is a certain lack of rigor when it comes to my sourcing my own analysis. The lack of sourcing would no doubt make most 350F's shudder...
3/ To that end, @simon_huwiler has added a place where I can source each unit's assessed general location. So I've been slowly gathering all the sources I should have meticulously tracked before, up to the beginning of the war. I'm not sure of the exact format yet...
1/ Gone through quite a few materials, now reasonably sure this is a case for 2x 122mm rounds plus charges that was pictured being loaded, apparently at Bronnaya Gara, Belarus several days ago. How I came to this conclusion to follow.
2/ First thing I did was count the # of pixels wide and high the box was. Important thing is the ratio: 530/90 = 5.8. It's at a bit of an angle, so it's hard to tell. If the latches at the top are included, the ratio is about 5.4, so that's the ballpark I went with.
3/ Then I looked through a catalog of box sizes for various munitions I acquired. Was fairly certain it was tube artillery rounds based on what the depot stored, but didn't totally exclude other types of munitions.
1/ Thanks to @DAlperovitch for having me on last night, a few elaborations on what I said on a couple points which I may not have communicated very well in the moment
@DAlperovitch 2/ A mid 90's congressional report put the total number of US artillery projectiles stored at about 25 million (20.8 Army, 400k Marines). This number is available here: govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GA…
@DAlperovitch 3/ Since then, the stock is likely lower based on Cold War production winding down and the closing of several plants. The number serves is useful in that in shows what the scale of Cold War era stockpile was. Soviet numbers were likely higher given they had many more systems.
From @MotolkoHelp about the loading of ammunition in Belarus. Depot mentioned is at 52.612887, 25.066014 near the town of Bronnaya Gara. Not sure how significant this is yet, but interesting enough to do some research on the depot (what it stores and how much) this morning.
2/ Changes for Kherson: Shifted forces north in response to UA bridgehead over Inhulets. Placed 2 BTGs of 20th GMRD back near Kherson city. They've likely been there since April, but I had previously removed them due to info they had withdrawn that turned out to be wrong
3/ Changes for Izium: 3rd MRD rotated back in over the past week. Elements 4th GTD also likely in the area, but a little less info on them. Overall, the change over the past week shows a significant strengthening of Russian forces in this direction.
1/ Last week's statements of 🇷🇺 firing 50-60k shells/rockets for every 5-6k 🇺🇦 shells presented a unique opportunity to quantify 🇷🇺 current artillery advantage in terms of rounds fired per system and draw some preliminary conclusions. See attached picture /brief thread hopefully
2/ This assumes that the numbers stated by Oleksandr Danylyuk and my estimates of number of artillery systems currently involved in fighting are accurate. subjected my system numbers to sensitivity analysis by +- 20%, shown in the range of estimates and slide notes.
3/ I also assumed that Oleksandr Danylyuk was only referring to conventional tube artillery (in this case 122mm or greater caliber) when referring to Ukrainian numbers, while using both conventional tube artillery and rocket numbers when referring to Russian numbers.