Ukraine has never posed and could never pose an "existential threat" to Russia, contrary to Mearsheimer and Co.
But the war itself helped create one. (🧵.)
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In 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF treaty).
In 2019, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from it. This decision created the possibility for a new nuclear arms race in Europe.
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There is a debate on why the US quit the treaty.
The official US position was that Russia broke the treaty by developing the 9M729 cruise missile that had a range of 2,500km (thus violating the 500km limit in the treaty).
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Russia denied this and claimed that the missile's range was under 500km.
In fact, the real reason could be the desire of the US to contain China, not Russia's alleged violation of the treaty that could be just a pretext.
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In any case, the placing of US intermediate-range missiles in Europe could indeed be seen as dangerous to Russia, restarting the missile arms race on the continent.
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In late December 2021, Putin declared: "The United States is standing with missiles on our doorstep. Is it an excessive requirement not to install shock systems at our house?"
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However, most crucially, the US indicated that it *was* willing to negotiate on the issue of intermediate-range missiles and NATO exercises in Europe.
In early February 2022, the US and NATO offered Russia to inspect its bases in Romania and Bulgaria in order to verify the absence of Tomahawk cruise missiles that are capable of reaching Russian territory.
However, the Kremlin dismissed these proposals and went to war with Ukraine.
Quite possibly, the reason for this dismissal was that the Kremlin itself had installed intermediate-range missiles in Kaliningrad, refusing NATO inspections of the site.
Now, the issue of Ukraine was in no way connected to the issue of intermediate-range missiles.
Even the full occupation of Ukraine would not have prevented the US from installing missiles in Eastern Europe - more like, accelerated it.
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After the invasion, all talks on the limiting of intermediate-range missiles collapsed and no one offers the Kremlin to inspect missile sites in Romania and Bulgaria anymore.
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In other words, the invasion of Ukraine did not have anything to do with "existential threats" to Russia - what is more, it actually created them by making the new missile arms race in Europe all but inevitable.
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This is a consequence of the invasion on par with Finland and Sweden joining NATO - if not a more strategically important one.
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The real reason for the invasion was and has always been Putin's inability to tolerate independent, sovereign Ukraine.
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The first phase of troop build-up in Spring 2021 started after Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the sources of Russian influence in Ukraine, taking off the air three TV channels belonging to Viktor Medvedchuk, Putin's ally and personal friend.
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This does not, and has never had, anything to do with "existential threats" or "security concerns".
It has everything to do with Putin's desire to have a personal veto on any decision made by the Ukrainian government.
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Not just "leverage", but full veto power. Indeed, as I wrote earlier, absent the invasion, Nord Stream 2 pipeline was all but guaranteed to open, depriving Ukraine of its leverage on Russia's gas sales to Europe - and 3bn in transit fees.
For this goal, Putin is willing to risk everything, including any security considerations. They are the casualty of the invasion, not its cause!
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Now, I do not know what was Putin's primary motive - a sense of personal humiliation after two decades of failed Ukrainian policy (and humiliation is his biggest fear) or the imperialist megalomania emerging out of his obsessive interest in Russian and Soviet history.
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But the fact remains - Putin was willing to risk everything, including Russia's short-term and long-term security and its economic interests, over his desire to subjugate Ukraine.
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It's not like he was not warned - even by the staunchly nationalist ex military figures - that the invasion of Ukraine would be a colossal mistake and a disaster for Russia.
The bottom line: Russia is a personalist autocracy and it demonstrates not only the misery such regimes inflict on their populations, but the immense dangers they bring to the world.
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Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was highly likely that the new Russian-German pipeline would finally become operational. And yet, Russia invaded Ukraine and the pipeline has remained unused (probably forever).
A 🧵.
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Most commentators focus on the question: how could Germany engage in this project to begin with? (It was launched in 2015, when Russia had already started a hybrid war against Ukraine.)
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However, there is another side to this question: Why did Russia start the war, putting this project to rest even as it was exceptionally close to fruition?
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One macro effect of sanctions that is not often discussed: Russian Central Bank projects an astonishing $246 billion net outflow of capital in 2022 - despite capital controls!
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This could be explained by the mass exodus of foreign companies, but that's not it: Western companies and individuals are also subject to capital controls, they cannot move their money out of the country easily.
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The explanation apparently lies in the fact that exporters accumulate their profits on their foreign accounts and do not re-invest in Russia. This is registered as capital outflows.
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One part of my recent article that I want to share separately: teaching under authoritarianism.
Been thinking about it for a long time (a 🧵):
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"In authoritarian contexts, teaching paradoxically becomes a political act while still being fully compatible with Max Weber’s dictum: "Politics is out of place in the lecture room."
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Weber differentiated between taking a stand and analyzing political structures: for a professor, promoting specific positions in the classroom would mean exercising undue influence on their students since the relationship between a professor and a student is asymmetrical.
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E.g., the article says: "Global businesses represent around 12 percent of Russia’s workforce (5 million workers)". There's a link to an AP story that quotes me.
Here's the quote: "Some 2.8 million Russians were employed by foreign or mixed ownership firms in 2020, according to political scientist Ilya Matveev. If suppliers are taken into account, as many as 5 million jobs, or 12% of the workforce, depend on foreign investment."
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Higher education in Russia: years of efforts down the drain.
In this 🧵, I will discuss the sorry state of Russian academia and utter devastation wrought by the war.
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I entered academia in 2005, when I began my studies in the Moscow State University, and I've stayed ever since.
It breaks my heart to see what's happening. I'll describe the problems that have existed before February and the consequences of the war for higher education.
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Three general problems that have long existed in Russian academia are 1) insufficient funding, 2) endless red tape and the de-professionalization of academics, 3) suffocating political censorship.
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