"The A-10 can use AGM-65 Maverick to hit russian targets 10-20 km away."
๐คก๐คก
To target a AGM-65 the pilot needs to have a line of sight to the target.
To sight a target 10+ km away the pilot needs to fly at least 1 km above ground, which means he gets blown to bits by a
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russian S-300, S-400, or Buk air-defense missile.
If the pilot flies below russian radar coverage (below 50m) he will spot at target just 0.5 to 1 km before flying over it. Too close to sight a AGM-65... and he will be in MANPADS range and get blown to bits by a russian.
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is a business doing epoxy coating of aviation parts.
If this fin would have been manufactured in Germany, then the missile would be one of the AGM-88B Block IIIa of the Luftwaffe... but those are upgraded AGM-88B that retained Texas Instrument fins. Also the buyer of the
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German AGM-88 was the "Waffensystemkommando der Luftwaffe" (CAGE Code: D3333), but on this fin the buyer is the US Navy's Naval Air Systems Command (CAGE Code: 30003).
So: a real, burnt out, worthless tail section of a AGM-88, with fake/ photoshopped data.
When US Air Force F-16CM Falcon or US Navy EA-18G Growler fighters fly Wild Weasel missions they use Self Protect mode.
In this mode the Falcon's AN/ASQ-213 HTS R7 (to the left of the air inlet) and the Growler's AN/ALQ-218(V)2 (on the wingtips) sensor systems detect, locate, 2/n
analyze, and identify sources of radio frequency emission. Once a threat is identified the pilot transmits the target data to the missile and launches it.
There is no chance this would work with Ukrainian fighters as US sensor systems can't be installed on Ukrainian planes
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On 10 June 1999 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1244, which tasked NATO to enter Kosovo & establish a peacekeeping mission with the duties of:
โข deterring renewed hostilities
โข maintaining & where necessary enforcing a ceasefire
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โข ensuring the withdrawal & preventing the return into Kosovo of (Yugoslav) Federal & Republic military, police & paramilitary forces
russia voted Yes & Yugoslavia accepted.
50,000 troops from ๐ฌ๐ง๐ฉ๐ช๐บ๐ธ๐ซ๐ท๐ฎ๐น๐ณ๐ฑ๐จ๐ฆ๐บ๐ฆ๐ช๐ธ๐ง๐ช๐ฌ๐ท๐น๐ท๐ณ๐ด๐ฉ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฑ๐ซ๐ฎ๐ธ๐ช๐ฆ๐น๐ญ๐บ๐ต๐น๐จ๐ญ๐ท๐ด๐จ๐ฟ๐ง๐ฌ๐ฑ๐น entered Kosovo 2 days later.
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All NATO members' parliaments repeatedly voted to support KFOR, which is operationally assigned to NATO's Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples.
Therefore talk of "NATO can't intervene if Serbia invades Kosovo unless member parliaments vote for it" is factually wrong.
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I think last evening Serbia's General Staff officers explained to President Vuฤiฤ that if he orders to attack Kosovo NATO fighter jets would appear over Serbian forces within hours and start bombing them... and within 48 hours the US Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade would be 1/4
airlifted to Pristina Airport and the Italian Army's Paratropers Brigade "Folgore" airlifted to Gjakova Airport (which Italy's military built for this purpose).
Followed a day later by the Italian Army's Mechanized Brigade "Pinerolo", which is based in and around Bari, and 2/4
would be shipped by the Italian Navy's 3rd Naval Division with its amphibious ships from Brindisi to Durrรซs within 2 days. From Durrรซs to Mitrovicia the Pinerolo's wheeled Freccia IFVs and Centauro tank destroyers need 6 hours thanks to the Western co-financed A1 highway. 3/4
1) it wasn't a GMLRS rocket 2) it was a thermobaric weapon 3) russia staged it and did so (as usual) incompetently
Firstly: keeping POWs so close to the front violates Article 19 of the Third Geneva Convention making it a war crime.
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Secondly: Olenivka is about 15 km from the frontline. Striking a target so close to the front with sparse and expensive long-range GMLRS rockets, when one could use 105 mm artillery rounds that cost around 0.4% of a GMLRS rocket makes no sense.
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Thirdly: Olenivka has been a well known DNR POW and concentration camp for years (and a penal colony for decades). So much so that the wives of the POWs knew about it. One needs to be a delusional russian troll or propagandist to believe Ukraine would strike this target.
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