Having finished @jim_storr's book on the Cold War, I share his view that IFVs need the following characteristics: 1. Same level protection as MBTs 2. Ability to carry a full section 8 + 2 crew 3. 20 bhp / tonne power to weight ratio
I also agree that Namer is a good benchmark.
Jim suggests that weapon turrets add weight and reduce carrying capacity. However, modern unmanned turrets are light and do not take-up interior space. Their sensors are extremely helpful for locating the enemy and they can defeat the IFVs / LAVs of potential adversaries.
If current IFVs are too light, Jim suggests that MBTs have become too heavy. He views mobility as being as essential to survivability as the level of protection provided. Again with unmanned gun turrets, MBT weights can be reduced by 10-15 tonnes without removing armour.
In other words, a common MBT and IFV platform with a basic weight of 40-50 tonnes and the ability to mount appliqué armour, for a gross weight of 60 tonnes could be the way ahead. MGCS is certainly looking at a single platform type for heavy roles.
The concept is somewhat validated by Warrior TES: 45 t with add-on armour and Challenger 2 Megatron at 68 t. IFVs weighing more than 32 t are as difficult to deploy as MBTs. Both will utilise the same manoeuvre support assets, so a heavier IFV is no bad thing.
I like the duality of heavy tracked armour and wheeled medium armour. Wheeled medium forces deploy quickly but lack resilience. Heavy tracked forces deploy slowly but have staying power. Regardless of vehicle weight, the trick is to avoid mixing wheels + tracks in same formation.
You'll need light wheeled vehicles (Panther, JLTV etc) and light tracked (BVS10, Wiesel) as well. This gives you heavy tracked, medium wheeled, light wheeled, and light tracked, or four core combat vehicle types.
If the war in Ukraine resulted in a re-think on the retirement of the British Army's Warrior IFV, a new upgrade programme could simply add an unmanned turret. This would increase interior space, reduce the risk of fire and allow extra armour to be added. Just an idea.
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It was right to retire the British Army's Thales Watchkeeper WK450 UAS. It took far too long to bring it into service and by the time it arrived, newer and better systems were available. It was also difficult to operate. The question is what do we replace it with? (1/6)
An obvious choice is General Atomics Mojave, which is optimised for STOL operations from austere locations. This has a larger payload, double the range and better ISR sensors. It can also carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles for strike tasks. Crucially, it is harder to jam. (2/6)
Mojave, which is a modified version of General Atomics' MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS, weighs 1½ tonnes and has a reinforced undercarriage. Technically, it compares well to Watchkeeper while also being considerably less expensive to purchase and operate. (3/6)
The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret.
As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.
At each stage of the process, risk was managed. The onus was on @GD_LandSystems to resolve any issues in order to move the program to the next stage. Brigadier Glenn Dean, who has assumed overall responsibility for MPF deserves credit for doing a fantastic job.
Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire.
Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.
Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, the USA had already initiated an upgrade programme to increase GMLRS range from 70 km to 150 km, while the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can hit targets at 499 km, versus the existing ATACMS with a 150 km range. This is a significant upgrade.
The British Army's Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support.
As good as Boxer is, only 4 infantry battalions will be equipped with it. So having a larger fleet of lower cost PMVs will be essential. Also, the way in which they're being used in Ukraine, as battlefield taxis that move infantry out-of-contact, points to a new way of operating.
For some roles, it makes sense to purchase an off-the-shelf solution from abroad (e.g., Oshkosh JLTV) where the price is lower than domestically produced vehicles can match. But for others, British industry is perfectly capable of producing a state-of-the-art 4x4 or 6x6 PMV.
When it comes to properly regenerating NATO forces, a prevailing view is that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will be long over before any new capabilities ordered today are delivered, so any uplift in defence spending is pointless. THIS VIEW IS TOTALLY WRONG. Here's why...
While the conflict has resulted in the comprehensive degradation of Russia’s land force capabilities, Russia is not yet a spent force. Vladimir Putin has not accepted defeat, nor has he relinquished his territorial ambitions.
Even if the conflict is resolved in the short-term, either through the voluntary withdrawal or forced eviction of Russian forces from Ukraine, Putin is likely to use any peace agreement as an opportunity regenerate his army.
I've been analysing the British Army's overall structure in anticipation of the Defence Command Paper Refresh. It'll be interesting to see how it will be reorganised to accommodate the headcount reduction from 77,000 to 72,500.
Since many units are already operating below their permitted headcount, or are reliant on the Army Reserve to deploy, we could see much leaner units across the Army. Will 450 person infantry battalions be fit for purpose?
I am sure those responsible for reconfiguring he Army will be trying all kinds of models to make the new structure work. But I fear a bold correction may be necessary to ensure the combat units we do intend to field have sufficient potency and resilience in terms of headcount.