Thread by @MarkHertling

Informally engaging w/ MBA students & healthcare professionals over the last few days, I often hear "what's going on in Ukraine."

Here's a summary 🧵 of what has happened in the last 6 months, what's happening now, & some things I'm watching. 1/21

Russia’s ground forces have proven to be poorly led, ill-trained & with low morale, increasingly & significantly attritted in personnel & equipment (some sources now indicating that when they went into this fight in Feb most units were understrength), unable to regenerate. 2/

RU lacked the ability to execute combined arms operations (CAO’s), defined as combining infantry, tanks, fires (arty or air), engineers (for river crossings, demining operations, etc), aviation, intel, & logistics to seize, occupy, & defend land areas or secure ground. 3/

Executing CAOs is much more difficult than what many might comprehend. It takes years of developing the right kind of leaders and soldiers, getting the right equipment, having the right doctrine, doing the right kind of training & exercises, and...4/

having the right kind of govt to support those activities without grift or corruption. (It's what the US Army does at 3 different major training centers). It's more than “giving Ukraine everything they need” and believing it will automatically become a modern & capable force. 5/

Russia came into this fight thinking they could execute a “Desert Storm-like offensive” that would be completed in a few days . This was delusional. They lacked the leadership, training, equipment, to do it. Given RU culture & systems, they aren't capable of fixing this. 6/

The UA -while *relatively* well-trained, well-led, w/ high morale, & having support from their govt, citizens & having the will to continue the fight– also, unfortunately, does not currently have the training or the type of organizations & equipment for large scale CAO’s. 7/

Don’t get me wrong, UA *can* execute defensive operations, counterattacks, hasty attacks & smaller scale CAO’s. They are not yet capable of large-scale CAO's over large areas. BUT, they are adapting, training w/allies, incorporating new equipment, and doing so very quickly. 8/

The Donbas slugfest was a counterfire battle; limited maneuver, a battle of attrition. RU attempted to deplete UKR will w/ imprecise strikes against civilian targets. UA -w new weapons– targeted RU's logistics. The result: lack of territorial gains by either side. 9/

In the S., RU's goal of achieving operational obj required occupation of ground. They were not able to do that due to poor maneuver capability & bad leadership, so they relied on a scorched earth campaign. Result: destruction of infrastructure & an attempt to seize/secure...10/

cities as limited objectives. Holding onto that (securing objectives) is extremely hard in a contested environment.

Russia is now stalled in the south & can only resupply from Rostov-on-Don (in Russia) or from Russian bases in Crimea (which is now being threatened).11/

-In the S, UA is now targeting logistics & supply lines with precision “fires” (arty, air, special ops, resistance saboteurs), while defending & conducting limited attacks to regain ground with conventional forces.
They’re also conducting a guerilla campaign. 12/

Defined: guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare where small groups of combatants -paramilitary personnel, armed civilians, or irregulars- use ambushes, sabotage, raids, hit-and-run, assassinations, etc) to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military.13/

Ukraine knows something RU doesn’t: UKR knows you can’t *WIN* wars with artillery or air alone. Those may affect the outcome, or even prep the battlefield for future fights, but an force can’t regain ground with “fires” alone. You must do it with maneuver forces...in CAO's.14/

What UA is doing now is “prepping the battlefield” while conducting limited counterattacks & guerilla ops that contribute to the early stages of a counter-offensive. Because that is what they are capable of doing *right now*. That will change soon, but it will take time. 15/

Early RU goals were beyond their capability. Reducing the goals didn't help. Now, RU's defending in more places against a growing conventional UA threat & an expanded guerilla war. UKR has transitioned to the offense & can pick where they attack; RU is now on the defense.16/

Having said all that, I'm still watching the battlefield, but I'm looking at other things:
1.The Enerhodar Nuclear Power Plant in Zaporizhzhya. RU is playing with a large-scale (3x Cherbobyl) nuclear disaster potential. Downwind hazards predictions could affect EU & RU. 17/

2. Holding Russia accountable for war crimes. The horrific violations require world condemnation of Putin/RU.
3. Ukraine society. UKR is running an unsustainable 4-5B Euro/month deficit; an estimated 15M Ukrainians have left their homes & 5M have lost jobs....18/

...and UKR needs support from world financial organizations. Seized RU assets ought to be applied directly to UKR rebuild.
4.Putin offers of any cease-fire (without UKR regaining territorial sovereignty). These overtures must be avoided at all costs. 19/

5. Western nations must continue support for UKR as winter comes. US, NATO and EU must not allow the potential of another RU frozen conflict....our future and the future of EU depends on us continuing helping UKR in this fight for their sovereignty. 20/

Yesterday's $750M US package of (in my view) the exactly right type of arms and equipment UKR needs. Combined with increased training programs (many of which are under the radar) are also critical.

The fight continues. 21/21