(Long) Thread: Analysis of every goal conceded by Manchester United in the 2022/23 season.
I'm going to pick apart every detail of the goals #MUFC concede below. I will try to offer my insight and highlight/sample systemic faults on a team-tactical or individual level.
Some considerations before we dig deeper:
-My aim is to deliver my insight into what happens and for what reason
-My aim is not to single out players positively or negatively
-The process of analysis is one where POVs come together to find a solution - feel free to argue!
The goal starts from United's goal-kick. De Gea signals Maguire to open the pitch but then opts for the long ball - which doesn't follow Ten Hag's principles as Maguire is open to progress down the right.
De Gea spots our attackers on the left side. They have created a 4v4 situation versus #BHA's defense. The tallest player among them is Rashford, offside, and they lose the first ball.
A loose touch brings Eriksen & McTominay into contention to win the second ball.
Eriksen does well to get his body across and regains P+. Fred is available as an outlet out of the 2v2 situation - but he isn't chosen. There is a lack of COMMUNICATION here; Eriksen is unsure whether McTominay will take over or whether he should continue.
Scott decides to take initiative and storms ahead through the BHA players. Their CB slows down Scott very well, while Caicedo takes the ball out of McTominay's feet. A difficult 2v1 situation, from a lack of communication.
Perhaps understandable in their first game together.
BHA regain the ball in the centre of the pitch. Unaware of their surroundings, Fred & Eriksen "jump" to counter-press despite leaving the centre open. A lack of SCANNING and COMMUNICATION.
BHA play it well and run at MUN's backline, unprotected by its midfielders.
McTominay does well to recover, and his pressing angle forces BHA to play it out wide. Contrary to before, the centre is now protected - which is a crucial principle in defending transitions!
During this time, the #MUFC wingers are yet to track back. Dalot signals McTominay to press the ball as it is an open/dangerous area to not press during transitions.
Scott cannot do that, as that would leave the centre open. The RW, Sancho, should have been on Trossard.
Trossard sees Welbeck start his run - and Dalot jumps. Maguire scanned thrice in anticipation, but did not know where Welbeck was going. He had to guess and guessed wrong: either the information he gathered was incomplete (harsh!) or Martinez did not communicate effectively.
When Welbeck touches the ball in the box, BHA has overloaded MUN's very own box. Fred lost track of his man, and is metres behind. #MUFC's wingers are still high and not contributing to the immediate defensive play. Maguire doesn't recover in time to cover Fred's man.
Box defending: MUN do not space well in the box. Martinez's "blocking hole" is too big to cover, Maguire is late to cover Martinez's left side, Fred is late to the centre of the box and Shaw is overloaded because he's picking up Fred's man.
DDG should do better with this ball.
A lack of tracking back and help of teammates means Shaw is supposedly marking two players. Groß is there at the back post to steer in Brighton's opener.
A sequence lacking the core principles of communication, cover, scanning and tracking back.
To start here, it's worth noting MUN's rest defense. After their last offensive action in BHA's half, they have Shaw, Fred, Dalot, Martinez and Maguire behind the ball.
Notice how Dalot does well to invert in anticipation of a second ball/turnover.
Dalot wins the second ball, but doesn't keep it in MUN's favour. MUN go to a man-marking scheme out wide, while Dalot cuts off the playing angles. A backheel finds Moises.
Remember MUN are in the highest third, man-marking a chaos moment.
After Trossard's problem-solving, MUN's press has been bypassed and they are already vulnerable because the left side did not compress the pitch - Bruno & Rashford should be doing much more here.
Eriksen does well to DELAY the attack and tries to grab Moises' shirt - good idea!
Fred is not defending side-on, and is unaware of BHA's movement behind him. He wrongly decided to "jump", and the ball immediately passes him.
BHA now enjoy a 3v4 dynamic overload versus the rest defense of Maguire, Martinez and Shaw.
As ever, the centre is most important during defensive transitions. Groß finds Lallana in the centre, unopposed by MUN's jumping midfield.
Welbeck makes a great dummy run to confuse MUN's CBs but they switch their men well. Again unopposed by MF or wingers, BHA get into the box.
Shaw is found in a 1v1 situation with March. Important here is to close down, get low, take short steps and defend side-on. March gets it out of his feet well and is just too quick for Shaw, who didn't recover in time from March's shoulder drop. Bruno too late to help.
On the shot, Lallana makes a smart near-post dart which unsights De Gea even more from Maguire & Shaw already. DDG goes with his hands rather than feet this time, perhaps due to the velocity or David's calculated rebound route.
De Gea can only parry straight into Groß' path, away from Fred.
The second goal originates from a lack of cover, tracking back, and scanning. Tons of mistakes are involved in every goal, but if they are not solved, they keep piling on each other.
A goal that starts from MUN's goal-kick. Maguire & Martinez could stretch the pitch a bit more to relieve pressure. Toney curves an out-to-in run, a pressing trap to force DDG into playing to Eriksen.
That leaves #14 with only one risk-averse option - Maguire.
Playing that pass makes it easy for Eriksen's marker to run right onto Maguire, who due to a suboptimal pass (slightly behind his far foot) doesn't have time to continue the sequence.
The ball goes out for a MUN throw-in, and Maguire signals Fernandes should've dropped in.
There is little movement on the throw, but Dalot spots Ronaldo who does well to control the ball. He goes down, but refs are less lenient in 22/23. Fred & Fernandes who rotated to receive behind #7, are now caught out.
The centre is left open.
Martinez & Shaw are in a 2v2 position with a dynamic disadvantage - the midfield left them naked. Martinez decides to jump & block the shot.
As @Jhdharrison1 perfectly explains, this is not the shot to perform a "cup hand shape" on. For reference, here is the reply of the ideal shape DDG should've used.
Again, a goal-kick, where the CBs have now spaced themselves further away to be under less pressure.
Toney again curves his run to exclude Maguire - and forces the ball into Eriksen. This was a pressing trap Brentford used before United started going long.
De Gea's decision to play into Eriksen was wrong - and as Ten Hag would say after the game, this was 'naive' and 'not possible'. He also mentions the importance of decision-making & problem-solving on the pitch - something his players couldn't manage.
BRE's pressing trap works, and Eriksen only can try to reach Maguire due to the situation he is put in. Jensen reads this, intercepts the ball and now BRE are right before MUN's goal, for which they don't need a second invitation.
A goal marked by the importance of decision-making in practice and problem-solving when the game needs to be read. De Gea failed in both aspects of the game.
Corners are Brentford's bread and butter and here's why. They pack up in an 8v4 but then split in 3 box rebounders, 2 6-yard occupiers and 3 ball attackers. This way MUN cannot prepare for their routine.
2 ball attackers run to the goal, and 1 to the back post.
BRE overload the 6-yard box and the GK to make sure De Gea cannot catch the cross. Toney's dynamic advantage (coming off a run) and aerial ability win him the header and he brilliantly directs it onto the goalmouth.
De Gea is late, and Martinez cannot duel Ben Mee for the aerial duel. Mee heads in from close range.
United conceded this because of their GK and two CBs, there is only one player that is an aerial powerhouse. De Gea doesn't command his box enough and Martinez is too small.
Being 3-0 down, United commit more players forward and their rest defense is even more vulnerable than usual. Sancho loses the ball after a fizzed pass into his feet. Brentford launch it long as soon as they get it.
BRE didn't launch it to "get it out" immediately - MUN's rest defense was a mess and they picked up on it. Maguire should be marking Toney but loses him out of sight - yet more importantly, he does not communicate to Martinez to take him over.
Toney is in a 1v1 position with Shaw up against the faster Mbeumo. It's hard for Martinez to delay in this situation, and Toney's wonderful pass reaches Mbeumo *just* ahead of Shaw.
De Gea here is caught in two minds: should he sweep or stay on his line? After Mbeumo's first touch takes him away from Shaw, DDG decides to rush & close down. He is too late and caught in no man's land here.
Staying on his line here gives him more time to react to this shot.
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•Expecting inswinger towards far post: staggering first bank + Van Dijk back post
•Zonal defending of 6-yard box and blocking of 3 runners
Collective issues within this set-up:
Wary of a Modric shot or far-post cross, Liverpool overload the far post zonally and bring their bank close to their GK.
The central zone is completely undefended, and their full-backs are on opposite sides - a negative for their counters.
Individual issues in the set-up:
#43 and #18's body shape is close enough to 45° - they can see the ball, their opponent and can move to block. TAA's body shape is all over the place. He does not see the ball, and can only block Militao if he moves to the far post.
To have the ball-near CB engage the CF when dropping, you need to have the ball on that side.
United usually force this by having their wingers curve their press runs from "out-to-in". It forces the ball inside, where the midfield is compact and the CB can step out.
Leicester picked up on a weakness in this shape.
If the winger (LW in this case) doesn't screen the pass from CB➡️RB well, it allows the opposition down the outside.
As @TalkinTactics points out, the FB following the opposition FB causes problems when play is built outside.
THREAD: Analysis of Manchester United's gameplan versus Leicester City and the half-time changes made by Erik ten Hag and his analysts that won the game:
TEAM SELECTION:
• Martinez-Lindelof CB partnership (ball progression + carrying + high line)
• Fred-Sabitzer-Weghorst midfield (intensity + long ball target)
• Rashford #9 (scoring threat and creation of depth)
• Weghorst #10 (long ball target + hold-up play)
FIRST HALF:
In the words of Erik ten Hag, a rubbish half, which entailed plenty of individual, group-related and collective mistakes on the technical and tactical levels.
I'll delve into the many mistakes of the 1st half before explaining the in-game changes that fixed them.
THREAD: How Erik ten Hag's Manchester United planned to beat Manchester City at Old Trafford
Key points of the GAMEPLAN of #MUFC in GW 18 of their Premier League season.
Starting XI choices:
-Malacia at LB gave extra intensity to wide 1v1s and security in deep build-up (1st phase)
-Fred-Casemiro pivot gave 2nd ball prowess & intensity in duels
-Rashford & Bruno wide gave transitional threat
-Martial offered technical security up front
Proactive Pressing in mid-block:
-Medium block with proactive pressing
-Martial & Eriksen cover shadow Rodri
-Wingers Rashford & Bruno closed central access to #MCI's #8's
-Ball forced wide to FBs
-Fred man-marking KDB's runs into the channel
-Ball-near CB follows CF
I'm going through United's PL opener and there's *a lot more* to unpack than you might think. #MUFC were second-best on Sunday due to an overflow of factors:
A thread on my perspective of United's defeat at the hands of Brighton & Hove Albion.
During the live watch, I noticed United looked quite uncertain on the ball. Even before #BHA's goals, players looked nervous and did not wholly execute the game plan - or at least not the game plans they stuck to during pre-season.
This possibly has its stems in multiple roots:
-the players didn't take well to the atmosphere of OT
-the coaching & playing staff did not expect Brighton to set up the way they did
-the players were not used to the "false 9" dynamics they were introduced to only Thursday (MD-3)