An image by @planet shows the steam plant at North Korea's reprocessing facility, which separates plutonium for nuclear weapons, is operating. *Sometimes* that indicates the plant is separating plutonium, but @DaveSchmerler and I think probably not *this* time.🧵
Why say anything at all if its nothing? There are many analyses that note the times the steam correlated with a reprocessing campaign. It is equally important to document the times steam DOES NOT correlate with reprocessing. Photo-interpretation is about documenting patterns.
Quick refresher: Yongbyon has a reprocessing plant (aka "Radiochemical Laboratory") to separate plutonium from spent fuel unloaded from a reactor. North Korea uses plutonium to make nuclear weapons. The reprocessing plant relies on steam served from a nearby thermal plant.
Why steam? Reprocessing facilities need heat, which at Yongbyon is supplied by steam. If the reprocessing plant is separating plutonium, then the thermal plant is supplying steam. Japan's Tokai reprocessing plant, FYI, also also uses steam. inis.iaea.org/search/search.…
This is why, when North Korea "disabled" the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 2007 during the Six Party Talks, one of the steps that North Korea took was to "cut two of the four steam lines into the reprocessing facility." No steam, no separating plutonium. files.ethz.ch/isn/55146/2008…
And this is also why @rafaelmgrossi, last summer, pointed to the operation of the steam plant as evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more spent fuel and, presumably, recovered more plutonium for its stockpile of nuclear weapons. en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN202103…
Sometimes, however, the steam plant operates for other reasons. In 2018, the steam plant operated for about a month, which the @iaeaorg concluded was related to some operation other than reprocessing, such as waste consolidation. iaea.org/sites/default/…
What's waste consolidation at a reprocessing facility, you ask? Boy, do I ever have a paper for you. inis.iaea.org/collection/NCL…
In this case, the crucial difference is duration. It takes several months to reprocess a load of spent fuel. We have a single image of plume on one day. To conclude the plant is producing plutonium again, as it did last summer, require operation of the steam plant over months.
Neither @DaveSchmerler nor I expect the plant to operate for months because North Korea just completed a reprocessing campaign last year. North Korea doesn't have any spent fuel left to separate. The gas-graphite reactor is busy making more, but it won't be ready until next year.
This is, ultimately, a methods thread. To interpret exhaust from the steam plant's stack, we must know both when that exhaust signaled reprocessing and equally all the times it did not. This allows us to observe differences between operations, in this case indicated by duration.
In the past, such an approach was infeasible because Yongbyon might only be imaged every few months. One clear day with exhaust coming out of the stack might be the only picture taken during a reprocessing campaign! Today, though, we have frequent enough imagery to do it right.
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"And we are not deploying nuclear-armed,
land-based missiles outside of our national territory. Two other NPT nuclear weapon states cannot make each of these claims."
"Two other NPT nuclear weapons states" means Russia and China. (There are 5 NPT nuclear weapons states and he's clearly not talking about the US, UK or France.)
But neither Russia nor China is known to deploy "nuclear-armed land based missiles" outside of their territory.
Now, in the case of Russia, that may change as Russia has indicated it will provide Belarus with dual-capable aircraft and missiles using phrasing that implies nuclear-sharing of some sort.* reuters.com/world/europe/r…
Sometimes you *can* see intentions in satellite images. A short retrospective thread on Burma's democratic backslide, which we could see from space even if no one wanted to look down here on earth.
In 2014, journalists reported that the Directorate of Defense Industries seized some land from local farmers, razed their village and built a defense facility. The gov't responded by seizing copies of the paper and arresting the journalists.
DDI was a powerful element of the military. It was also under US sanctions for its military cooperation with North Korea. home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
A good thread. One idea I question I would ask is whether Iran is hedging or whether its strategy will be opaque nuclear proliferation. I lean toward the latter.
The difference is: "Hedging" means Iran would give itself an option to build a bomb that it might not exercise; "opacity" means that Iran builds a small stockpile of nuclear weapons but does not disclose this fact until it is necessary, likely by conducting a nuclear explosion.
This use of the word "hedge" FWIW can create all sorts of amusing translations. When , the Russians interpreters alternated between translating it as "break out" and "shrubbery". washingtonpost.com/archive/politi…
The US has a "launch-under-attack" posture, not launch-on-warning. We all pretend there is a difference in meetings. There isn't. It's just gate-keeping. A short thread on what happens if you use "LOW" in a meeting.
How does the US define a "launch under attack" posture?
"Execution by the President of Single Integrated Operational Plan forces subsequent to tactical warning of strategic nuclear attack against the United States and prior to first impact." bits.de/NRANEU/others/…
Yes, that's correct: The US does not have a launch-on-warning posture, it has a "launch under attack" posture defined as launch "on tactical warning." Completely different postures. 😉
New York City has a new PSA on what to do if the city is struck by a nuclear weapon. The advice isn't wrong, it's just ... unhelpful.
The big problem with the video is that it omits some pretty important context: If Russia, China or North Korea hit NYC with a 300 kt warhead, this advice won't help many people in the city itself. It's more useful to people in communities downwind. nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=3…
Even then "stay inside" doesn't go very far: Are you even at home? If not, will others let you inside? What about children at school? Do they try to get home? What if your building collapsed? What if you were injured in the blast and need medical care? What about food? Water?
Suth Korea's plans to decapitate the North Korean leadership in a crisis is the most plausible route to a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. Officials should stop making these threats so I can stop making these threads. 🧵
For years, South Korean officials have suggested the ROK Army Missile Command can kill Kim Jong Un and other DPRK leaders before they can issue an order for the KPA to use nuclear weapons. This is called "decapitation." 38north.org/2013/02/jlewis…
This is the *military* plan that is most likely to succeed. I understand why the JCS recommends it as the best of some bad options. But it is also the option most likely to create uncontrollable escalation dynamics and start a nuclear war. Politicians should say "no thank you."