There were 11.2 million job openings at the end of July, UP slightly from June (though down from the spring). Quits down a hair. Layoffs basically flat (at a very low level). #JOLTS bls.gov/news.release/j…
Job openings are down from their peak, but they are still extraordinarily high by historical standards. The Fed is hoping it can cool the job market by bringing down openings without leading to more layoffs. Not a lot of evidence of that happening so far.
On the other hand, layoffs also remain extremely low, despite some high-profile job cuts in tech.
There were a hair under two job openings for every unemployed worker in July. That ratio had dipped ever so slightly in May and June, but it's back to close to a record high. (Granted, records only go back 20 years or so.)
The "Great Resignation" may not be over, but it is ebbing. 4.2 million people voluntarily quit their jobs in July, down from a peak of 4.5m+ last year.
Reminder that most of these people are leaving for *other jobs,* not stopping work entirely.
Openings rates are still elevated across the board relative to before the pandemic. But they've come down significantly over the past year in some key industries, notably leisure and hospitality.
I've talked to a lot of businesses lately that say it's become a bit easier to hire in recent months. Not a lot of evidence of that in the data yet, though. The number of hires for every posted job opening has stopped falling, but it hasn't really risen either.
Most industries are generating fewer hires per posted opening than they were a year ago -- let alone than they were before the pandemic.
Note: Many people have raised questions about whether a "job opening" means something different today than it used to. Maybe companies are posting jobs but not trying hard to fill them, or leaving openings up in the hope that the perfect person will come along, etc.
These are good questions! I don't have great answers. It seems plausible that the job openings figures overstate the amount of active recruitment going on, and perhaps by more than in the past. But it's also very clear that there are lots of openings right now.
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@jeannasmialek Powell: "While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month's improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down."
Powell is very direct: "While higher interest rates ... will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.
July data on income/spending. All numbers vs. June:
Personal income: +0.2% (vs 0.7% in June)
Consumer spending: +0.1% (vs 1.0%)
Real spending: +0.2% (vs flat)
Consumer prices: -0.1% (+1.0%)
Prices ex. food/energy: +0.1% (0.6%) bea.gov/news/2022/pers…
Yes, that's right: Consumer prices *fell* (slightly) in July, per the PCE price index.
I didn't do a full chart-a-palooza today (too much other work!), but this is notable: Inflation adjusted spending is falling further below its trend line. That's probably pretty much what the Fed is aiming for: positive but below-trend growth.
I see a lot of confused commentary around the GDP vs GDI divergence, with people offering explanations based on real-world trends, when in fact the gap must be the result of measurement issues.
I don't know if this analogy will help or confuse the situation, but going to give it a go anyway: Suppose you're trying to keep track of how much your kid is growing. Every three months, mom measures junior from the floor up, and dad measures from the ceiling down.
Neither of you has a tape measure, so you're measuring by hands. Not very precise! You'll probably come up with different numbers.
Two measures of output, two different stories:
Gross domestic income, adjusted for inflation, grew at a 1.4% annual rate in the second quarter.
Gross domestic product (also adjusted) fell at an 0.6% rate (revised up from -0.9% in the advance estimate). bea.gov/news/2022/gros…
If we average the two measures together (as recommended by both BEA and NBER), growth actually accelerated in the second quarter (albeit from a weak base), to +0.4% annual rate from +0.1%.
The divergence between GDP and GDI is remarkable. In theory, the two should be identical -- they measure the same thing from opposite sides of the ledger. Any differences are due to measurement issues. Yet they are telling totally different stories about the economy right now.
One theory for why the job market has looked so good while GDP has looked so bad is that the jobs numbers were overstated. Well, based on the preliminary benchmark revisions released today, it doesn't look like that theory holds much water. bls.gov/web/empsit/ces…
Context: The monthly jobs numbers are based on a survey of employers. But the government also has much more comprehensive data on employment via state unemployment insurance systems. That data is released at a lag, and is incorporated in annual "benchmark revisions" of the data.
Today, @BLS_gov released *preliminary* benchmark revisions, which reflect data through March 2022. They show payroll employment was nearly half a million jobs higher than previously believed.
(We'll get final data in February.)
Black workers have returned to work much faster from the pandemic recession than from past downturns. But now the Fed's efforts to control inflation are putting those gains in jeopardy.
With @talmonsmith nytimes.com/2022/08/24/bus…
This story really begins in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The labor market recovery was slow overall, and it was *especially* slow for Black workers. The Black unemployment rate didn't fall below 10% until 2015. (It never hit 10% for white workers in the first place.)
But by 2018-19, the labor market recovery was finally reaching Black workers. The Black unemployment rate hit a record low. Wages were finally rising, including young Black men, who had been left out of early stages of the recovery. nytimes.com/2018/02/23/bus… nytimes.com/2020/02/07/bus…