OK since anytime I say anything about the #visaban, many people get excited, let me side with the following idea. I think a general tourist visa ban is counterproductive. On the other hand, I think that greater scrutiny of applications is *certainly* in order.
As is targeting specific individuals connected to the regime (consider, for instance, Navalny's list of 6000).
Including a statement in the application along the lines of "Have you ever been directly involved in, or endorsed the conduct of, Russia's invasion of Ukraine" with a "Yes" or "No" answer might be the right approach. Such statements are often included to vet for terrorism.
The smartness of this approach is that it a) projects the right message to the Russians (that invading Ukraine is a crime on par with terrorism and genocide); while b) making it legally possible for the Russians to say "No" without contradicting the Russian law.
Incidentally, if anyone is wondering: no, I have no personal stake here whatsoever. I genuinely think the visa ban is a dumb idea, and an unwarranted distraction from things that really matter: helping Ukraine win this war. Also, it undermines European values.
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Reading Oleg Moroz's book on Russian reforms with my morning coffee. Particularly poignant in view of Gorbachev's passing. At one point Morov turns quite philosophical and tries to understand why it is that reforms so often fail in Russia. Here's his take: 👇🏿
He argues that reformers like Gorbachev and Yeltsin did not know what they were looking for. When they pushed for reforms, they did so without the full resolve necessary to carry them out, and sacrificed their most forward-looking lieutenants for reasons of political expediency.
Yeltsin's sacrifice of Gaidar in December 1992 is a case in point, according to Moroz. He argues that the problems with Soviet/Russian reforms was not that they were being carried out too quickly but, rather, that they were being carried out too slowly.
So @DAlperovitch and I have a new article out in @ForeignAffairs. It takes a long view on Russia, arguing that it's here to stay (largely regardless of what happens in Ukraine) and we need to figure out a long-term strategy: foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa….
The article makes five broad and interrelated points. First, avoiding a direct Russia-NATO war remains a key priority (fortunately, there are good reasons to think it's highly avoidable). Second, de-stabilising or breaking up Russia into feuding fiefdoms is not a good idea.
Three, we might as well give up on trying to "democratise" Russia; this is sadly not in the cards. Four, sanctions must of course be maintained until Russia adopts a more sensible foreign policy and quits Ukraine.
Interesting. There is no doubt that results of any referenda in Kherson will be fraudulent. Polling figures are definitely fake but on the other hand, it's important to reflect (as few people do) that eight years of Russian occupation have taken a toll on Donbas.
Eight years is a long time; enough, I suppose, to impose a narrative, especially when those who might be disposed against have long left. New loyalties emerge, new economic links. Propaganda and education contribute to reshaping the public opinion in the "desired" direction.
In short, I would be equally skeptical of the notion that DNR and LNR are desperate to throw off Russia's yoke and embrace Ukraine. But Kherson is (for now) a completely different story. Which makes it all the more interesting that the Kremlin is trying to conflate the two.
On this day in 1968 the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia, with minimal Western reaction. Less than four years later, Nixon was in Moscow to launch detente. Many things happened in between, not least the border war between China and the USSR (March 1969).
The rise of Willy Brandt (Sept. 1969) was also key. Brandt, with his Ostpolitik, built up quite a close relationship with Brezhnev, in some ways displacing Brezhnev's key European partner, Georges Pomipidou.
Brezhnev was keen to play France against Germany, and Germany against France, and both of them against the United States. Above all, he despised and feared China. He was also deeply worried about prospects of a nuclear confrontation in Europe.
My view on the assassination of Dugin's daughter...
Dugin is a despicable albeit influential academic whose views are tantamount to unapologetic advocacy of Russian imperialism. He is of course no "Putin's brain," nor his adviser. So these 👇🏿 hot takes (CNN) are problematic:
While I despise Dugin's ideology, and would not shake his hand, nor appear at academic events that also feature Dugin, I would certainly not call for Dugin's assassination. Why? That's just me. With some justifiable exceptions, I do not believe in assassinations.
From the perspective of ethics of war, Dugin is unarguably a non-combatant, however hideous one at that. His daughter Daria, though she held highly questionable views, is also a non-combatant. By all indications, she was assassinated by accident (the bomb was intended for Dugin).
An interesting thread that raises some pertinent points, but arrives at wrong conclusions. Let's delve into details. First, is it true that consumption paradise is a major basis for Putin's legitimacy? The answer is "yes, to some extent."
The Soviet regime's inability to deliver for the consumer was a major reason for its loss of legitimacy. Mass impoverishment in the 1990s fed into political instability that ultimately brought Putin to power.
We know, too, that relative affluence of the Chinese middle class has provided CCP with a basis for legitimacy (this is just to show that Russia is not unique in this regard). However, travel to the EU has *very* little to do with all of this.