One of the objectives that @DrRadchenko and I wanted to achieve in our @ForeignAffairs piece (link below) is to debunk some of the prevailing myths about Russia. Here are the most important ones: 🧵
Myth #1: Once Putin leaves power/dies, Russia will abandon its anti-Western belligerent policies and return to the bosom of the liberal Western order
Reality: Putin is most likely to be replaced by another hardliner who will continue or even accelerate his aggressive policies
Myth #2: It's only a matter of time before Russia turns into a Jeffersonian democracy with the rule of law, free press, etc
Reality: Democracy has become a dirty word in Russia over the last 3 decades. Even long after Putin is gone, the Russian public is unlikely to desire it
Myth #3: Russia and US will one day join forces to form an anti-China alliance (Reverse Kissinger model)
Reality: Russia, with historical visions of its own grandeur, has no interest in joining any alliance—much less a Western one. Nor is it in its interests to antagonize China
Myth #4: The only options for Russia are to become a junior partner to China or US
Reality: Russia's desired state is a multipolar world, where it is one of the poles. With its power diminishing, it is unlikely to get that. But it can still project power by pursing non-alignment
Myth #5: It is possible to destroy or dismantle Russia (or that it would be in our interests to do so)
Reality: As George Kennan famously once said "The Soviet Union will not last, but Russia will"
It is a country of 140m people that is not going to disappear or disintegrate
Myth #6: Putin will get replaced in a popular uprising
Reality: Putin's hold on power is the strongest it's been in 23 years, since becoming President. If he gets replaced, it will be due to a palace coup orchestrated by people who think he is not aggressive enough
Myth #7: We can enact a regime change in Moscow
Reality: It's a folly to think that we are even capable of such action. Not to mention that US track record of regime change over the last half century in countries considerably weaker than Russia is not stellar, to say the least
We need a long-term strategy for Russia that takes into account these realities and focuses on pursuit of achievable goals, not hopeless dreams. A non-aligned Russia, equidistant from America and China, is a possible outcome that would benefit US *and* Russia
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Zelensky initially approved the plan, according to one officer who participated and three people familiar with it. But later, when the CIA learned of it and asked the Ukrainian president to pull the plug, he ordered a halt.
Zaluzhniy, who was leading the effort, nonetheless forged ahead.
“An attack of this scale is a sufficient reason to trigger the collective defense clause of NATO, but our critical infrastructure was blown up by a country that we support with massive weapons shipments and billions in cash,” said a senior German official familiar with the probe.
In May of 2022, a handful of senior Ukrainian military officers and businessmen had gathered to toast their country’s remarkable success in halting the Russian invasion. Buoyed by alcohol and patriotic fervor, somebody suggested a radical next step: destroying Nord Stream.
With the concerted effort by the SBU with the participation of the Ukrainian Navy (and later GUR) since mid 2022, Ukraine was able to develop more and more capable maritime drones that showed their capabilities against Russian military ships and land infrastructure
It is interesting to see how strategically they are thinking about the development of capabilities of these drones:
"We want to decompose a large warship into its functions - air defense, weapons, protection - and put these weapons on several drones," Hunter (SBU) explains.
The more important question to ask is what would bring about that improved position for an eventual negotiation with Moscow
The only one that’s being discussed as at all plausible is having Ukraine get to the Sea of Azov, destroy the Kerch Bridge and put fire pressure on Crimea🧵
Putting aside the feasibility and likelihood of success of each of those elements of the strategy, I think it’s worth questioning the assumption that Putin would be driven to the negotiation table even if all of the above conditions come to pass
A big assumption in this strategy is that without the Kerch bridge and under constant fires from the Azov coast, Crimea would be difficult to resupply
But the Kerch bridge didn’t exist until 2018 and the rail part until 2019, yet occupied Crimea was just fine since 2014
Good article on the challenges seen in the early days of the Ukrainian counteroffensive back in June. Some key points: washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/…
“The goal for the first 24 hours was to advance nearly nine miles, reaching the village of Robotyne — an initial thrust south toward the larger objective of reclaiming Melitopol, a city near the Sea of Azov, and severing Russian supply lines”
“Rather than making a nine-mile breakthrough on their first day, the Ukrainians in the nearly six months since June have advanced about 12 miles and liberated a handful of villages. Melitopol is still far out of reach”
Putin/Defense Ministry/GRU were muscling in to take over Prigozhin’s Africa business and he dared to resist. He did not get the message after the June mutiny—that it was time to apologize and disappear, go to Belarus or wherever. Not fight for control of business in Africa
That is what doomed him
If he had just gone away to sip margaritas in the Maldives and turned over all his businesses to Putin and Co. as penance instead of fighting to preserve them, he would probably still be alive today
Putin had personally told Touadera, the Central African Republic president, that the time had come to distance himself from Prigozhin. When Touadera visited St. Petersburg last month, he abstained from taking a selfie with the Russian warlord
Since June, the Kremlin had been trying to assert control over that shadowy web of murky arrangements. The Defense Ministry had been dispatching delegations to inform foreign governments that they would henceforth do business directly with the Russian state
Prigozhin’s mutiny had left Haftar, the Libyan warlord who had paid Wagner for securing its oil wells and territory, and his close circle nervous about Wagner’s presence in Libya
“They felt that if they do it in Russia, they can do it in Benghazi”