Hard to disagree with @paulkrugman that the economic collapse after Gorbachev helped to set the stage for Putin. But on the details, I think we know a bit more than he suggests.
As Krugman notes, output collapsed in Russia during the 1990s. It was bad everywhere in the former Soviet empire, but it was especially bad in Russia. Here, from a 2002 JEP paper by @Jan_Svejnar. 2/
What caused the output collapse? Krugman suggests four possible explanations, each related in some way to #privatization, by far the most visible and controversial transition policy. 3/
I confess I am sympathetic to one of these stories👇. Russia was notoriously slow to create institutions complementary to private economic activity. 4/
And local bureaucrats often had little interest in supporting private enterprise. Where the inherited bureaucracy was small—relative to OECD countries, it was on average quite small—bureaucrats had holdup power, and privatization performed worse. 5/
Whatever the reason, it just took longer than anyone expected for Russian privatization to have a positive impact on firm performance. Here, from my Oxford Handbook chapter with Brown and Earle. 6/
#Liberalization is probably not what you think it is. Liberalization of foreign trade, yes, but also of internal trade—the right of sellers to sell to whom they want, and of buyers to buy from whom they want, for a mutually agreed price, previous plan be dammed. 10/
Sounds great, right? I mean, we know that the plan was riddled with inefficiencies. It's the raison d'être for the "tolkach"—the sleazy but essential black marketeer, vividly portrayed as Chekuskin in Francis Spufford's magnificent Red Plenty. 11/ amazon.com/Red-Plenty-Fra…
Alas, and completely counter to expectations, liberalization had a large NEGATIVE effect on output in the short run. 12/
There are two versions of the basic story. The first, by @ojblanchard1 and Kremer, emphasizes bargaining inefficiences when economic relations are highly specific—when a supplier, say, produces the input precisely one other firm needs. 13/
The other, by @gerardrolanducb and Verdier, also assumes specificity, though here the focus is on search frictions rather than bargaining inefficiencies. 14/
In each case, the basic idea is that liberalization creates opportunities for firms outside of the plan. In BK, that can cause bargaining to break down. In RV, that discourages investment as firms look around for new partners. 15/
These are transition effects.
In the long run, reputation, vertical integration, and other mechanisms reduce bargaining inefficiencies. In the long run, firms settle on new partners and invest in those relationships.
In the short run, output collapses. 16/
Notably, neither story requires privatization to work, so long as state-owned enterprises are freed from the plan.
Liberalization, not privatization, caused the output collapse. 17/
One more thing: Krugman points to the large decline in life expectancy in Russia during the transition period.
It is easy—too easy—to ascribe this to "deaths of despair," the collateral damage of economic reform.
In 2015 @timothymfrye, @kailmarkvart, @reutertweets and I tried to answer this question with a series of list experiments. Our conclusion: Putin was roughly as popular as opinion polling suggested (i.e., very).
What about now? A thread. 1/
In the six years after we ran those first list experiments, Putin's apparent popularity declined dramatically—more so than for other Russian politicians. 2/
In principle, the actual drop could have been greater yet, as survey participants responded to Russia's increasing authoritarianism by saying they supported Putin when in fact they did not. This was the period of Navalny's poisoning and arrest, for example. 3/
I desperately hope that Western sanctions and the corporate exodus encourage unrest and split the Kremlin elite.
Here are three forces that might push the other direction.👇🏼 1/4
With respect to unrest, the implicit model seems to be dissatisfaction —> voice. But dissatisfaction also encourages exit, as Hirschman taught us. And the people exiting are among those most skeptical of the war and most opposed to Putin. 2/4
Meanwhile, sanctions could backfire, encouraging Russians to rally around the flag. Work by @timothymfrye suggests skepticism, but we’ve never seen sanctions like this before. 3/4
Lots of evidence that Russia botched the logistics of its military operation. But I think this video illustrates another problem for Putin: a failure to prepare Russia's population, including its soldiers, for war. A short thread. 1/
Until the war actually started, most Russians seemed to believe it could not—that this was just another example of Putin extracting concessions from a weak negotiating partner. 2/ themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/19/nav…
The propaganda campaign really only kicked in a few days before the invasion—here, for example, a state TV report that, echoing Putin, questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. 3/