#OTD 5 September, 1812, Murat, Davout, Eugene, and Poniatowski stormed the Shevardino Redoubt defended by Prince Gorchakov.
At night, Napoleon occupied this left flank outpost of the Russians at Borodino, marking a prelude to the bloodiest battle of 1812. #Voicesfrom1812
The morning was marked by an ominously "sharp frost."(Vionnet) Napoleon had bivouacked at Girdneva the night before. As Murat continued to pursue Konovnitsyn's rearguard from Gridneva toward the Kolotskoi Convent, the Grande Armée resumed its march across the Old Smolensk Road.
By 14:00, Murat was chasing Konovnitsyn away from the monastery. The army again advanced across the Old Smolensk Road in three columns. Eugene went leftward via Bolshi Sadi, while Poniatowski, guarding Murat and Davout from the right, marched on the same road. (Dodge, Paskevich)
Around 15:00, Konovnitsyn went out of Murat's sight. Napoleon, then at the Kolotskoi monastery, soon received Murat's report on the direction taken by the retreating enemy. Wishing the local monks 'Bon appétit!' in broken Polish, he galloped off northeastward. (Dodge, Zamoyski)
As the Grande Armée approached Borodino, Segur "recognized the field of battle" in the nearby villages of Fomkino, Aleksino, and Kolotsa-all stripped bare of crops and supplies and filled with "clouds of Scythians." The vanguard resumed skirmishes with the Cossacks. (Segur)
Inspecting the terrain on a knoll, Napoleon immediately detected the enemy's weak left flank, compared to the right anchored on the angular ravines of the Kolocha.
He wore "the look of an eagle," as if "he is about to dart with all his might and all his impetuosity."(Segur)
Napoleon thereupon ordered all to concentrate around the Old Smolensk Road and capture Fomkino, Aleksino, and Kolotsa leading to the Russian left, soon done with ease.
Kutuzov's groundless prediction that the French would advance on his right, therefore, had failed him.
In his memoir, Barclay wrote that Kutuzov had assumed "[the Old Road] could be easily defended by irregular forces." In retrospect, building a redoubt "at the most important heights by this road," defended by Tuchkov's III Corps, "would have completely held the enemy at bay."
At the time, the Russians were still finishing up the earthworks. Kutuzov, at the news, dispatched an improvised corps de bataille commanded by Prince Gorchakov, a nephew of Suvorov. The Second Western army, then at Shevardino, was pulled back to the Semeonvskoye. (Mikaberidze)
Around 16:00, Murat, after crossing the Kolotsa, discovered the Shevardino Redoubt. According to Labaume of the IV Corps, Napoleon speedily concluded that the enemy "had constructed it to strengthen their left" and "there was nothing for it but to carry this redoubt."
Across the hills, Major General Paskevich of the 26th Infantry Division was able to observe "a mass of cavalry...descending from the heights opposite." He claimed to have spotted Napoleon who, "in this quarter of an hour... figured out the weakness in [their] position."
The defenders of the redoubt, commanded by Gorchakov, consisted of the 27th Division Neverovsky, the 2nd Cuirassier Division, and five regiments of Jägers screening the southward position of Duronino. They totalled about 20,000 men, plus 12 guns.
Poniatowski's V Corps launched the first attack at the enemy's extreme left at Duronino, with his cavalry routing the Jägers.
At 17:00, the 5th Division Compans "marched forward with a determination which guaranteed success," occupying the redoubt within an hour. (Labaume)
"The 61st [Regiment of Compans' 5th Division] captured their first redoubt," Sergeant Bourgoyne recorded the moment of honor. Segur, too, praised the brave men who seized Shevardino "by a single effort, and with the bayonet."
But reinforcements from Bagration shortly arrived, the formidable grenadiers under whom expelled
Compans' men from the redoubt.
Paskevich recorded that "[T]hree times the redoubt changed hands," while Segur wrote "[T]hree times did the 61st recover it from the Russians."
Around 20:00, the 61st Regiment "at last..maintained itself..covered with blood and half destroyed." The French had lost about 3,000 men, and the Russians 6,000-thus confirming Barclay's notion that "that the irregular troops were insufficient to cover the Old Smolensk Road."
The internal situation of the French, however, did not mirror the triumphant atmosphere within the 61st Regiment.
That night, after a heavy fighting "no rations were issued." (Brandt) On top of everything, possibly from the first frost of the year, Napoleon was falling ill.
(Part 2) #OTD 7 September, 1812, the Grande Armée of Emperor Napoleon and the Russian Army of General Kutuzov fought for the fate of Moscow at the Battle of Borodino. The bloodiest day of the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a phyrric victory for the French. #Voicesfrom1812
The fall of the flèches allowed the French right wing to aid Eugene, whose detachments were bombarding the Great Redoubt since 10. General Bonamy of the 3rd Brigade led an abortive attack on the redoubt and fell into captivitiy, mistaken for Murat to the delight of his captors.
Shortly after the capture of Bonnamy, around 11:00, Major Kutaisov in command of the artillery was killed. Because of Kutuzov's negligence, this position remained empty throughout the war; a fault which significantly compromised the Russian advantage in artillery.
(Part 1) #OTD 7 September, 1812, the Grand Armée of Emperor Napoleon and the Russian Army of General Kutuzov fought for the fate of Moscow at the Battle of Borodino. The bloodiest day of the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a phyrric victory for the French. #Voicesfrom1812
From midnight to daybreak, Napoleon was unable to fall asleep.
He lamented to Rapp that "Fortune is a liberal mistress." Somewhat disturbed by the remark, the general reminded the Emperor that he had said at Smolensk "that the glass is full, that it must be drunk off." (Rapp)
Napoleon, in a melancholic mood, only said:
"It is at present the case more than ever. The army moreover knows its situation..that it can only find provisions at Moscow..
This poor army is much reduced, but waht remains of it is good; my Guard besides is untouched." (Rapp)
#OTD 6 September, 1812, on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, the combatants stood facing each other across the Kolotcha. The spectacles of Kutuzov praying to the Icon of Smolensk and Napoleon displaying a portrait of his son momentarily rekindled the men's vigor.#Voicesfrom1812
After the Battle of Shevardino, Napoleon bivouacked at Valuyeva, with Berthier by his side and Eugene and the Guard in front of the imperial tent. Suffering from "intense and anxious expectation" worsened by a bad cold, thirst, and urinary retention, he had barely slept. (Segur)
Neither could the soldiers, for that night "a cold mizzling rain began to fall, and the autumn set in with a violent wind."
In the absence of firewood and ration, it was unnerving for them to watch the Russians "light innumerable fires" and "resplendent." (Segur, Labaume)
#OTD In the morning of 4 September, 1812, Napoleon ordered the Grande Armée to leave Gzhatsk. Amidst the chaotic march in the directon of Moscow, Murat's vanguard reencountered Konovnitsyn's rearguard, who retreated toward the unfinished earthworks at Borodino. #Voicesfrom1812
At 6:00, the main body of the Grande Armée resumed its march across the New Moscow-Smolensk Road. On the 3rd, the troops had been joined by Junot's VIII Corps and Division Pajol, thus increased from 128,000 at Gzhatsk (which included Junot's men) to 130,000. (Dodge, Vionnet)
It had rained for several days, but the weather on the 5th turned out unusually fine. During the march to Vyazma, Napoleon had promised Berthier "to retire if the rain continued, but it became fine again." (Lejeune) Berthier must have hoped for the rain to continue on this day.
#OTD 3 September, 1812, after much meandering, Kutuzov finally established the Russian camp near Borodino and set forth his half-baked plan to fortify the area.
Napoleon, at Gzhatsk, anxiously tried to curb non-combat losses worsened by excessive foraging. #Voicesfrom1812
Kutuzov had abandoned the previously suggested positions at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche and Gzhatsk, the impromptu decisions which Barclay attributed to the senile commander's whims, for, "on this principle, he could not find a decent position in the whole of Russia." (Barclay)
Bagration's letter to Rostopchin emitted a similar level of discontent, although he had done the same at Usvyaty.
"As usual we have yet to make a decision when and where to give a battle-we are still selecting places and are finding each new one to be worse than the previous."
#OTD 2 September, 1812, Napoleon established himself at Gzhatsk to prepare for "the battle he so ardently desired."(Caulaincourt) After issuing a regulation on excess carriages, he ordered an accurate roll call, from which 128,000 were reported as fit for service. #Voicesfrom1812
Fully convinced that "the new general [Kutuzov] cannot continue this plan of retreat," Napoleon planned a three-day stay at Gzhatsk from the day of their arrival on the 1st to the 3rd. He intended to muster the scattered columns into the main body and restore discipline. (Caul.)
Napoleon was bent on maximizing his capabilities before a-hopefully final-pitched battle with Kutuzov. He first hastened Junot's VIII Corps in Vyazma, as well as the detachments of Pajol, Pino, and Guyon to rejoin the rest of the army at Gzhatsk.