Reports indicate Zelenskyy will announce tonight (Ukraine time) that UA is executing operations in Kharkiv Oblast.
This confirms RU inability to maneuver forces between theater locations & within their force's defensive "stance" to counter Ukrainian offensive actions.
Why? 1/
As noted from the start of the RU illegal invasion, intel indicated RU had aligned a force estimated in size of 190,000 troops around UKR's ~1400 mile border, with a plan of attack along 9 main axes.
A large part of that force was in the north & it was decimated. 2/
In phase 2 (starting in April), RU shifted their northern forces to the eastern Donbas to try to achiever more limited objectives.
Remember, there was a shoddy attempt to "regenerate" the forces for that second offensive...they rushed it, and UA kept up the pressure. 3/
Yesterday, UAF proclaimed they had reached the level where 50,000 RU soldiers are "casualties." Not sure if those are killed, wounded, captured, deserted...but if close to the truth, that's 1/3 of the original RU force
Most were likely fighting forces, not support troops. 4/
After successful Donbas defense, Zelenskyy & Gen Zaluzhnyi saw an opportunity to shift forces to southern Ukraine.
Very smart move, since it was difficult for a depleted & immobile RU force to move to counter.
Plus, UKR has interior lines, easier for shifting. 5/
Add to that, UA has reinforced their forces with new soldiers, new equipment. Plus, they are resisting in areas where RU is trying to defending.
RU is nursing wounds, bearing loss of combat capabilities (people & equipment), have bad leaders. 6/
UA defense & small-scale counterattacks in Donbas along w/ recent deliberate attacks in Kherson (destroying RU logistics, bridges & ammo dumps) has generated a commander's favorite ally: momentum!
It has also placed RU on the horns of a dilemma: Where (& how) to defend? 7/
Russia's additional problems:
-a massively depleted force with few reinforcements
-hard to move/maneuver
-active UKR resistance + more capable & precision UKR conventional force (with good targeting)
-hampered supply lines + dysfunctional logistics
-crush of sanctions 8/
If I were Ukraine's field commander, here are my questions:
-Can we continue Donetz defense (all indications, yes).
-Are actions in Kherson Oblast achieving objectives (yes)
-If we attack toward Kharkiv will it draw RU forces away from Donbas & increase pressure (likely) 9/
I have no insight into Gen Zaluzhnyi's thinking, but he's a good commander.
He's likely considering these things...knowing a move on Kharkiv is bold & risky.
My guess: we'll see continued offensive in Kherson, continued active defense in Donetsk, smaller Kharkiv offensive 10/
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While it's not on the news, I'm watching the current fight in Kherson (and the renewed fight in the Donbas).
The "Kherson pocket" (a smaller version of the WWII "Falaise Pocket" I mentioned a few weeks ago) is not a large "counteroffensive," but it is interesting. 1/16🧵
What follows are maps, descriptions of terrain, locations of tactical battles, and their relative potential significance.
Without battlefield intel, I don't know details of what General Zaluzhnyi or Col-Gen Shaptala see, but these are my thoughts.2/
1st, some geographical reminders about Kherson (in light green).
-It's both a city & an Oblast (like a province)
-The Oblast is about the size of Maryland, the city is about 1/2 the size of Baltimore.
-The wide Dnipro River dissects the Oblast and runs to the Black Sea. 3/
@CNN's @EllieCKaufman reports accurate information, but the headline -with one small picture- implies West Point (my alma mater) is displaying a plaque to the KKK outside an academic building. 1/5
Several other media outlets have done the same.
In reading this article, Ellie does a good job in telling of the "triptych" artwork that tells "the history of the United States in bronze relief" w/ 3 panels each 11x5 feet.
Here's what the ENTIRE piece of art looks like: 2/
Artist Laura Fraser (1889–1966) was an American sculptor commissioned to design the panels.
She wanted to create a piece depicting “historical incidents or persons” while "documenting both tragedy & triumph in our nation’s history." The KKK was part of the tragedy. 3/
In 2011, a Sikh recruit approached his basic training commander asking for an exception to Army policy to allow him to serve with religious accommodation.
The @usarmy did so. His name is @kamaljeetkhalsi
& today he is a reserve LTC, surgeon & member of a @potus commission. 1/
He made a strong argument, stood up for his religious & cultural beliefs, & made sacrifices. He was awarded a Bronze Star in Afghanistan while saving many lives. 2/
He’s also helped other Sikhs join our @USArmy, and several have graduated from West Point.
It's 6 PM here on the east coast, but it's 0100 in the morning in Kyiv. It is already Ukraine's Independence Day.
There's predictions this will be a tough day for our friends, as Russia hates independence - freedom & sovereignty - when it concerns great nations. 1/8
Putin threatens more death from the skies - from Russian rockets, missiles, whatever is left - and promises to reign these devices on civilians.
They threaten strikes on Kyiv's Khreshchatyk Street, the one stretching from European SQ through the Maidan to Bessarabska SQ. 2/
.@StateDept is telling US citizens to seek safety because Russian rockets aren't precise & Kyiv is likely a target. That's prudent.
So today, I've been thinking more about Ukraine...Ukrainian soldiers, seeing Ukraine's culture... during my last few years in the Army. 3/
Informally engaging w/ MBA students & healthcare professionals over the last few days, I often hear "what's going on in Ukraine."
Here's a summary 🧵 of what has happened in the last 6 months, what's happening now, & some things I'm watching. 1/21
Russia’s ground forces have proven to be poorly led, ill-trained & with low morale, increasingly & significantly attritted in personnel & equipment (some sources now indicating that when they went into this fight in Feb most units were understrength), unable to regenerate. 2/
RU lacked the ability to execute combined arms operations (CAO’s), defined as combining infantry, tanks, fires (arty or air), engineers (for river crossings, demining operations, etc), aviation, intel, & logistics to seize, occupy, & defend land areas or secure ground. 3/
This 25 tweet 🧵by my Australian friend MG (ret) Mick Ryan @WarintheFuture is succinct, descriptive of campaign planning & operational art, and a phenomenal discussion of Ukraine's potential plans in the south.
Hope Mick doesn't mind, but I'll add a few additional comments. 1/