This is when I get to use the Die Hard movie line "Welcome to the Party, Pal" to the CIA to getting around to something in September 2022 that I called out in April 2022. Which was apparent in the 2015 Russian rocketing of Kramatorsk.
The rocketing of Kramatorsk, Ukraine was one of the events that was featured in EXPLOSIVE WEAPON EFFECTS: FINAL REPORT by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
It is a "must have" resource for the Russo-Ukrainian War... 5/
And enabled me to find this US State Department resource I've also used in previous🧵 titled "DANGEROUS DEPOTS: The Growing Humanitarian Problem Posed by Ageing and Poorly Maintained Munitions Storage Sites Around the World." 9/ 2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/10…
The overwhelming majority of the munition explosions on that State Department list involved Ex-Soviet & Ex-Warsaw Pact artillery munitions.
The punchline for all of this?
Old DPRK artillery munitions are far more dangerous than Ex-Soviet munitions.
10/
This is something easily demonstrated with the YŎNP’YŎNG-DO INCIDENT, of Nov 23, 2010 (H/T @LIM49Spartan).
The folks running the 38north -dot- org site put together a very nice report that among other things detailed the performance of
"In the Yeonpyeong Island Incident of November 23, 2010 the North Koreans fired 170 copies of the Russian 122mm Grad rocket at the South Korean island. Fired at relatively short range, only 80 rockets...
12/
...hit the island while 90 landed in the water. The 80 rockets that hit the island suffered a 25% dud rate. Thus 110 out of 170 rockets were completely wasted. And this was a premeditated attack that presumably used the best crews and highest quality ammunition available.
13/
... The rockets were fired in a pair of time on target salvos coinciding with scheduled South Korean maneuvers on the island, so that SK Marines were caught in the open, but casualties were only 2 SK Marines killed, 2 civilians killed, 18 wounded."
14/
Having 110 of 170 rockets fall short or fail to detonate is a ~64% failure rate on the very best DPRK 122mm artillery rockets it horrid.
The double punch line to that number set is 1. It happened 11 years ago & 2. It doesn't count rockets that misfired and never left
15/
... the launchers.
This is where things get interesting. When you look up standard pattern DPRK 122mm rocket launchers, they come with 40 rockets each.
...assuming the DPRK used five BM-21 class launchers.
The kicker?
The standard BM-21 122mm rocket battery is six launchers. This makes the misfire # 70 rockets...
17/
...which seems high to me.
Newer domestically produced DPRK 122mm launcher using smaller local truck chassis only carried 30 122mm rockets each.
Since the Yeonpyeong Island Incident was a "show" put on for/by the latest Kim. Let's assume six of these. 18/
Six time 30 is 180 rockets, of which 170 launched, 90 fell short, and 60 of the 80 that hit the island actually detonated.
So we have:
90 of 180 fell short of the island
80 of 180 reached the island
60 of 180 detonated on the Island
10 of 180 misfired on the launchers
19/
The very best 122mm DPRK rockets fired on the newest launchers with the best crews had the following:
33.3% successful island impact rate**
50% fall short rate
5.5% misfire rate.
** This is far bigger than rated circular error probability, AKA wildly inaccurate.
20/
DPRK 122mm rockets are a terror weapon...
...for Russian logistical and rocket artillery troops.
Russian standard 122mm rockets are too long to fit sideways in a standard Russian railway car. Thus the standard loading causes them to roll down... 21/
Running thousands of 35-to-45 year old, badly stored, DPRK 122mm rockets down the Trans-Siberian railway will be marked by detonating trains, depots & BM-21 launchers.
22/22 End
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It looks like the Kharkiv Oblast break-in point chosen by Ukraine was so lightly held that any serious mechanized force would blow through it like tissue paper with no local reserves behind the lines to stop it.
This means the Ukrainian forces involved could be as small as 1/7
...a Ukrainian reinforced tank or mechanized brigade could be involved in this offensive. (H/T @battle_order)
This points up a real problem with Russian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets versus Ukraine's integrated air defenses.
2/7
Russia has to be allocating its drone ISR assets across the whole of the vast Ukrainian front line – Kherson first first, then Donbass, then dribs to the rest of the front.
And Ukraine is Texas sized. (GMLRS/ATACMS map by @ameliairheart)
The Soviet Union produced 10,000 KS-19 anti-aircraft guns from 1948 to 1957. They have a range of up to 21 km and at an altitude of up to 15 km at air targets with a flight speed of up to 1200 km/h.
The guns were finally removed from Army service in the 1980's and were
2/6
... used to start avalanches in mountain passes and resorts inside Russia by the "Roshydromet" (Russian Hydrometeorological Service).
Removing them from the Roshydromet to provide artillery support in Ukraine 3/6
@kamilkazani gave us all an early May 2022 thread which included this infographic tweet explaining how Russian forces of the "Putin Imperium" are structured.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense counts Russian Army, Wagner, Chechin & the LNR/DNR colonial militias as "Russian."
Now compare that 28 Aug 2022 Russian Ministry of Finance 48,838 CONFIRMED Russian Army-only deaths #'s with Ukraine's 5 Sept. 2022 #'s for all Russian forces. 3/
It remains to be seen if the Ukrainian military has enough local mobile forces to make this into an operational scale breakthrough offensive that cuts the Russian ground lines of communications to Izyum.
2/4
The only rapidly available tool for the Russians appears to be airpower.
The Russians have to commit the VKS in a big way to slow this Ukrainian break-in down and helicopter lift infantry blocking forces in front of the Ukrainians to save their logistical position at Izyum.
3/4
This should not be surprisings, since Ukraine's information operations pulled lots of Russian strategic & operational reserve ground forces to Kherson.
Then cut them off.
This has allowed Ukraine to exploit its interior lines of communications at Kharkiv with no Russian 1/5
...reserves available to counter attack and seal the breach in Russian lines.
Ukraine's GMLRS delivered "Follow on Forces Attack" (FOFA) advantage has put Russia in the classic "He who defends everywhere, defends nothing" position.
2/5
The Russian military has committed most of its available reserves and has to stop attacks elsewhere to be able to respond to this new Ukrainian offensive at Kharkiv.
And someone in the Russian army has to tell Putin and get him to believe the bad news without getting shot.
3/5
Kherson & the new Kharkiv offensive are being done incrementally both to minimise 🇺🇦 losses & to present a diffuse force at the forward edge battle area (FEBA) that provides no tempting targets for Russian tactical nukes 1/