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Beosin Alert Profile picture
@BeosinAlert
Sep 10, 2022 • 3 tweets • 1 min read • Read on X
#BeosinAlert
$DPC was hacked for ~$103,755. The attacker first used the tokenAirdop function in the DPC token contract to prepare for claiming the rewards, then swapped $USDT for $DPC, added liquidity to obtain LP tokens, and then staked LP tokens in the token contract.
2/ The attacker then repeatedly called the claimStakeLp function to repeatedly claim the rewards. The rewards can keep accumulating because of the " ClaimQuota = ClaimQuota.add(oldClaimQuota[addr]);" in the getClaimQuota function. ImageImage
3/ Finally, the attacker called the claimDpcAirdrop function in the $DPC contract to claim the rewards and swapped them for $USDT. The stolen funds are still at the attacker's address 0xf211Fa86CBc60d693D687075B03dFF3c225b25C9.

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More from @BeosinAlert

Beosin Alert Profile picture
Jun 30, 2023
H1 2023 Web3 Security Statistics

🚨Total losses from hacks, phishing scams, and rug pulls in Web3 reached $655.61 million in the first half of 2023.

Among them,
108 attacks -> $471.43M
Phishing scams -> $108M
110 rug pulls -> $75.87M https://t.co/8Q9kmDETfQtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
2/ The total loss from hacks in Web3 has significantly decreased compared to last year.

In H1 2022, the total loss from attacks was ~$1.91 billion, and in H2 2022, it was about $1.69 billion, while in H1 2023, this value dropped to $470 million.
3/ Distribution of loss amount in hacks:

Loss exceeding $100 million: 1 incident
$10 million to $100 million: 7 incidents
$1 million to $10 million: 23 incidents

Read 5 tweets
Beosin Alert Profile picture
Jun 6, 2023
Last month, Beosin security researchers have discovered a high-risk vulnerability CVE-2023–33252 in the library of SnarkJS (version 0.6.11 and earlier).

The high-risk vulnerability that allowing double-spending has now been fixed by Circom. It has a severity score of 7.5 in the… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… ImageImage
2/ Circom is a zero-knowledge proof circuit compiler developed in Rust. The team behind Circom has also developed the SnarkJS library, which supports various functionalities, including trusted setups, generation and verification of zero-knowledge proofs. Image
3/ In versions of SnarkJS <= 0.6.11, the library fails to perform comprehensive validation checks on the parameters during proof verification. This allows attackers to forge multiple proofs that pass the verification process, enabling double-spending attacks.
Read 9 tweets
Beosin Alert Profile picture
May 19, 2023
Swaprum on Arbitrum rugged for ~$3M.

The deployer of Swaprum used the add() backdoor function to steal LP tokens staked by users, then removed liquidity from the pool for profit.

One tx:
arbiscan.io/tx/0x36fef881f… ImageImage
2/ The project has upgraded the the normal liquidity collateral reward contract to a contract containing backdoor functions.

arbiscan.io/address/0x9980…

arbiscan.io/address/0xcb65…
3/ The backdoor function add() will transfer LP tokens from the contract to the _devadd address. By querying the _devadd address, it will return the ‘Swaprum:Deployer’ address. ImageImage
Read 4 tweets
Beosin Alert Profile picture
Apr 16, 2023
On Apr 15th, @HundredFinance was exploited for over $7M on #Optimism.
Hundred Finance was also a victim of a reentrancy attack on Mar 2022.
Txs:
0x15096dc6a59cff26e0bd22eaf7e3a60125dcec687580383488b7b5dd2aceea93
0x6e9ebcdebbabda04fa9f2e3bc21ea8b2e4fb4bf4f4670cb8483e2f0b2604f451
2/ The root cause is that the attacker can manipulate the exchangeRate by donating a large amount of WBTC to the hWBTC contract.
In the getAccountSnapshot function, the value of exchangeRateMantissa relies on the amount of WBTC in the contract. ImageImageImage
3/ The attacker flashloaned 500 $WBTC, then called the redeem function to redeem the previously staked 0.3 WBTC.
Next, the attack contract 1 sent 500.3 WBTC to attack contract 2. Contract 2 used 4 BTC to mint 200 hWBTC. The redeem function was then called to redeem the 4 BTC. ImageImage
Read 5 tweets
Beosin Alert Profile picture
Apr 9, 2023
Root cause: The reset of lastCalledPool is before the check. This results in an invalid check on Pool, allowing attackers to specify malicious Pool to transfer users’ funds that have approved when swap.

Example: 0xea3480f1f1d1f0b32283f8f282ce16403fe22ede35c0b71a732193e56c5c45e8
1) The attacker created the malicious pool contract 30 days ago.
2) The swap is performed by calling SushiSwap's router function processRoute, specifying the malicious contract as the pool contract.
3) After the swap, the malicious contract calls the uniswapV3SwapCallback, specifying the tokenIn as WETH and the from address as the victim's address (@0xSifu sifuvision.eth), thus using the victim's approval to router contract to transfer the funds.
Read 6 tweets
Beosin Alert Profile picture
Apr 5, 2023
Sentiment protocol was under an attack with a loss of ~$1 million caused by a price error due to reentrancy.
arbiscan.io/tx/0xa9ff2b587… Image
2/ The attacker first calls the "joinPool" function of Balancer Vault to make a deposit. Then he calls "exitPool" to withdraw, during which Balancer Vault sends eth to the attacker to call the fallback function of the attack contract.
3/ In the fallback function, the attacker calls the 0x62c5 contract's borrow function, which does a price calculation based on the return data from Balancer Vault.getPoolTokens().
Read 4 tweets

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