Thread by @RealCynicalFox

The Izium Pocket 🧵:
With the caveat that this front is developing so fast there may not be an Izium pocket long, some initial thoughts on the development and aftermath of the current situation.
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1. Welcome to kesselschlacht, or in English, the battle of encirclement. UAF appears to be conducting a double (north-south) envelopment of Russian formations in/around & north of Izium. Whether this pocket becomes closed, or remains somewhat open - the Russian situation is dire.

In the case of a closed pocket the task will be to reduce the formations inside while isolating it from relief attempts. In an open scenario, the object will be to close the trap, or harry fleeing units to the best of the UAFs ability.

2. The retreat must be harried. When an army breaks as the Russian army currently is, it becomes an opportunity to generate maximum casualties & maximum panic. Defeated armies tend to suffer the most casualties once they begin to rout, it is then they can be comprehensively

destroyed. The UAF must (as it is able) stay on their flanks & rear and continue to shell them. Air strikes on retreating columns would also be ideal, circumstances permitting. This is the time to break them, while keeping yourself from overextending. It will be a balancing act.

3. Russian command & control is, for the moment, absent in any observable sense from the Russian units heavily engaged or retreating. Nor do the Russians appear to possess the combat power to halt UAF advances at present. They will begin pulling troops from the south to

stabilize the sector of front, they have no choice. Once that move begins in earnest, the UAF will be granted another window to hit the Russians hard in Kherson. The Russians are short on manpower, keeping them off balance & reactive will pay dividends.

4. If another "back-to-the-river" massacre of Russian units can be orchestrated at Kherson, it will do incalculable damage to the Russian army in terms of morale, manpower, and materiel. This must be the goal. Killing Russians, in large numbers, while minimizing risk.

5. If the UAF can push the Russians over both the Oskol & the Dnieper rivers, it will be in an excellent position to hold for the winter while it consolidates, trains, reequips, and refits its forces. Spring 2023 will not be pleasant for the Russian army in such a scenario.

6. Keep an eye on the level of equipment captured in the current offensives. It will indicate both the level of panic experienced by Russian troops, and provide a critical source of resupply for non-western systems still in use.

7. Should both the Kherson & Izium sectors fall & fall hard, Russian casualties will be extreme. This will have ramifications inside Russia. If Putin's response is to demand mobilization & fresh offensives, his own position in the power structure will become far less secure.

At some point, a broken & ravaged Russian army becomes a threat to undermine the power structure that supports not only Putin, but the three centers of power in the Russian system: the Oligarchs, the Generals, & the intel/security services. Putin may be willing to throw the dice

& gamble everything he has on Ukraine. It is unlikely the bulk of these other individuals will make the same choice. If they become convinced Putin is no longer a rational actor, the possibility of something drastic happening at a high level within Moscow becomes more likely.

Historically, Russian autocrats do not fare well in the aftermath of major Russian military disasters.
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