Thread by @MarkGaleotti

Rossiiskaya Gazeta, the Kremlin's 'newspaper of record,' is as stodgy as you might expect, but in light of the extraordinary Ukrainian successes in the past few days, it's instructive to see what it's telling Russians today (and what it's not). A short thread 1/

First, and most obvious, there's not even a hint of the Ukrainians' advance from Kharkov deep into Russian-held territory. Quite the opposite, instead there are tallies, drawn directly from MOD briefings, of alleged enemy losses (4000 KIA since 6 Sept) 2/
rg.ru/2022/09/11/mo-…

At the same time, again picking up a recent theme of Kremlin propaganda, much talk of 'foreign mercenaries' fighting on Kyiv's side, although of course they too are, Russians are told, being hammered 3/
rg.ru/2022/09/11/min…

But even so, the propagandists can't help but trip themselves up. The account of how a Mi-35 gunship crew allegedly thwarted a Ukrainian river crossing might be comforting to the paper's readers...assuming they don't look at a map, because... 4/
rg.ru/2022/09/11/eki…

By placing the action at Sen'kove, on the Oskil River (which seems to have been taken already), it is admitting just how deeply the Ukrainians have already gone. Presumably, they are relying on readers imbibing the triumphalist tone and not digging into the detail. 5/

But this illustrates some wider issues. 1) The Kremlin seems stunned, and has not yet come up with a plan as to how to try and spin this, so to a large extent the media are ignoring the bad news until they get a directive. No one wants to show initiative lest they get it wrong 6/

(Which is, incidentally, the same Soviet-style defensive thinking that is bedevilling the military, especially disastrous in a time of rapid and unpredictable change) 7/

2) The Kremlin is happy to lie, but can't just ignore realities, and so is really struggling to create any positive narratives on issues where some basic fact-checking is possible. This is the kind of dilemma we saw in Chechnya (x2) and the Sov war in Afghanistan, and... 8/

...Tends to be a sign that the state's control over the narrative is cracking. It is not so much IMO that Russians up to now have necessarily *believed* the official line so much as that they have had no reason to both *disbelieving* it as that is dangerous... /9

...both politically and also morally. I remember one parent of a vet from Afghanistan I interviewed for my PhD. She said "I didn't want to believe what people were saying about the war, because if I did, then I would either have to act or be a part of it." /10

This desire to avoid the truth as long as possible is a very human one, alas, but especially prevalent in authoritarian regimes. But in due course - and esp as the official narrative becomes less and less credible - it does break over time. 11/

The evening TV 'shock jocks' will still rant, but they matter less than many believe. When even core state propagandists like RG are at a loss, despite their closeness to the administration, then this is a sign of political pressure, maybe even crisis. 12/end

That should have been 'bother' in the last line, not 'both'!