1/ A couple of somewhat brief opinions/thoughts on the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast.
2/ Hundreds of Russian vehicles were lost, most being abandoned. At least 200, more will be counted over the coming days. Based on others' work on analyzing Oryx's data with captured Russian documents, I generally assume the # we count on social media is 70% of the actual total.
3/ While there were no doubt Ukrainian losses, we would be seeing more if they were anywhere as significant as the Russian losses. Framing this as anything other than a significant victory, potentially altering the course of the war, would be a mistake.
4/ However, I do tend to be cautious, which I do to try to be realistic and to restrain my innate biases. Although Russian equipment losses were high, it is apparent to me that their personnel losses were likely as high as one may expect with the amount of equipment lost.
5/ At the moment, in the absence of additional information, I think the number of Russian casualties (KIA/WIA) in the counteroffensive, specifically in Kharkiv Oblast, was in the high hundreds, not thousands. For a prisoner estimate, I would also say several hundred for now.
6/ The main reason for this was the vehicles and equipment were mostly abandoned, possibly out of action prior to the counteroffensive due to maintenance issues. There was very little actual fighting, mostly consisting of Russian delaying actions.
7/ The Izium grouping of several thousand personnel, in particular, was largely able to escape unfortunately (without armored vehicles). There are some suggestions this was an agreement between the Ukrainians and Russians. I'm not sure one way or the other at the moment on this.
8/ I was going to write about if Ukraine will be fully able to continue exploitation into the Luhansk Oblast, but the situation is still very fluid, supply may be a concern as well. The resistance from Luhansk and BARS reservists at Lyman may have been an unexpected development.
9/ Also somewhat interesting that the Luhansk fighters and BARS reservists are putting up more resistance than "elite" formations like 1st GTA did, which doesn't really gel with prewar expectations. Crossing the Seversky Donets isn't easy, as the Russians found discovered /end
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Finished an update for 27 August for uawardata.com. A few significant changes/improvements: Added both a notes and a sources field. Strength in BTG for HQ units includes subordinate units in parenthesis, Unlocated subordinated units have an asterisk.
"Approx. Strength in BTG" is cumulative for HQ units is total assessed for across its listed subordinate units. I'm not doing the individual BTG geocords at the moment (largely a lack of info and time required). I also need to further refine some methodology.
Ukrainian units are entirely derived from Militaryland.net which comes only from official press releases from Ukrainian Officials, official statements and Ukrainian news source.
1/ TASS: Executive director of Kurganmashzavod (KMZ) appears to have been asked by the Russian MOD to resume production of "earlier generation BMPs", likely meaning BMP-2's (overhauls and possibly new builds). Currently, they produce mainly BMP-3's/BMD-4M's. Possible explanation
3/ Last run of new build BMP-2's for Russian military was 2005-2006, last for export 2002. Spare parts production continued to maintain existing vehicles. Upgrade programs also existed, the most significant/successful being the BMP-2M.
1/ Hi all, haven't tweeted in a while. I've had some exceptionally bad luck with health recently. I'm fairly confident I got food poisoning over the weekend so I'm out of commission again. I never really expected to get this many followers and I know some of you reached...
2/ out asking where the updates are. I've been working on some projects, but the main thing troubling me lately is a certain lack of rigor when it comes to my sourcing my own analysis. The lack of sourcing would no doubt make most 350F's shudder...
3/ To that end, @simon_huwiler has added a place where I can source each unit's assessed general location. So I've been slowly gathering all the sources I should have meticulously tracked before, up to the beginning of the war. I'm not sure of the exact format yet...
1/ Gone through quite a few materials, now reasonably sure this is a case for 2x 122mm rounds plus charges that was pictured being loaded, apparently at Bronnaya Gara, Belarus several days ago. How I came to this conclusion to follow.
2/ First thing I did was count the # of pixels wide and high the box was. Important thing is the ratio: 530/90 = 5.8. It's at a bit of an angle, so it's hard to tell. If the latches at the top are included, the ratio is about 5.4, so that's the ballpark I went with.
3/ Then I looked through a catalog of box sizes for various munitions I acquired. Was fairly certain it was tube artillery rounds based on what the depot stored, but didn't totally exclude other types of munitions.
1/ Thanks to @DAlperovitch for having me on last night, a few elaborations on what I said on a couple points which I may not have communicated very well in the moment
@DAlperovitch 2/ A mid 90's congressional report put the total number of US artillery projectiles stored at about 25 million (20.8 Army, 400k Marines). This number is available here: govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GA…
@DAlperovitch 3/ Since then, the stock is likely lower based on Cold War production winding down and the closing of several plants. The number serves is useful in that in shows what the scale of Cold War era stockpile was. Soviet numbers were likely higher given they had many more systems.
From @MotolkoHelp about the loading of ammunition in Belarus. Depot mentioned is at 52.612887, 25.066014 near the town of Bronnaya Gara. Not sure how significant this is yet, but interesting enough to do some research on the depot (what it stores and how much) this morning.