1/ Did a culture of institutionalised lying contribute to Russia's recent disaster east of Kharkiv, by giving its senior commanders a distorted and false picture of the true situation on the ground? A 🧵 reviewing the evidence.
2/ While reading Russian soldiers' personal accounts from published intercepted phone calls and personal accounts (link ⬇️), I've seen one point mentioned repeatedly: Russian army officers frequently lie to their superiors about their unit's status.
3/ In his now-famous memoir, the former paratrooper Pavel Filatyev complains bitterly of "the system of photo reports [фотоотчетами] that is now so widespread in the army, when the command hides problems". So what is this system, and how does it work?
4/ As in armies everywhere, Russian officers are expected to write reports to their superiors on their unit's status. In Russia's case, reports appear to be supplemented with photos taken by the officers or the men under their command, depicting their activities.
5/ Russian officers seem to be using photo reports to disseminate false information about their units. Personal accounts from Russian soldiers describe photo reports being used to fake training exercises, presumably to accompany false reports of compliance with orders.
6/ According to former Russian air force lieutenant Gleb Irisov, commanders hold fewer exercises than they are supposed to and disguise the true number, so that they can steal the resources budgeted for them. This likely helps to explain the use of false reporting for exercises.
7/ One army doctor, Pavel Zelenkov, found that in his unit, "All medicine was reduced to window dressing. Before a field trip [i.e. exercise] you get dressed up like for a masquerade, you get photographed – a report is sent to command, everyone returns to their places."
8/ Soldier Daniil Frolkin says that while training in his unit, "we just submitted photo reports. We would arrive at a firing range and stand with a rifle pointed at the target. And as soon you’re photographed, you are free to go."
9/ Even more dangerously – for all involved – photo reports were reportedly used in Frolkin's 64th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade to support commanders' false claims of combat successes. This endangered soldiers lives directly, to their understandable disgust.
10/ In one instance, according to a soldier who spoke to the independent Russian military outlet iStories, commanders forced soldiers to pose for photographic reports against a background of combat vehicles. They would sweep up the dust around them while shells landed nearby.
11/ The brigade's commander reportedly asked his soldiers to provide photo reports to enable him to report to his superiors that "it wasn’t just one tank that was destroyed, it was three! No — five!" Unsurprisingly, such false reporting had bad consequences for him and his men.
12/ Frolkin says, "He had reported that the forest was taken, and then the Deputy Minister of Defence arrived. And it turned out the forest was not taken at all." The commander was injured when the Ukrainians attacked and had to be evacuated in Frolkin's armoured vehicle.
13/ Many Russian soldiers are likely to have died or been wounded as a direct result of false reporting. Soldiers' accounts speak of commanders falsely reporting combat successes, and subsequent attacks being launched on the basis of the false information.
14/ For instance, according to former infantryman Viktor Shyaga, on one occasion, eight helicopters were ordered to support an attack. "Only two of the eight helicopters took off. Others were either broken or had no fuel."
15/ "Only one of the helicopters successfully fired at the objective. Not all the targets were hit. Or in fact, 80% of the targets were not hit. Yet this operation’s commander reported to his leadership that all is well and all the targets were hit..."
16/ As Shyaga notes, "The superior commander believes that if all the targets were hit then he can send infantry with tanks to assault this area." Soldiers were repeatedly sent into strongly defended areas that they were told had been cleared, suffering heavy casualties.
17/ "Twice before the attacks we were told that everything was going to be alright, that the enemy artillery was suppressed, that ahead of us other units of ours are already advancing and we just needed to reach them.
18/ "But each time this turned out to be a lie and ended up with senseless losses for us."
Not surprisingly, Shyaga says, "due to constant lies we couldn’t believe our command anymore."
19/ This was profoundly demotivating for the soldiers, who felt they were being treated like cattle.
Russian soldiers have complained about false reporting in phone calls intercepted and published by the Ukrainians.
20/ One soldier complained: "The army commander is talking crap to the higher command that everything here is fucking awesome, that everything is working, that we have a lot of people.
21/ "For instance they will put forward data… if 26 people are going to attack, they’ll put forward data that 126 people are going into an attack."
22/ Another soldier in a severely depleted unit said: "They have data hanging on the wall in the headquarters that our brigade’s staffing is 87%. Can you believe what these faggots are doing? We won’t even have fucking 10% here! Fuck this shit!"
23/ Russian milbloggers have condemned such false reporting. The Telegram channel Zа (V)Побѣду ("To (V) Victory") commented on this issue, which was said to be a problem on the Kharkiv front, a few days ago.
24/ "Remember Hitler's non-existent divisions, with which he was going to rectify the situation on the front, stop the Russian army from moving, defeat it, and already counterattack and all that? We have roughly the same picture now. The planning is based on reports.
25/ "And the reports are different from the real picture. In reality, the units are staffed only in reports, the equipment is [only] serviceable and staffed according to the state, the so-called volunteer battalions and other PMCs are also burning down."
26/ The consequences of this lying and cheating are likely to have been very grave for the Russian military, and its individual soldiers. Soldiers have spoken of their inadequate training and equipment, which has left them poorly able to cope with the demands of war.
27/ As we've seen, command decisions – where and when to attack, and probably also to defend – have clearly been taken on the basis of false information. This is likely to have caused many needless casualties and military failures. As Zа (V)Побѣду puts it:
28/ "[W]ith [only] a slight onslaught, units that exist 50% only on paper naturally sit down [i.e. collapse]. Not because there is some kind of unprecedentedly serious onslaught, but because these units are [only] very conditionally combat ready."
29/ The practice of false reporting is clearly widespread. It's been reported from Russian units on all fronts and of all specialisations, ranging from paratroopers to mechanised infantry. It likely also occurs in the navy, air and missile forces.
30/ The effect of false reporting is likely to be compounded as it goes up the chain of command. False reports from small unit commanders may be aggregated with more false reports from higher up, to which senior officers add their own false reports.
31/ Eventually, by the time the reports get to the top of the chain – the Russian MOD leadership and Putin himself – it's quite likely that they are so distorted and inaccurate that the people directing the war have a very unrealistic picture of what's happening on the ground.
32/ There likely isn't a single reason why this is happening. It's most likely a combination of institutional corruption (see threads below ⬇️), an emphasis on box-ticking rather than genuine achievement, and unwillingness to report bad news up the chain.
33/ As the Russian "Vostok" battalion commander Aleksandr Khodakovsy puts it in a recent Telegram post, "Everything that happens on the ground stays on the ground, and we will only send to the top the things that will not disturb anyone's sleep.
34/ "That's why they don't allow military correspondents at positions, and if they do, a person with a camera follows them and takes pictures so that the military reporters don't say anything extra...
35/ "And not because the enemy will see it – the enemy knows about it better than us, but because this will be seen by the first [higher-ranking] supervisor."
But if false reporting has infected the entire Russian chain of command, it's likely following a lead set at the top.
36/ Russia holds frequent large-scale exercises, such as Zapad-2021 in the summer of 2021. These certainly look impressive: Zapad was claimed to involve 200,000 men practicing manoeuvres against a hypothetical NATO force. But it seems to have been at least partly faked.
37/ As the New York Times reports, "The whole exercise was scripted. There was no opposing force; the main units involved had practiced their choreography for months; and each exercise started and stopped at a fixed time."
38/ Even the number of troops participating was probably far less, perhaps as few as half the number claimed. @walberque notes: "Nobody is being tested on their ability to think on the battlefield", but only on their ability to follow instructions. The results are obvious today.
39/ Such exercises have been described by Western commentators as PR stunts. That may well be part of it, but I wonder if the bigger issue might be that the military system is so corrupted that those leading it literally have no idea what their army's true situation is. /end
(With thanks to @wartranslated for various of these translations.)
A great indicator of the problem here: "We even found a notebook that contained the medical records of a Russian regiment ... The regiment has hundreds of soldiers, and there was not a single complaint or registered ailment. Not one. That’s impossible."
"The soldiers were clearly told to feed bullshit to the doctors, which created an internal line of bullshit. That bullshit was then reported to their superiors, who fed that bullshit up to central command. So they got a totally fake view of the front." unherd.com/2022/09/why-uk…
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1/ Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with the expectation that it would be a quick intervention lasting only a few weeks. Its soldiers went to war lacking a wide range of what turned out to be essential skills. ⬇️
2/ 'Vault No. 8', a serving Russian soldier warblogging on Telegram, recalls the lack of preparedness for an extended conflict among pre-war contract (professional) soldiers when the invasion was launched on 24 February 2022:
3/ "1. Level of training.
According to the regular personnel themselves, they were proficient with the weapons and equipment assigned to them—they could repair and operate them. At the level of training they had.
1/ Russia appears all but certain to fully block Telegram on 1 April 2026, on the grounds that it promotes frauds, disinformation, and violence. The Russian army has many similar problems; one Russian warblogger asks if the government should consider blocking the army instead. ⬇️
2/ Svatoslav Golikov writes:
"In the light of Roskomnadzor's latest attack on Telegram, it's time to explore some new ideas.
Let me remind you of a recent TASS report (I quote):
"Telegram blocked over 235,000 channels in one day, but the problem is systemic.
3/ "Deputy Anton Nemkin expressed this opinion in a conversation with TASS:
'But let's call things by their proper names: if the number of blocked communities is in the millions, then the problem is not isolated, but systemic.'
1/ The AI boom is leading to drastically higher prices and possible shortages of the Chinese-made fibre-optic cables used by many Russian kamikaze drones. Prices have nearly quadrupled due to a massive increase in demand for fibre optics by data centres. ⬇️
2/ According to Russian media reports, Russian buyers are having to pay between 2.5 to 4 times more for fibre optic cable per kilometre than last year. By 2025, Russia was purchasing about 10.5% of all fibre optic cable produced globally – equivalent to 60 million kilometres.
3/ Russia is entirely dependent on Chinese fibre optic manufacturers. Its only domestic fibre optic manufacturer, JSC Optic Fiber Systems in Saransk, was destroyed by Ukrainian drone strikes in April-May 2025.
1/ Former Russian foreign ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin is very gloomy about Russia's prospects after four years of full-scale war in Ukraine. He criticises the country's "feudal-capitalist regime of revenge" and asks whether Vladimir Putin will "lead it to its decline". ⬇️
2/ Writing on his Telegram channel, Demurin – whose views reflect an ultra-nationalist constituency that has been disappointed by Putin's perceived lacklustre approach to the war – is explicitly critical of Putin's leadership:
3/ "On the fourth anniversary of the launch of the Special Military Operation, I have nothing inspiring to say. The reshaping of Ukraine along Nazi and anti-Russian lines, its militarisation, and the NATO takeover of its territory and political space required a rebuff—that's…
1/ Russian warbloggers continue to reflect on the war in Ukraine entering its fifth year. The 'hurrah-patriotism' of 2022 is now long gone and the mood is bleak. Nikita Tretyakov says there is "nothing left to hope for; all hopes and illusions have been shattered". ⬇️
2/ In comments that illustrate the political dangers which the Putin regime will face when the war ends, Tretyakov – a mobilised paratrooper, military correspondent, and volunteer – writes on his Telegram channel:
3/ "Four years of war is a monstrously long and daunting time. As culture and history have taught us, such an anniversary demands some analysis, conclusions, and a summing up of interim results...
1/ Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin is marking the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – after eight years of war in Donbas, which he did much to start – but he isn't celebrating. He sees a "bleak" outlook of mutual exhaustion, caused by poor leadership. ⬇️
2/ Girkin writes from the prison where he is now half-way through a sentence for "inciting extremism" (i.e. criticising the Russian government's mismanagement of the war):
3/ "Today officially marks the fourth anniversary of the start of the Special Military Operation (although according to some sources, it began two days earlier, but was announced to begin on 24 February 2022).
We arrived at this significant date with extremely negative results.