1/ Did a culture of institutionalised lying contribute to Russia's recent disaster east of Kharkiv, by giving its senior commanders a distorted and false picture of the true situation on the ground? A 🧵 reviewing the evidence.
2/ While reading Russian soldiers' personal accounts from published intercepted phone calls and personal accounts (link ⬇️), I've seen one point mentioned repeatedly: Russian army officers frequently lie to their superiors about their unit's status.
3/ In his now-famous memoir, the former paratrooper Pavel Filatyev complains bitterly of "the system of photo reports [фотоотчетами] that is now so widespread in the army, when the command hides problems". So what is this system, and how does it work?
4/ As in armies everywhere, Russian officers are expected to write reports to their superiors on their unit's status. In Russia's case, reports appear to be supplemented with photos taken by the officers or the men under their command, depicting their activities.
5/ Russian officers seem to be using photo reports to disseminate false information about their units. Personal accounts from Russian soldiers describe photo reports being used to fake training exercises, presumably to accompany false reports of compliance with orders.
6/ According to former Russian air force lieutenant Gleb Irisov, commanders hold fewer exercises than they are supposed to and disguise the true number, so that they can steal the resources budgeted for them. This likely helps to explain the use of false reporting for exercises.
7/ One army doctor, Pavel Zelenkov, found that in his unit, "All medicine was reduced to window dressing. Before a field trip [i.e. exercise] you get dressed up like for a masquerade, you get photographed – a report is sent to command, everyone returns to their places."
8/ Soldier Daniil Frolkin says that while training in his unit, "we just submitted photo reports. We would arrive at a firing range and stand with a rifle pointed at the target. And as soon you’re photographed, you are free to go."
9/ Even more dangerously – for all involved – photo reports were reportedly used in Frolkin's 64th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade to support commanders' false claims of combat successes. This endangered soldiers lives directly, to their understandable disgust.
10/ In one instance, according to a soldier who spoke to the independent Russian military outlet iStories, commanders forced soldiers to pose for photographic reports against a background of combat vehicles. They would sweep up the dust around them while shells landed nearby.
11/ The brigade's commander reportedly asked his soldiers to provide photo reports to enable him to report to his superiors that "it wasn’t just one tank that was destroyed, it was three! No — five!" Unsurprisingly, such false reporting had bad consequences for him and his men.
12/ Frolkin says, "He had reported that the forest was taken, and then the Deputy Minister of Defence arrived. And it turned out the forest was not taken at all." The commander was injured when the Ukrainians attacked and had to be evacuated in Frolkin's armoured vehicle.
13/ Many Russian soldiers are likely to have died or been wounded as a direct result of false reporting. Soldiers' accounts speak of commanders falsely reporting combat successes, and subsequent attacks being launched on the basis of the false information.
14/ For instance, according to former infantryman Viktor Shyaga, on one occasion, eight helicopters were ordered to support an attack. "Only two of the eight helicopters took off. Others were either broken or had no fuel."
15/ "Only one of the helicopters successfully fired at the objective. Not all the targets were hit. Or in fact, 80% of the targets were not hit. Yet this operation’s commander reported to his leadership that all is well and all the targets were hit..."
16/ As Shyaga notes, "The superior commander believes that if all the targets were hit then he can send infantry with tanks to assault this area." Soldiers were repeatedly sent into strongly defended areas that they were told had been cleared, suffering heavy casualties.
17/ "Twice before the attacks we were told that everything was going to be alright, that the enemy artillery was suppressed, that ahead of us other units of ours are already advancing and we just needed to reach them.
18/ "But each time this turned out to be a lie and ended up with senseless losses for us."
Not surprisingly, Shyaga says, "due to constant lies we couldn’t believe our command anymore."
19/ This was profoundly demotivating for the soldiers, who felt they were being treated like cattle.
Russian soldiers have complained about false reporting in phone calls intercepted and published by the Ukrainians.
20/ One soldier complained: "The army commander is talking crap to the higher command that everything here is fucking awesome, that everything is working, that we have a lot of people.
21/ "For instance they will put forward data… if 26 people are going to attack, they’ll put forward data that 126 people are going into an attack."
22/ Another soldier in a severely depleted unit said: "They have data hanging on the wall in the headquarters that our brigade’s staffing is 87%. Can you believe what these faggots are doing? We won’t even have fucking 10% here! Fuck this shit!"
23/ Russian milbloggers have condemned such false reporting. The Telegram channel Zа (V)Побѣду ("To (V) Victory") commented on this issue, which was said to be a problem on the Kharkiv front, a few days ago.
24/ "Remember Hitler's non-existent divisions, with which he was going to rectify the situation on the front, stop the Russian army from moving, defeat it, and already counterattack and all that? We have roughly the same picture now. The planning is based on reports.
25/ "And the reports are different from the real picture. In reality, the units are staffed only in reports, the equipment is [only] serviceable and staffed according to the state, the so-called volunteer battalions and other PMCs are also burning down."
26/ The consequences of this lying and cheating are likely to have been very grave for the Russian military, and its individual soldiers. Soldiers have spoken of their inadequate training and equipment, which has left them poorly able to cope with the demands of war.
27/ As we've seen, command decisions – where and when to attack, and probably also to defend – have clearly been taken on the basis of false information. This is likely to have caused many needless casualties and military failures. As Zа (V)Побѣду puts it:
28/ "[W]ith [only] a slight onslaught, units that exist 50% only on paper naturally sit down [i.e. collapse]. Not because there is some kind of unprecedentedly serious onslaught, but because these units are [only] very conditionally combat ready."
29/ The practice of false reporting is clearly widespread. It's been reported from Russian units on all fronts and of all specialisations, ranging from paratroopers to mechanised infantry. It likely also occurs in the navy, air and missile forces.
30/ The effect of false reporting is likely to be compounded as it goes up the chain of command. False reports from small unit commanders may be aggregated with more false reports from higher up, to which senior officers add their own false reports.
31/ Eventually, by the time the reports get to the top of the chain – the Russian MOD leadership and Putin himself – it's quite likely that they are so distorted and inaccurate that the people directing the war have a very unrealistic picture of what's happening on the ground.
32/ There likely isn't a single reason why this is happening. It's most likely a combination of institutional corruption (see threads below ⬇️), an emphasis on box-ticking rather than genuine achievement, and unwillingness to report bad news up the chain.
33/ As the Russian "Vostok" battalion commander Aleksandr Khodakovsy puts it in a recent Telegram post, "Everything that happens on the ground stays on the ground, and we will only send to the top the things that will not disturb anyone's sleep.
34/ "That's why they don't allow military correspondents at positions, and if they do, a person with a camera follows them and takes pictures so that the military reporters don't say anything extra...
35/ "And not because the enemy will see it – the enemy knows about it better than us, but because this will be seen by the first [higher-ranking] supervisor."
But if false reporting has infected the entire Russian chain of command, it's likely following a lead set at the top.
36/ Russia holds frequent large-scale exercises, such as Zapad-2021 in the summer of 2021. These certainly look impressive: Zapad was claimed to involve 200,000 men practicing manoeuvres against a hypothetical NATO force. But it seems to have been at least partly faked.
37/ As the New York Times reports, "The whole exercise was scripted. There was no opposing force; the main units involved had practiced their choreography for months; and each exercise started and stopped at a fixed time."
38/ Even the number of troops participating was probably far less, perhaps as few as half the number claimed. @walberque notes: "Nobody is being tested on their ability to think on the battlefield", but only on their ability to follow instructions. The results are obvious today.
39/ Such exercises have been described by Western commentators as PR stunts. That may well be part of it, but I wonder if the bigger issue might be that the military system is so corrupted that those leading it literally have no idea what their army's true situation is. /end
(With thanks to @wartranslated for various of these translations.)
A great indicator of the problem here: "We even found a notebook that contained the medical records of a Russian regiment ... The regiment has hundreds of soldiers, and there was not a single complaint or registered ailment. Not one. That’s impossible."
"The soldiers were clearly told to feed bullshit to the doctors, which created an internal line of bullshit. That bullshit was then reported to their superiors, who fed that bullshit up to central command. So they got a totally fake view of the front." unherd.com/2022/09/why-uk…
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1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 3: why many Russians don't want to go to war any more. ⬇️
2/ After Russian warblogger Alex Kartavykh asked his followers on Telegram why "you're ... still fixing a stove in civilian life ... and you're still not storming Pokrovsk", he received no fewer than 4,396 responses. This thread continues a look at what they said.
3/ The first thread in this series summarises what respondents gave as their reasons for not volunteering to go to war:
1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 2: why many Russians don't want to go to war any more. ⬇️
3/ Kartavykh has collated quotes from his respondents into a number of categories, and highlighted representative examples. They provide a rare insight into unfiltered Russian public opinion, which isn't normally on display like this:
3/ Kartavykh has collated quotes from his respondents into a number of categories, and highlighted representative examples. They provide a rare insight into unfiltered Russian public opinion, which isn't normally on display like this:
1/ Recruitment to fight in Ukraine is drying up to the rate of "a teaspoon a day," despite very generous salaries and bonuses, according to a Russian government official. Thousands of Russian Telegram users have responded to explain why they don't want to join the army. ⬇️
2/ Warblogger Alex Kartavykh has written a commentary on why Russian civilians are increasingly wary of signing military contracts, despite very lucrative salaries and bonuses. The reasons why seem to be escaping those responsible for recruitment.
3/ "I recently had an interesting conversation with someone who could, in principle, be considered a representative of the state. He's not to blame for any of our troubles, and in fact, he's basically just passing by, because that's his job description.
1/ Three years of gruelling warfare and constant fear of attack, day and night, has left Russian soldiers exhausted and desperate for it to end, even as fresh soldiers are shovelled into the meat grinder. One soldier describes the grim scene among the hills of western Donetsk. ⬇️
2/ "The chalk mountains, so unassuming against the backdrop of the kilometres-high, snow-capped giants, certainly make a deceptive impression on the traveler from afar. What's the issue with climbing a hundred metres, really?
3/ "Only when you're lugging several dozen kilograms of gear, wearing armour, with stinging blisters instead of heels, with your nose clogged with lime dust, do you begin to curse the damned hills.
1/ Russia's volunteer soldiers (known as kontraktniki) have evolved significantly since the start of the Ukraine war, with the quality of the soldiers steadily decreasing. A Russian commentary describes how the profile of the Russian contract soldier has changed over time. ⬇️
2/ The author of the 'Vault No. 8' Telegram channel, one of the relatively few surviving mobilised soldiers from September 2022, writes of his experience of encountering contract soldiers over the course of 2024 to 2025:
3/ "My first personal encounter with them occurred in January-February 2024, when our regiment was deployed to a rear-area training ground as part of a rotation (for only 20 days, but that's not the point).
1/ Russian UAV specialists are being treated as "slaves" and transferred to extremely high-risk assault squads despite their expertise as engineers and programmers, even in the Russian army's most effective UAV unit, according to a bitterly critical Russian commentary. ⬇️
2/ 'Voenkor Kotenok' has published a commentary, which has since mostly been deleted, on the tendency of the Russian army (here referred to euphemistically as the "Laotian army") to compensate for huge manpower losses by transferring scarce specialists into assault squads.
3/ "This issue is not discussed in high-level meetings—it is considered shameful to speak about it. We are referring to slavery, which emerged in the 21st century in the Laotian army during military operations. There are numerous examples. What are we referring to?