Thread by @shashj

I was struck by @Gottemoeller remark on Tues that Russia could "strike back now in really unpredictable ways" incl tactical nuclear weapons. It's unknowable, but I'm less worried. TNWs wouldn't necessarily halt Ukr advances & could induce NATO intervention economist.com/the-economist-…

I'd also note this point, below, that Russia has many non-nuclear options for escalation (though none of them necessarily effective). The harder question to answer is whether and when defeat in Ukraine comes to be interpreted as a threat to regime survival

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1570029099422195715?s=20&t=bHHQkbBvVofzZMwtXKUzJA

A few other useful pieces. @OlyaOliker in March. "If Russia were to detonate nuclear weapons as part of the invasion, it would run counter to the state’s official doctrine and Vladimir Putin’s stated nuclear plans." foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…

.@BrunoTertrais in July. "The risk of a nuclear weapon being used seems extremely low unless an escalation of the conflict leads Moscow to consider that there could be a threat of an “existential” nature for Russia." trendsresearch.org/insight/the-uk…

.@JohnARaine1: "NATO’s fear of a nuclear exchange as the inevitable or even likely ‘terminus ad quem’ has been ruthlessly leveraged by Putin. He has used it to create a very large space in which he can wage conventional war" iiss.org/blogs/analysis…

Sidharth Kaushal and @Sam_Cranny: "Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons are designed to achieve deterrence and military success against a technologically superior opponent. They are unlikely to be deployed in Ukraine." rusi.org/explore-our-re…

.@james_acton32 in April. "I am legitimately worried that in that circumstance Putin might use a nuclear weapon, most likely on the ground in Ukraine to terrify everyone and get his way. We are not at that point yet." bbc.co.uk/news/world-606…

.@KomissarWhipla on July. "we can conclude that hostilities in Ukraine should not even be seen as a regional war with a peer adversary, therefore it is rather difficult to talk about any role for the TNW." russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-a…

More @KomissarWhipla, from July: Ukraine war "generally has no real targets for ... TNW. Even conventional high-precision long-range weapons do not appear to be used to their full capacity. So far, there are no enemy groups whose size makes them “worthy” of using nuclear weapons"

Kofman and Fink, in 2020: "The Russian military has a visibly different comfort level with nuclear weapons than the US & arguably always will, but it does not write of nuclear escalation in recklessly optimistic terms, incognizant of the associated risks." warontherocks.com/2020/06/escala…

"in contrast w/ Soviet thinking, Russian military does not believe limited nuclear use necessarily leads to uncontrolled escalation. [It] believes calibrated use of conventional & nuc capability is not only possible but may have decisive deterrent effects" warontherocks.com/2020/06/escala…

More Kofman & Fink. "The purpose of limited [nuclear] strikes is to shock or otherwise stun opponents, making them realize the economic, political, and military costs they will pay for further aggression, but also to offer them off-ramps" warontherocks.com/2020/06/escala…

.@jeffaedmonds writing in May. "[Russian] Tactical nukes could be used to target military units to change the operational situation on the ground, although to do so significantly would likely require multiple non-strategic nuclear weapons strikes." thebulletin.org/2022/05/potent…

On the probable visibility of preparations for any TNW use. "The United States will most likely observe the movement of these weapons in real time: by means of satellite surveillance, cameras hidden beside the road, local agents with binoculars." theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…

SWP analysis from April. "as long as NATO does not intervene directly in Ukraine and the Russian regime does not feel existentially threatened, both intentional and unintentional nuclear use remain extremely unlikely." swp-berlin.org/publications/p…

The challenge in analysing potential Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons is understanding how lines between deterrence (which we think of as 'defensive') & coercion ('offensive') can become blurred in some scenarios, and how battlefield dynamics connect to regime (in)security

.@DrRadchenko thread on this issue. "I don't think, for instance, China's or India's positions will matter much when it comes to it...I also don't think that the fact that Shoigu's or Gerasimov's agreement would be required would make much of a difference"

https://twitter.com/DrRadchenko/status/1570340180631887872?s=20&t=bHHQkbBvVofzZMwtXKUzJA

.@Jack_Watling yesterday: "the Kremlin could embrace a populist approach and promise to resolve grievances through decisive action ... The placation of [hard-line nationalists] is this path that most plausibly leads to tactical nuclear use in Ukraine." rusi.org/explore-our-re…

Aleksey Arbatov: "Incidentally, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima that killed 90,000 people had the power of 15 kilotons and would be classified today as a low-yield tactical warhead" russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-a…