During a crisis leaders often encourage unity. At the same time, polarization is increasing - and a crisis can be used to shed further negative light on opponents.
How did these competing incentives shape elite rhetoric during the pandemic?, asks @MJHeseltine at #APSA2022 1/5
The data is 20 million tweets from 6 English-speaking countries, using classifiers of polarizing rhetoric in COVID-19-related tweets. 2/5
Analyses show that there was a massive spike in covid tweets in March 2020, in particular in the US and Canada. At the same time, in spring '20, there is a strong decrease in polarization but it increases again after a few months. 3/5
As the pandemic unfolds, covid-related tweets begin to become more polarized than non-covid tweets, especially in Australia. As covid cases increased, there are more tweets on covid and also more polarizing content. 4/5
To understand polarization during the pandemic, it is key to focus on the entire timeline. The beginning was characterized by a dip in polarization but, as the crisis unfolded, covid became a polarizing topic in itself. 5/5
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At #APSA2022, Tsveta Petrova asks: Do political scandals mobilize populist voters because it gives proof of "corrupt elites"? And what happens if it is the populist elites that are the focus of the scandal? 1/5
The dataset are data on political scandals in Hungary and Poland from 2000 to 2020. This includes scandals related to legality, morality and democratic violations. This is connected to data on electoral support (i.e., vote shares). 2/5
The data shows that populist elites are heavily involved in scandals when they come to power. But having populist in power also increases scandals among the opposition, in part, because the populists use official media to target the opposition. 3/5
Populists in power undermine democratic institutions but are these actions aligned with the preferences of their voters?, asks Tsveta Petrova at #APSA2022 1/5
In general, some prior research suggests that populist supports are loyal to pluralist democracy. Other research suggests that populist supporters do not, in fact, support democracy. 2/5
A third possibility is that populist voters support a particular form of democracy: majoritarian democracy, where decisions reflect the "will of the people". 3/5
At #APSA2022, Natasha Wunsch asks why voters tolerate democratic backsliding, focusing on the Hungarian case. 1/9
The puzzle is why citizens who state they support democracy still support undemocratic leaders? There is a growing literature on partisanship and how group psychology produce acceptance of inparty candidates, even if they are undemocratic. 2/9
But these findings are not entirely reproducible. Instead, it may be that there is heterogeniety among supporters of authoritarian politics. The party essentially builds a large voter coalition and this enables them to stay in power. 3/9
At APSA2022, @ArifMemovic asks why Americans sometimes are willing to excuse political violence? 1/7
The common sense notion is that political violence is prohibited in democracies. But there is political violence and surveys show some (and increasing) support for political violence. But this is controversial & there are a larger methods discussion about the survey evidence 2/7
In the present study, it is asked whether people evaluate acts of political violence depending on the severity of the act and the identity of the perpetrator?
In other words, are all acts judged equally? Are people act- or identity-centered? 3/7
At #APSA2022, @EricGroenendyk asks how perceptions of politics as conflict shape other political attitudes.
While many often see politics as conflict over resources, it may also be conceptualized as joint problem-solving. Does perceptions of this matter? 1/10
This is part of a larger project. In a published paper, it has already been shown that politics-as-conflict activates motivated reasoning. The present results focus on how politics-as-conflict perceptions shape political engagement. 2/10
Prior research suggests that conflict orientations increases engagement in politics. This raises the question of whether participatory democracy is even compatible with delibrative problem-solving democracy? 3/10
At #APSA2022, @Bryan_Gervais asks whether elite political incivility polarizes the electorate?
There are two camps: One says 'yes' and one says 'no'. The latter camp argues that incivility may in fact depolarize.
But: May the effect depend on the conditions of incivility? 1/6
When may in-elite hostility polarize? Perhaps in competitive elections where status threats are clear. Prior research shows that status threats lead to preferences for aggression. But when status threats are not clear, incivility might be rejected by partisans. 2/6
The data comes from four experiments in online surveys. The timing of these surveys differed in their distance to a competitive election. In the surveys, participants are exposed to civil versus incivil political statements from in-party elites. 3/6