*Do Russians support general mobilization?* Since early June, we've regularly asked respondents to what extent they'd support a general mobilization in 🇷🇺 to advance the "special military operation" in 🇺🇦. On avg, ~20% of Russians would support gen. mob., while ~80% oppose. 1/
Men and women tend to show similarly low levels of support for general mobilization: ~22% of women and ~19% of men either "fully support" or "generally support" the policy. 2/
But we see striking differences across age groups: ~39% of respondents aged 18-24 support gen. mob., while a mere 11% of respondents >54 y.o. do. This is surprising, given that younger ppl (men in particular) wld be more likely to be affected by mass conscription. 3/
Amidst speculation that 🇷🇺 might take drastic measures to increase its forces in 🇺🇦 in light of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the Kremlin has denied any plans to declare mobilization: themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/13/rus…. 4/
Expect further insights in the coming days on Russian views abt increasing the size of the 🇷🇺 military. As always, check out our website for more findings: russiawatcher.com. END/
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What is the relationship btwn support for the "special military operation" and television consumption in 🇷🇺? We found that on average, the more often Russians encounter info abt the SMO on TV, the higher their level of support for the "operation." 1/
This comes as no surprise, given the hawkish rhetoric and propaganda that is regularly broadcast on Russian TV channels--which are both highly popular sources of news and tightly controlled by the state. 2/
In fact, ~62% of our respondents encounter info abt the SMO in Ukraine on television more than once a day. Only ~7% said they never get info on the SMO from TV. [Note that these figures exclude don't know/ NA responses.] 3/
What do Russians think about Ukrainian counteroffensive? A preview: as 🇷🇺 state narrative shifted from initial denial to (partial) acknowledgment of 🇺🇦 gains, Russians increasingly (a) believe that an offensive is occurring & (b) view it as a threat. russiawatcher.com/counteroffensi… 1/
At first, 🇷🇺 media denied that 🇺🇦 offensive was taking place (ria.ru/20220829/khers…). Then they claimed 🇺🇦 had tried but failed to mount an offensive (ria.ru/20220829/nastu…). 2/
Recently, 🇷🇺 has acknowledged "regrouping" and "temporary successes" of 🇺🇦 mil (radiosputnik.ria.ru/20220912/lnr-1…). As the narrative has shifted, so have Russians' beliefs abt what's going on in 🇺🇦. 3/
❗️New blog post: support for the "special military operation" by demographic group. Although majority of Russians (~74% overall) support the SMO, we do see interesting variation across gender⚧️, age🎂, and education level👩🎓. Some basic findings: 1/ russiawatcher.com/war-support-in…
(1) Men support the SMO more than women. On avg, 77.8% of men claim to support SMO, while 71.2% of women do. Women are also more likely to give "don't know" & NA responses: 17.2% compared to 8% for men. 2/
(2) Older people support the SMO more than younger people. Among respondents aged 18-24, support is at 59.4%. For each successive age group, avg level of support is higher. Among respondents > 54 y.o., avg SMO support reaches 78.9%. 3/